

The Global Commonwealth of Citizens

Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy

Daniele Archibugi



2008

80 279287

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON AND OXFORD

28/11/08

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

management of global affairs. A state has therefore been reached in which much of the world population, including those who would benefit most from the implementation of democracy in their own countries, accuse the leaders of the western democracies of being hypocritical and egotistical, almost to the same degree as their own home-grown despots. The wars fought by the liberal countries have merely strengthened the opinion that rulers, whether democratic or despotic, are all more or less the same. While the actors, singers, and writers of the West are applauded as heroes wherever they go, their leaders are greeted with vigorous protests. This is an alarming situation, as the West has not only produced good films, songs, and novels but has also and above all perfected a system of government—namely, democracy—that deserves universal approval and to be extended geographically and qualitatively enhanced.

The incapacity of consolidated democracies to exercise their own powers of persuasion has had disastrous effects: some of the most pressing world problems—safeguarding the environment, financial stability, security—are managed by select clubs that act outside all control. Others—defense of human rights, natural catastrophes, epidemics—are not managed at all. At the same time, the process of democratization, which raised so many hopes after the fall of the Berlin wall, seems to have suddenly halted. For their part, the western democracies have to contend with globalization processes that are radically modifying the relationship between those who make the decisions and those who are affected by them. In increasingly extensive areas, the democratic countries are finding they have to face up to external phenomena and decisions made outside their own borders. While increasing efforts are made to boost existing checks and balances on the internal sphere, the internal sphere is gradually decreasing in importance vis-à-vis the external sphere, where the participation and control mechanisms continue to be rudimentary.

This book contains a proposal for radically reversing this situation: to extend democracy not only inside each state but also as a form of management of global affairs. This proposal is not universally accepted; many consider that democracy was born and has grown up inside state borders and is ill-adapted to crossing them. I maintain the opposite thesis: democracy can and must become the method of global governance. Just as democracy has brought considerable benefits to the peoples who have tried it out, so today democracy can benefit for the whole of humankind. However, this assumption means that democracy must be re-appraised and reinvented to suit the new historical conditions, and on a different scale. Which rules among those that are applied inside the states can be applied to the global sphere and in international organizations? Which principles must on the other hand be further discussed and

229
287

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

reformed? Depending on the scale and the institutions to which it is applied, democracy changes form, although certain basic principles may be identified that remain unaltered whether applied to a small community, a national state, or the entire world.

The present book presents the proposal for cosmopolitan democracy, which a group of researchers at the end of the Cold War developed, as the management of different levels of governance. This proposal takes into account contemporary historical conditions, in which political communities with different historical and cultural backgrounds interact willy nilly with other neighboring and remote political communities. The form of representation of citizens in the global sphere based on the delegation of governance to a territorial state has become insufficient and in many cases an aberration. For this reason citizens of the world need to be given the possibility of directly participating in global choices through new institutions that are parallel to and autonomous with respect to those that already exist inside the states. Many find the suggestion of a world parliament annoying, as they consider it unrealistic and vague. Yet today it would seem a necessary path to tread in order to ensure that vested interests do not trample the principles of democracy daily and to attain an effective global commonwealth of citizens. A world parliament would give institutional clout and a say in political and social affairs to those global movements that have appeared on the world political scene full of enthusiasm and often with a solid baggage of skills.

The present book does not suggest building up a greater concentration of force. The many problems facing contemporary society cannot be tackled through new coercive powers. It is indeed a matter of strengthening the rules and of imposing penalties for the failure to respect them in order to serve as a stimulus to improve the behavior of political actors. The contemporary world is already based on shared choices, often among specific subjects and in delimited areas. Air transport and telephone communications, trade and finance, culture and information now increasingly involve individuals beyond their specific membership of a given secular state. It is in everyone's interest to participate in these international regimes inasmuch as the failure to participate is itself highly penalizing. Globalization thus offers the possibility of obtaining international integration without using violence to a much greater degree than in the past. But for this to occur requires both identity of intentions and impartiality, at least among those who claim to be champions of democracy.

