Transnationalism and Subnational Paradiplomacy:

Is this Perforated Sovereignty or Are Democracy and Civil Society Just Reaching Across Borders?

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ABSTRACT

Has the traditional view of the nation-state as the only sovereign actor in international relations given way to a new model with globalization, the rise of subnational governments, and the potential weakening of the state implied by the governance and networks literature? Cross-border interactions now involve an enlarged cast of characters and much theoretical literature suggests that the nation-state is therefore losing power. This research seeks to validate this through survey research of the Pacific Salmon Commission, a binational organization established under the Canada-U.S. Pacific Salmon Treaty in 1985. While such institutions have assumed a significant role in international relations, this research sought to determine if this represents a reduction of national sovereignty through increased power for either non-state actors or subnational governments.

INTRODUCTION

International borders are one type of boundary and they are used frequently as barriers rather than bridges because the reigning model of world governance is based on the sovereignty of the nation-state. The nation-state, however, has not always been the dominant conduit for collective action and may give way to developing forms of collective organization as the world progresses. In the meantime, networks and network structures are holding things together reasonably well without having to abandon the nation-state model. The success of these networks may be dependent on their ability to solve problems that cross national borders while avoiding the appearance of impinging upon national sovereignty. Indeed, the argument has been made that
a patchwork of network structures may be emerging in the 21st century with a degree of sovereignty that rivals or exceeds that of 20th century nation-states (Mingus, In Press).

The traditional view of the relationship between two sovereign nation-states is that diplomats for the national units of government serve as the primary interface, with politicians showing up to close deals and shake hands in front of the cameras. The more contentious the issue, the greater the role for elected officials and the more advance work required by the diplomatic corps. The more the issue is viewed as a technical or scientific issue, the more public administrators enter the picture to assist politicians and diplomats in developing policies and stamping out the required level of detail.

This view has changed dramatically with globalization, the rise of subnational governments, and the potential weakening of the state implied by the “governance” and “networks” literature. Interactions across national boundaries are now thought to be highly complex and involve an enlarged cast of characters, including nation-states, subnational governments, quasi-governmental organizations, and an array of private and non-profit organizations. Whereas astute politicians and diplomats might always have been in close contact with this enlarged cast, the newer view is that this enlarged cast is directly involved in cross-border relationships and may even undermine the traditional approach to international relations and the sovereignty of nations.

This article discusses this new view of international relationships and presents the results of survey research on the Pacific Salmon Commission (PSC) supranet, which was designed to measure the extent of involvement by transnational organizations and subnational governments. As introduced elsewhere, a supranet is a cross-border network of within-border networks, termed subnetworks or subnets (Mingus, 2001).
The PSC is a binational organization established under the Canada-U.S. Pacific Salmon Treaty in 1985. While it seems clear that regional, international institutions have assumed a significant role in managing complex cross-border policy problems, this survey research sought to determine if there really is a movement of power away from the traditional nation-state (national politicians, diplomats, and administrators). Such a movement of power might reveal itself through increased power for either non-state actors (non-profit organizations, private businesses, etc.) or subnational units of government (states, provinces, municipalities, etc.). The use of this specific case involves the additional complication of Tribal governments, which are a complicating factor because they have a different legal status in the Southern U.S., Canada, and Alaska.

TRANSNATIONALISM

Borders are created as cognitive structures (“us” as opposed to “them”) and as legal structures (so “we” can achieve wealth, democracy, and so forth without the need to share these things; so “they” can maintain a dictatorship rather than embracing “our” principles). The solid lines on maps represent sovereignty while dotted lines might be more in sync with the interconnected existence of the 21st century. These borders are surplus structure with regard to numerous issues because the nations being separated are not individuatable with regard to the policy, program, resource, or issue of concern. Another way to state this argument is that networks and network structures are now frequently viewed as constructs to help societies maintain the belief that national borders are still meaningful although for numerous specific policies these borders have disappeared or are counterproductive.

