Uhl: Introducing a criminological bribery game. An experimental research design for the analytic study of corrupt decision-making
Seminar with Andrzej Uhl (University of Cambridge)
The seminar is part of the seminar series Preventing Corporate Misconduct.
Why do certain people engage in corruption despite its well-known negative consequences? And why do some refuse to? To find answers to these questions, my presentation explores the scholarly literature through an analytic lens and challenges the established theories of action present in the discipline. Corruption, I will argue, cannot be reduced to a rational choice or a cultural habit but should also be studied as moral action and criminal offence. An alternative approach informed by the situational action theory of crime causation is proposed to organise the extant knowledge about corruption. Its methodological implications guide the design of an experimental study aimed at testing core hypotheses about how corruption emerges. Introducing my envisioned research, I will discuss the development and pilotage of an experiment situated between a behavioral bribery game and a factorial survey studying the interplay of personal and environmental factors.
Time & Location
12 January 2024 | 2:00–3:30 p.m.
In-person & online
Business School | Thielallee 73 | Room 013
Join via fuels.berlin/webex