The first part of this book gives consideration to the foundations of a democratic theory that sets the ambitious task of being applied outside fixed geographic boundaries. Many researchers have studied the conditions required for the democratization of authoritarian countries. It is

since related
239

too often taken for granted that there is a single causal link leading from the democratization of states that are still authoritarian to peace and international cooperation. This causal link is implicitly postulated in the hypothesis that democratic states do not wage war on each other. To argue on the basis of a single causal link ranging from internal democratization to international cooperation is extremely convenient for the self-interested choices, they lay the blame for international conflicts on others. One other equally important fact has also been ignored, namely, the establishment of international conditions favorable to internal democratization. This is an opposite causal link, and one that postulates the decisive contribution that may be given by the democratization of the world political system to the establishment of democracy within states. The existence of this link lays an obligation on all countries, starting from the hegemonic ones, which are for their good fortune democratic, to harmonize their policies with the actors involved in them.

The topics discussed have a valence that is not only theoretical, quite the contrary. The theory expounded is necessary to address several of the knottiest issues of contemporary politics. It is to these topics that the second part of the book is dedicated, which treats current problems such as United Nations reform, how to go about deciding on humanitarian interventions, suitable instruments for convincing other peoples to adopt democracy, the possibility of resolving conflicts over self-determination and of minimizing violence, the rules for coexistence in political communities inhabited by different peoples. In all these areas of application, I have endeavored to show how the obstacles standing in the way of the attainment of desirable objectives depend on the fact that too much power is concentrated in the hands of too few governments. For this reason cosmopolitan democracy appeals for the creation of new institutional channels that will allow popular participation and the political control over global choices to be increased. Only by creating given individual rights and duties, albeit to a limited degree, will it be possible to attain a democratic global commonwealth of citizens.

This book dedicated to the idea of a cosmopolitan democracy was a long time in the writing. My initial ideas on the topic date back to the gloomy years of the Cold War and the apparently insurmountable rivalry between East and West. The emergence of a new unipolar world order dominated by the western powers modified the original project but without altering its basic thrust. In intellectual symbiosis with David Held and Mary Kaldor, a kind of elective brother and sister, the research project outlined herein, based on the idea that the democratization of the international system is the best guarantee of peace and the respect of

human rights, it began to take shape and gradually involved an increasing number of researchers. Richard Falk was a model of inspiration with his capacity to combine disenchanting analysis and bold proposals.

My younger brother, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, was a true critical conscience and a boundless source of suggestions, criticism, and references. Together with Franco Voltaggio we scoured through the authors of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century peace projects and discovered them still to be a precious source of ideas. I was honored to receive numerous detailed comments from Norberto Bobbio right up to the time of his death. It is now a quarter of a century since I began my intellectual debate with Mario Pianta, with whom I have shared militant activity in the movements for peace and global justice. Raffaele Marchetti obliged me to engage in some energetic mental gymnastics. To Mariano Croce I owe both encouragement and the checking of bibliographic references. On a number of occasions I benefited from conversations with many Italian colleagues; in chronological order, I am duty bound to mention at least Luigi Cortesi, Luigi Ferrajoli, Luigi Bonanate, Giulio Marcon, Federico Varese, Francesco Gui, Fabrizio Battistelli, Nadia Urbinati, Danilo Zolo, Patrizia Nanz, Mario Telò, Sergio Fabbrini, Filippo Andreatta, Rufo Guerreschi, Sebastiano Maffettone, Alessandro Ferrara, Virginio Marzocchi, Stefano Petrucciani, Luigi Caranti, and Teresa Pulan. No less useful was the dialogue with my foreign colleagues: I learned a lot from David Beetham. My dialogue with Iris Marion Young was interrupted far too early by her premature death, a harsh blow for all those who hope that theory may still enlighten politics. I am equally grateful to Ulrich Beck, Jürgen Habermas, Michael Walzer, Tom Pogge, Tony McGrew, Andrew Linklater, John Dryzek, Carol Gould, Tom Farer, John Keane, Chantal Mouffe, David Chandler, Nancy Kokaz, Andrew Strauss, Hilal Elver, Bruce Morrison, Roland Paris, Ken Booth, Terry and Kate Macdonald, Nieves Zuñiga, Anja Karnein, Inge Kaul, Michael Zürn, Susan George, Rainer Bauböck, Seyla Benhabib, and Étienne Balibar for their comments, criticism, conversations, and emails that, one way or another, helped me revise or reformulate my stance.