For example, in “Managing Transboundary Resources” Ingram, Milich, and Varady demonstrate the impact of domestic water planning decisions in a border region in Southern
Arizona and Northern Mexico. They stress the concept of “bridging borders” through binational regional institutions that represent state, local, and nongovernmental interests and state that such institutions must “fit into the already crowded space of existing institutions by cooperating and helping existing institutions reach their goals” (Ingram, Milich and Varady, 1994, 37). Transnational actors such as corporations and NGOs are touted as part of the solution.

More recently, Ali Farazmand (1999, 512-513) stressed that surplus accumulation of corporate capital has “crossed territorial borders and transcended national boundaries for decades,” that the search for new markets and cheaper labor has taken capitalism global, that corporate restructuring has increasing lead to transworld corporations and that a “concentration of corporate power at the global level [includes] the creation of a global ruling class.” This corporate model is dependent on government, however, because capitalism relies on a strong state to create stable economic, political, and social environments so that it can thrive.

Ironically, this line of reasoning might mean that borders are essential to increasing globalization. Without national borders it would be difficult to maintain the disparities of wages, unionization, regulations, and other conditions that have created the so-called efficiencies that drive corporate growth. Indeed, it would be even more difficult to quell social unrest (with martial law, social programming, and/or military intervention) as necessary to allow production and exploitation to continue. Significant disparities can certainly exist from region to region within any given nation, but it seems plausible that few nations would allow the extent of social and economic disparities that corporate globalization stands accused of.

Farazmand (1999, 514) concludes that, “Globalization has not brought about the end of the state and its bureaucracy; nor will it result in a decline of the state in the future. On the other hand, David Rosenbloom states that “globalization promotes policy diffusion and convergence among nations” (1999, 491). Rosenbloom presents constitutional schemes, administrative
cultures, and political coalitions as barriers to convergence, but he does not fully discuss the power of the corporate sector to push for or resist convergence.

Herbert Dittgen seems to find a middle road here, although he agrees with Farazmand that “equating economic globalization with the end of the nation-state may be a false conclusion” (Dittgen, 1999, 169). In Dittgen’s perspective, international politics increasingly involves transnational and non-governmental actors and international relations are increasingly determined by international regimes and organizations. However, sovereignty and the meaning of the border are not lost because borders serve five functions: the traditional military/national defense function, the legal/constitutional function, the economic function, the ideological/nationalistic function, and the social-psychological function (Dittgen, 1999, 167-172). Globalization of production, distribution, and financing challenge the sovereignty of nation-states primarily with regard to the economic function, although transnational regimes such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) also help converge social and environmental policies as suggested by Rosenbloom.

Finally, Philip Cerny spins these ideas in a useful manner by suggesting that the end of the Cold War marked an end to further centralization of the benefits of the international system. In effect, international mechanisms have been losing effectiveness at preventing defection by nation-states (“defection from above”) and also by non-state, subnational, and transnational actors (“defection from below”) (Cerny, 2000). In other words, the structural dominance of the nation-state in the international system has been reduced and the world is left with a system that is less stable, less driven by Western powers, and more democratic in the sense that transnational actors, weaker nations, and subnational units of government are increasingly empowered to act in their own best interests.
Ultimately this body of literature is largely theoretical and supports the need to empirically assess the impact of transnationalism by examining specific relationships.

SUBNATIONAL PARADIPLOMACY

In addition to transnational actors, there is substantial support for the idea that subnational units of government have become serious actors on the international stage. The idea that federal systems of government have led to a deterioration of the sovereignty of national governments within the nation-state model has been supported by numerous researchers (Boeckelman, 1996; Duchacek, 1990; Elazar, 1987; Soldatos, 1990). Concentration of power may be giving way to an international model where power is granted or dispersed based on what is appropriate for the specific issue or policy at hand. Phrases such as “perforated sovereignty” and “paradipomacy” describe this phenomenon quite well (Duchacek, 1990).

