Seminar with Klaus-Ulrich Schmolke (Universität Mainz)
Law makers increasingly try to capitalize on individuals having acquired knowledge of corporate crimes or other misconduct by inducing them to blow the whistle. In a laboratory experiment we measure the effectiveness of incentives on the willingness to report such misconduct to a sanctioning authority. We find that fines for non-reporting insiders, rewards and even simple commands increase the probability of whistleblowing. We find the strongest effect for fines. Situational determinants also influence the willingness to blow the whistle: insiders who are negatively affected by the misconduct are more likely to blow the whistle than non-affected or profiting insiders. Those (negatively affected) victims are also sensitive to the misconduct’s impact on the authority sanctioning the misconduct (public authority or employer): whistleblowing is more likely if the enforcement authority is negatively affected compared to positively or not affected.
Time & Location
7 February 2024 | 6:00–7:30 p.m.
In-person & online
Law School | Boltzmannstraße 3 | Room 4404
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