I am profoundly grateful to the Italian National Research Council for the wide-ranging freedom it allowed me and for a grant (RSTL-2007). The periods spent at the Centre for the Study of Global Governance of the London School of Economics and Political Science (2003–2004) and at the Center for European Studies of Harvard University (2004–2005), made possible by the two professorships of the Leverhulme Trust and the Lauro de Bosis legacy, proved to be particularly fruitful. In London I reaped the benefit of discussion, as well as with David Held and Mary Kaldor, also with a large group of researchers including Chris Brown, Clare Chambers, Mick Cox, Marlies Glasius, Paul Kelly, Janet Coleman,

Chapter 1

Introduction: A Queen for the World?

= public opinion

1.1 A Queen for the World?

An American peace thinker, William Ladd, in 1840 published one of the last peace projects which flourished during the European Enlightenment. In his project, he called for the creation of an international congress comprising one ambassador for each state. He envisaged this international congress as a world legislative power that would lay down rules that were shared and respected by all. Ladd realized that such a congress would be insufficient without a judiciary power charged with interpreting the rules and settling disputes, so he also proposed to set up an international court of justice. In a project so explicitly based on the separation of powers that existed in his native America, Ladd could not avoid raising the question of executive power. According to him, executive power was neither conceivable nor probably even desirable and it was therefore necessary to rely on the intangible power of world public opinion, which he optimistically dubbed "the Queen of the World."²¹

The idea that public opinion could be the queen of the world is today even more attractive than it was in the nineteenth century. As championed by numerous visionaries, many international organizations have been set up that are nowadays much more sophisticated than the

1. William Ladd, *An Essay on a Congress of Nations for the Adjustment of International Disputes without Resort to Arms* (New York: Oxford University Press, [1840] 1916), p. L.

is whether this can still be considered cosmopolitanism. It is doubtful. The etymology of the word contains a reference to the citizen, a notion that implies equality and participation. The genes of the cosmopolitan should therefore contain the will to consult those who are different before making any decision. When cosmopolitanism becomes intolerant it is because it has swallowed a dangerous poison, that is intolerance, that has transformed it into fundamentalism. Unlike cosmopolitanism, fundamentalism no longer feels any doubt, wants to impose its view on all and sundry, and does not shrink from using violent and coercive methods. An antidote may be found by marrying cosmopolitanism with democracy: it is not enough for an idea to be a good one in order to be imposed; it is also necessary for that idea to be shared through the required procedures by means of persuasion, not force. This is the ultimate goal of the cosmopolitan democracy project re-stated in this book.

1.4 Layout of the Book

The first part of the book is dedicated to the theory of cosmopolitan democracy, although a constant effort is made to illustrate theoretical problems by linking them to concrete cases. The second chapter presents the conception of democracy implicit in the cosmopolitan project: democracy is to be viewed as an evolutionary process in which the various communities follow an autonomous itinerary of their own. Also at a time in which democracy has fortunately become a widely accepted concept, differences have continued, and will continue, to exist between the way democracy is interpreted in different parts of the world and at different levels of political affairs management. Rather than force democracy into too narrow a cage, it is preferable to assess these differences and try to see how much can be learned in a laboratory that is destined to grow ever larger and more varied.

Chapter 3 addresses the relationship between democracy and the global system. This is a much more complex relationship than might appear at first sight. It is by no means certain that democratic states are worthy inmates of the global system; democratic states are often as quarrelsome and bullying as any other kind of state. And all states tend to become more bullying when their strength increases. I shall therefore try to shed some light on the links that exist between the international system and internal regimes. What attributes must the international system have in order to perform a maieutic function *vis-à-vis* internal democracy? Consequently, how can democratic countries contribute to rendering the global system fairer?