Problems in the most visible state-centric relations do not necessarily disturb interactions in transgovernmental and transnational relations (Fox and Hero, 1976). The distinction is that state-centric relations are the highest level international relations between two countries, generally involving diplomatic relations and political relations; transgovernmental relations occur at lower levels within the bureaucracies of each nation, including subnational units of government; and transnational relations are nongovernmental, often involving corporate interests, professional organizations that cross the border, and non-profit organizations that are active in each nation. Fox and Hero analyze the interrelationship of these three areas and conclude that “the capacity of the highest policy levels in Canada and the United States to regulate or counteract transnational and transgovernmental relations between the two countries has never kept up with changes in the pattern of these relationships” (1976, 407).
States and Provinces As Global Actors

Globalization of the economy, driven by ease of international communications and reduced shipping costs, has allowed state and provincial governments to become international actors (Brown, Fry and Groen, 1993; Rosenau, 2000). There are over 180 sovereign nations and close to 300 federated or subnational units of governmental, not counting municipal governments. The startling reality according to Earl Fry is that, “Among the twenty-five leading nations in the world ranked by gross national product (GNP), one could insert ten states . . . and among the top seventy-five nations, all fifty states” (1993, 124). More than 40 governors apply this economic clout by leading at least one international trade mission each year. Several interesting explanations exist for this growing international activity by the states, including the thirteen-fold increase in real terms in global trade in goods and services from 1950 to 1990, the uneven distribution of economic gains among the states, the growth in the states’ capacity to interact with international actors, and a willingness on the part of the federal government to permit the states to strengthen these international linkages (Fry, 1993, 125-128).

One concern about this trend is that civil disobedience on the part of state governments should not be allowed by the federal government--states should be able to speak their minds but must ultimately keep in line with existing federal policies in the international arena (Fry, 1993, 135). This seems to ignore the possibility that legitimate areas of subnational jurisdiction within a constitutional framework may be driving subnational governments to interact outside their national borders.

Subnational governments also play a number of important roles in international negotiations. For example, states provided useful information from localities to the central government during negotiations on the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Also, sensitive political issues can often be redefined into lower-level, administrative terms by subnational
agencies to reduce external pressures on the central government while national governments have developed international communications and networks that can prove useful to subnational governments (Hocking, 1993, 70).

According to Brian Hocking, much research on what he terms “the localization of foreign relations” assumes incompatible interests rather than seeking to place subnational governments within the national foreign policy process. His emphasis is on “the interrelatedness of the domestic and international political environments and the need for national policy makers to conduct diplomacy in both theatres simultaneously if they are to succeed in achieving their objectives” (Hocking, 1993, 3). While Hocking admits that the international interests of subnational governments are more limited in scope and more economic in orientation than those of national governments, he insists that the discussion is about intergovernmental relations at least as much as foreign affairs and that it would be misleading to dismiss subnational governments as second-order actors because they frequently have constitutional standing and habitualized processes for intergovernmental collaboration.

While linkage mechanisms have increased significantly, State departments may regard them as a way to contain subnational international activities while states and provinces may see them as a way to increase their influence at the center. In the U.S., the creation of Intergovernmental Affairs sections in federal departments increased the institutional capacity for coordination of these issues. In Canada, provincial governments have been more forceful in claiming the right to participate directly in the negotiating process (Hocking, 1993, 79). The development of linkage mechanisms has not precluded conflict between central and non-central governments on domestic or international issues, but it has demonstrated that subnational governments have a legitimate role to perform in international diplomacy.
State-Provincial Relations

In practice, Congress has determined that transborder interactions by state governments do not always require consent as described in Article I, Section 10, of the U.S. Constitution. On the Canadian side the Constitution gives the provinces joint jurisdiction on immigration and agriculture, and generally strong involvement in treaties dealing with powers under their purview. This gives the provinces generally greater autonomy in conducting transborder relations than the states (except Salmon are primarily under federal jurisdiction in Canada).

While there has been an increase in formal governmental institutions between Canada and the United States, these institutions do not constitute the core of the bilateral relationship. Transgovernmental relations, defined as the noninstitutionalized relationships between subunits of governments and the activities they undertake that remain reasonable immune from central control, are said to form the core (Holsti and Levy, 1976). This subnational collaboration takes various forms, including informal linkages, formal agreements, and joint membership in transborder intergovernmental organizations. Holsti and Levy suggest that province-state interaction is increasingly occurring because of a felt need to collaborate on issues that are within the jurisdiction of these subnational governments and that cross-border administrative interaction closely resembles interprovincial and interstate collaboration (Holsti and Levy, 1976, 295-296).

Roger Swanson conducted a survey for the U.S. Department of State to determine the extent of “currently operative processes” in which there was “direct communication between state and provincial officials on an ongoing basis” (1978, 232). He found a total of 766 state-provincial interactions, of which the 14 border states accounted for nearly two-thirds of the activity. These relationships were divided into agreements, understandings, and arrangements, respectively defined by decreasing levels of formality. Over 70% of the interactions were
categorized as arrangements, as opposed to the more formal agreements and understandings, indicating that “state/provincial interaction is largely an informal affair” (Swanson, 1978, 237).

While this research is from the mid-1970s, it has not been updated since that time. Much of the informality likely continues to this day, although some formal state-provincial institutions have developed. For example, the Eastern Canadian Premiers-New England Governors have regular meetings (Lubin, 1993) and a similar sense of regionalism has developed in the Pacific Northwest (Kaplan, 1998).

Canadian-American relations, unlike most international relations, are not characterized by the deliberate linking of various significant issues or concerns. In other words, if a strong dispute exists on cross-border investment, for example, neither country will likely threaten to cease the auto pact or some other significant agreement. Fox and Hero state that “it is neither in the interest of the bureaucrats where they are involved in an issue to do anything but ensure that it is strictly channeled nor in the interest of the weaker country to permit any packaging of issues” (Fox and Hero, 1976, 410). Although issues may not be linked or packaged, Swanson noted the interpenetration or intertwining of policy issues between the two nations, which made traditionally domestic issues the subject of foreign policy debate. This provides one more reason why there is intensive interaction between state and provincial governments within this binational relationship.

CASE OF THE PACIFIC SALMON COMMISSION

Methodology

In order to test for the existence of these newer modes of international relations a network analysis survey of the Pacific Salmon Commission was mailed to all individuals represented within the PSC committee structure, including the commissioners, the four regional panels, the
working groups and technical committees, and other miscellaneous committees. This is the core of the supranet depicted in Figure 1. The research questions were: *Do members of the Pacific Salmon Commission supranet identify key organizational contacts from a broad range of organizational types or primarily from the public sector?* and *When public sector organizations are identified as key organizational contacts, are they primarily from national or subnational units of government?*

The network analysis survey was designed to take 30 minutes to complete and included sections on background information, organizational contacts, and potential causes of conflict. With regard to organizational contacts the respondent was asked to identify the ten organizations “with which you have the most contact” and then was asked to “rank order the five organizations that are most significant to your work with the PSC.” For each of the four highest ranked organizations the respondent was then asked a series of questions about the nature of the relationship and the issues that were relevant for the relationship.

The official PSC mailing list included 208 unduplicated individuals officially serving within this network structure and they constituted the population for this cross sectional survey. Individuals frequently serve in multiple positions, technical committees form most of this network structure, and alternate representatives within each group are treated as members for all purposes. Thirteen surveys were “returned to sender” or “not involved with the PSC at the present time,” thus reducing the number of delivered survey instruments to 195 individuals that represented the core of the PSC supranet. A follow-up mailing containing an identical copy of the survey instrument was sent to all non-responders one month after the initial mailing.

Completed surveys included 83 from the first wave and 28 from the second wave, totaling 111 completed surveys for a 56.9% response rate. These respondents were representative of the supranet in terms of geographical location and their assignments within the PSC structure.
Figure 1. Pacific Salmon Commission Supranet
Six responders were on the PSC itself and 33 were on the four key panels--Southern Panel, Fraser River Panel, Northern Panel, and Transboundary Panel.

Types of Organizations

For the purposes of this study the top-10 organizations listed by each respondent were coded to represent the categories in Table 1. In keeping with the research questions, the purpose of this coding was: (1) to distinguish between national governmental organizations and all other organizations, (2) to distinguish between national and subnational governments, (3) to keep Tribal governments in a separate category, and (4) to assess the extent of non-state organizations such as non-profit organizations and private industry.

The middle column in Table 1 provides examples of frequently mentioned organizations to provide a better feel for the data. While the author was familiar with nearly all of the organizations that respondents listed on their top-10 lists, there was no previous research on the influence or impact of these organizations within the Pacific Salmon Treaty process.