Chapter 4 illustrates the institutional architecture of cosmopolitan democracy. The treatment is given on two linked planes. The first refers to the various levels of political management, from the local to the global. The second is performed by comparing cosmopolitan democracy to the two classical types of state unions, the confederation and the federation. The question is asked as to whether a third type may be envisaged that is more cohesive and demanding than a confederation but less rigid than a federation.

In the last twenty years, the problems and prospects associated with transnational democracy have received much attention, up to the point of becoming the subject of several university courses. Cosmopolitan democracy itself has been analyzed, scrutinized, and criticized, and not always in the most benevolent manner. Chapter 5 takes this critical debate into account. I have tried to engage in a fruitful dialogue with the critics, because their observations helped a great deal to table new problems and to clarify some crucial aspects. Regrettably, less attention has been devoted to authors who embraced and developed the project of cosmopolitan democracy; for lack of space priority had to be given to rebuffing the critics rather than to praising one's traveling companions. Nevertheless, I am pleased to see a growing number of young researchers working on these topics and brilliantly treating several key issues of the project in depth.

In part two, cosmopolitan logic is applied to several concrete cases. What does cosmopolitan democracy tell us in connection with daily political action? If cosmopolitan democracy is not to be a book of dreams, it is necessary to determine which steps can be undertaken daily in order to push forward in the direction of cosmopolitan democracy. Chapter 6 is therefore dedicated to the UN, the largest and most ambitious international organization ever conceived. Unfortunately, the UN and the other international organizations were born against a backdrop of great hopes that are daily dashed by political reality. However, much can be done, in the first place to ensure that the UN and its smaller sister organizations carry out the tasks that the states have already assigned them and in the second place to reform those organizations so that they are able to accommodate more decisively the norms and values of democracy. I have already spoken of democratic schizophrénia, and nowhere else is democratic schizophrénia found so extensively as inside the UN headquarters: on the one hand, the western governments protest against the lack of democracy inside the organization, and on the other, they do all they can to prevent any radical reform in that direction.

Chapter 7 tackles the problem of the legitimacy of the recourse to war for humanitarian purposes. Under what conditions is it legitimate to use military force in favor of foreign populations? The problem has been

debated on an increasingly wide front in recent years. Military operations for humanitarian purposes have been conducted in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and many other places. But in an equally large number of cases, no such operations have been carried out. Rwanda and Sudan have become paradigmatic cases of genocides that the international community failed to halt. We are thus always teetering between interventions that turn out to be medicines that are worse than the disease and failure to act. In chapter 7 I attempt to trace out a few cosmopolitan principles on which to base intervention so as to prevent humanitarian tragedies taking place in a situation of total indifference, but at the same time are used by some states as a pretext to engage in violence and to impose the will of the powerful on the weak. The main lesson to be learned from recent experience is that it is necessary to progress beyond a logic of emergency in order to set up institutions that are morally, politically, and also militarily equipped to intervene whenever necessary.

Chapter 8 brings us to the historical present: at a time in which two wars are being waged, one in Afghanistan and one in Iraq, the question is whether it is justified to export democracy at bayonet point, which prerequisites of democracy include also a preventive pact of nonaggression and the principle of nonviolence. It is therefore easy to understand why the peoples to whom this precious good is offered in the form of military invasion may be somewhat skeptical about the good intentions of their alleged benefactors. The chapter does not dwell exclusively on the negative teachings: in accordance with the theoretical framework of this book, it also explores the most effective methods for exporting democracy. The action of the international organizations, founded on dialogue and cooperation, has proved to be more effective than coercion. This is one of those fortunate cases in which there is no contradiction between the ends and the means: democracy is much easier to export by democratic means than by imposition.