Non-state actors

Thinking in terms of networks and especially supranets runs the risk of devaluing the status of governments. Governments are responsible for making decisions in the public interest--broadly defined--and networks may conceivably narrow the definition of public interest if such public/private networks become the primary sources of input for administrators or if administrators are on an equal footing in a system where the network is making the decisions. Several critics of the PST structure and operations suggest this is the case with regard to Pacific salmon and that fishing industry voices, especially commercial fishers, drive both the agreements and disagreements within the existing process, often to the detriment of the salmon, the
Table 1. Frequency of Organization Type Among Top-10 Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Most Frequent Examples</th>
<th>Number (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. National Governments</td>
<td></td>
<td>227 (25.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Actors</td>
<td>Canada Dept of Fisheries and Oceans (72)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Marine Fisheries Services (75)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Actors</td>
<td>Pacific Fisheries Management Council (13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission (14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Tribal Governments and First Nations</td>
<td>189 (21.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councils</td>
<td>Lummi Indian Tribe (6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quinault Indian Nation (12)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tahltan First Nation (9)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taku River Tlingit First Nation (11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tulalip Tribe (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Actors</td>
<td>B.C. Aboriginal Fisheries Comm. (8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission (29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. State and Provincial Governments</td>
<td>234 (26.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Alaska Governor’s Office (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agencies</td>
<td>Alaska Dept of Fish and Game (55)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oregon Dept of Fish and Wildlife (44)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Washington Dept of Fish and Wildlife (56)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Actors</td>
<td>B.C. Sport Fishing Advisory Council (15)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Point No Point Treaty Council (7)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Municipal Governments</td>
<td>8 (0.9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Pacific Salmon Commission</td>
<td>57 (6.4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Non-profit Organizations</td>
<td>154 (17.3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gear Groups and Vessel Owners Associations</td>
<td>Alaska Trollers Assn (18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Purse Seine VOA (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southeast Alaska Seiners Assn (11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>B.C. Wildlife Federation (6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northern Southeast Aquaculture Assn (10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Southeast Aquaculture Assn. (9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Private Sector/Corporate Actors</td>
<td>23 (2.6%)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

environment, and even the local fishing communities (Bergman and Haw, 1998; Glavin, 1998). Kathleen Miller summed this up this view nicely when she said, “However, perhaps the best description of management within each jurisdiction still is that it represents an effort to prevent the worst excesses of over harvesting while appeasing a vociferous collection of competing user groups” (Miller, 1996, 117).
Rather than devaluing government, developing clear descriptions of network dynamics may be a useful application of the network approach as a heuristic device to identify specific potential problems in democratic administration. If all relevant interests are not included in the networks of public administrators and elected officials, then democratic administration may be derailed by the power of selected interests. How those working on a particular issue define “relevant” may be an important clue. For example, in spite of persistent conflicts, the PSC subnets on both sides of the border tend to value (1) the role of scientists in providing information to make resource utilization decisions; (2) the application of analytical techniques to identify problems and prepare useful plans; (3) the use of the political process for reaching decisions in specific situations (often choosing both means and ends); and (4) the rights of groups, particularly those with vested economic interests, to be involved in the decision-making process.

The stakeholders’ process in Spring 1997 sought to increase the role of direct fishing interests by removing the various governments from the negotiations and having representatives of the fishing industry on each side of the border deal directly with each other. Public records on this process are minimal and so informant interviews must be relied upon for an accurate description—they consistently reported that the purpose was to force the fishers to make the tough tradeoffs while looking directly into the eyes of the competing fishers and that only one government “observer” from each side was involved in the process for each group. The observers were to help answer technical questions and to locate information to respond to requests from the industry representatives.

One problem with this process is that the mindset of the process absolved government of its essential responsibility to represent the public interest. There is no denying that in both nations the salmon resource is a public resource until someone lawfully removes the fish from
the water, but the process provided a strong role for the user groups and the respective
governments failed to take over to reach an agreement that was reasonable to the users and
protective of the public resource. Donald Kettl (1993, 39) illuminates this common problem:

Even as the sharing of responsibilities between the public and private sectors blurs
the boundaries between them, the separate interests of each sector remain. The
most important issue is whether the sharing of public and private power endangers
the public interest that the government is obliged--by the Constitution, by law,
and by public will--to pursue.

The general consensus is that Canadian stakeholders were well represented in the PSC
prior to the stakeholders’ process. While the three states may have fishing industry involvement
in their networks, they have far less fishing industry representation within the PSC structure. Part
of the reason for this is that so many Indian and non-Indian governments are involved in the U.S.
Section that more seats are taken by public servants so that each government is represented.
Alaska has more industry representation within the PSC than Oregon and Washington, but still
falls short of the Canadian model. This difference in the networks explains why U.S.
stakeholders might view the process as occurring primarily between government officials and
thus push for something like the stakeholders’ process.

In contrast, British Columbia stakeholders are represented but may not feel heard because
of the dynamic that puts the Department of Fisheries and Oceans firmly in charge. Concepts of
representative bureaucracy are more a part of the American model than the British-based
Canadian model. Thus, the Canadian Minister of Fisheries largely determines how and when
constituent’s voices will be heard. Minister Tobin was a hero to the fishers while Ministers
Mifflin and Anderson implemented sizeable reductions in the Pacific salmon fishery.

Within each network it is clear that fishing interests have a great deal of knowledge to
share with fishery managers as well as a measure of political influence. At the same time, the
managers know that the fishing interests are economically motivated and believe they will
consistently push for the highest catch possible. As governmental entities, the tribes face these same pressures from their fishers. A key reason why the stakeholders’ process broke down at the end, according to the majority of my informants, was that representatives found it difficult to negotiate away a portion of the catch for their groups. The stakeholders reportedly made strong progress and governments were unwilling to “close the deal” and “take the last step.”

As demonstrated in Figure 2, governmental organizations far outweighed non-governmental organizations when PSC supranet members listed the top-10 organizations with which they have the most contact. Over half of the organizations listed by the respondents were national, state, and local government agencies while 21% were Tribal governments and associations of tribal governments and just over 6% were parts of the Pacific Salmon Commission itself, a quasi-governmental organization. That left 20.4%—just over one fifth—in the category of non-state actors. That seems surprisingly low within a system where critics and even mainstream researchers claim the industry is “running the show.”

Figure 2. Types of “Most Significant” Organizations--Government Verses Non-Governmental
Furthermore, as respondents are asked on the survey to rank the top-5 and top-2 most significant organizations they have contact with in relation to the PSC, Figure 2 shows that local, state, and national governments increase from 52.2% to 65.9%, at the expense of Tribal and particularly non-state actors. The percentage for the PSC itself remains remarkably stable.

Interestingly, the data fails to show a statistically significant correlation between the type of organization the respondent is most strongly identified with and the types of organizations listed by that respondent. In other words, it is not just government employees selecting government agencies, people from the vessel owners associations, seafood processors, and Tribal associations are also highly likely to be selecting government agencies as their most significant organizations.

Subnational Governments

One might expect to find a weakening of the traditional political-diplomatic role in this specific case because it was convincingly demonstrated 25 years ago that the U.S.-Canada relationship is highly informal and that subnational governments have a strong role in this binational relationship (Swanson, 1978). In other words, the Canada-U.S. relationship has a high degree of interaction at “lower” levels of government and within their respective national bureaucracies. In this sense, if traditional nation-states were starting to lose their sovereignty, this particular binational relationship--the largest trading relationship in the world at $1.2 billion per day--would likely be one of the first international relationships where such fractures would be apparent.

The data in Figure 3 appears to provide strong support for the active role of subnational governments. Roughly one quarter of the organizations selected are national government agencies with one-quarter being state and provincial government agencies. Another one-fifth are
tribal governments and Tribal associations. It is difficult to categorize the Tribal responses because in the Southern U.S. the Treaty Tribes are sovereign governments while in Alaska and British Columbia they have some aspects of sovereignty and some aspects more akin to municipal governments. Nevertheless, this means that in the top-10 lists of the respondents, 47.1% are subnational governments of some kind and in the top-2 lists this still stays high at 45.3%.

The pattern in Figure 3 is particularly enlightening about the nature of the PSC supranet and seems quite meaningful given the high response rate for this survey. Specifically, as respondents are forced to be more selective, the percentage listing national government agencies increases from by 9.7% and the percentage listing state and provincial agencies increases by 4.7% while the percentage listing Tribal governments and associations decreases by 6.5% and the percentage listing non-profit organizations and the private sector declines by 7.1%. This
supports the view that a complex array of actors are involved in the PSC supranet, but the most significant actors, when respondents are forced to choose, are national and subnational governments. The PSC, once again, remains remarkably stable.

SOVEREIGNTY LOST OR DEMOCRATIC EXPANSION?

The first research question for this study was Do members of the Pacific Salmon Commission supranet identify key organizational contacts from a broad range of organizational types or primarily from the public sector? While a broad range of organizational types are identified, the most significant organizations are predominantly governmental. This indicates that the core of the PSC supranet remains in governmental hands rather than in the hands of non-state actors. In addition it would be difficult to argue that there are fewer non-state actors but that they are more important. That case is not supported for two reasons. The first is that when respondents rank their Top 5 and Top 2 most significant organizations, the percentage of non-state actors drops precipitously. The second reason is that no non-state actor garners more than 18 mentions out of the 892 mentions in the respondents’ Top 10 lists (see Table 1). In contrast, the Canada Department of Fisheries and Oceans receives 72 mentions and the Alaska Department of Fish and Game receives 55 mentions.

The second research question was: When public sector organizations are identified as key organizational contacts, are they primarily from national or subnational units of government? On this question it is clear that subnational governments maintain a great deal of involvement, with state and provincial governments outpacing national governments on the Top 10 lists and falling slightly behind them on the Top 5 and Top 2 lists. If tribal governments are included as subnational—which fits the way they are included in the PSC process—then the prevalence of subnational governments easily exceeds that of national government agencies.
This data lends extensive credence to the theoretical arguments developed in the governance and international relations literature. Involvement of non-state actors has been verified although they do not appear to be dominant in any way. Involvement of subnational governments has been verified and potentially at a level that makes them the primary actors in the PSC supranet. In fact, it is interesting to note that within the U.S. Section of the PSC, the national government does not get a vote while the subnational governments get to vote. On the Canadian side, however, the national government exercises what is generally considered to be a veto voting power.

In terms of sovereignty this evidence leads to a fuzzy conclusion. Has national sovereignty been reduced in this specific case for Canada and the United States or has democracy been increased through additional subnational participation and participation from non-state actors? Perhaps this seeming dilemma is inherent in the nature of any democratic nation state. The answer may depend on the level one chooses to discuss.

For example, only the two national governments were able to create the Pacific Salmon Commission, although this took extensive intergovernmental diplomacy within the United States. At this level a high degree of national sovereignty is apparent within Canada while a moderate degree exists for the U.S. where more subnational power clearly exists on this issue. In both cases, however, an agency of the national government coordinates their respective national PSC sections.

An example that might produce a different answer is that organizations on both sides of the border held out great hope that the stakeholders’ process would be able to reach a workable agreement in 1997 and 1998. That process only involved two governmental representatives from each nation, one for the Northern area and one for the Southern area. It seemed as if there was at least a momentary willingness to give up all claims to sovereignty if the non-state actors--fishing
industry representatives--could just work out an acceptable compromise by themselves. Nevertheless, fisheries managers--the scientists--were still in the position to determine what harvest levels were acceptable and so some sovereignty was inserted during the stakeholders’ negotiations.

In conclusion, the case of the Pacific Salmon Commission clearly shows a strong role for government, including the national governments, within a diversified group of organizational actors involved in this cross-border resource management regime. Subnational governments have significant power and non-state actors are visible in the process.

NOTES
1. Figure 1 was developed through archival research and extensive qualitative interviews with treaty negotiation team members from all jurisdictions in 1998. This qualitative process was iterative so that after narrative and visual descriptions of the PSC supranet were developed, they were sent back to the interviewees for additional feedback. A further round of revisions ensued, ceasing the iterative process when descriptions were considered complete and accurate.

REFERENCES