Chapter 9 addresses a typical problem of international relations, the self-determination of peoples. The number of conflicts arising out of clashes among political communities, each claiming its own right to self-determination, is surprisingly large and shows little sign of decreasing. To define what a "people" is that has the right to self-determination is by no means an easy task. The chapter attempts to distinguish among the various interpretations. To what extent can the cosmopolitan idea championed herein be of use in delimiting the various political communities and in minimizing the recourse to violence? I maintain that self-evaluation of self-determination is a contradiction in terms. In the case of dispute, the parties involved should agree to arbitration by a

third party. Also in the case of self-determination, I place reliance on a typical figure in democratic thinking—the third-party mediator and arbitrator.

Chapter 10 centers on the possibility of achieving democracy in multilingual communities. The ambitions of the cosmopolitan democracy project are worldwide; some object that democracy cannot be cosmopolitan and that cosmopolitanism cannot be democratic. They claim that a democratic community needs a language of communication that is accessible to all; otherwise it turns into an oligarchy. This is no minor objection, and I have taken it into consideration with all due attention. An analysis of linguistic policy actually reveals something of substantial importance for appreciating democratic inclination and how such an inclination can be tested on different scales. A school with students from different ethnic groups, a small country, and an international organization all have to cope with the problem of mutual understanding on a daily basis.

The list of issues tackled is by no means complete. Cosmopolitan democracy has much to say in regard to the enforcement of human rights, managing migratory flows, how to combat terrorism, refugees, the process of regional integration, and cross-border criminal justice. A number of references are made in the various chapters to specific studies on these problems. The aim of the present book is simply to make a contribution to a debate that has been ongoing for many years in the hope that the debate will continue in the years to come and can enjoy greater success not only at the intellectual level but also in the boundless seas of real life.

There is some doubt whether the eleventh and final chapter would be more suitably entitled "Conclusions" or "Sunday Political Rally." Many will probably opt for the latter hypothesis, but this would not trouble me. Also this book is one of those dangerous books written in the hope that our children and grandchildren will have a better world to live in. Such a better world cannot certainly be guaranteed, but at least our children and grandchildren could not reproach us for having ignored the challenge.

Chapter 7 Cosmopolitanism and Humanitarian Intervention

7.1 The Cosmopolitanism of Survival

SREBRENICA 1995

In July 1995, during the final phases of the bloody civil war in the former Yugoslavia, fighting raged on in the Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica, which was populated by Muslims but claimed also by the Serbs. The town had been declared a "safe haven" by the UN Security Council on April 15, 1993 (Resolution 819), like other cities under siege in Bosnia-Herzegovina such as Sarajevo, Tuzla, Mostar, and Zepa. The UN had thus sent an unequivocal political message to the Bosnian Serbs led by Radovan Karadžić and General Ratko Mladic and indirectly to the Serbian government of Slobodan Milošević. In the event the promised protection was much weaker than guaranteed and the other cities with a majority Muslim-Bosnian population were periodically attacked by Bosnian Serb soldiers. Ambushes, summary executions, and rape were the daily fare of the civil war.

Despite the siege, many displaced Muslims, also on the strength of the Security Council commitment, sought refuge in Srebrenica, which was considered safer than other localities. The presence outside the city, in the Potočari area, of some four hundred Dutch blue helmets under the command of Commander Tom Karremans, represented a protection that was not only military but above all political. On July 11, 1995, following a fiercer attack than usual, the weakened defenses collapsed completely

and the Bosnian Serb irregular troops entered the city. In the preceding days NATO air forces had attempted to dissuade the attack by carrying out a number of low-level flights but, not having received the order to open fire, which could come only from the UN High Command, and in particular from the French general Bernard Janvier, they did not appreciably deter the attackers. On the day of the attack, NATO aircraft destroyed a couple of Bosnian Serb tanks, but then operations had to be called off for reasons of poor visibility and above all owing to the possible reprisals to which the Dutch blue helmets would be exposed. After the front collapsed, between twenty and twenty-five thousand now-armed Muslims gathered at Potočari, around the blue helmets' camp, pleading to be saved. A Dutch soldier told the population that they could not protect them and invited them to disperse. None of the blue helmets gave them any precise information as to where to go and how to get there.

General Mladic entered the city, intoxicated with joy, and immediately had some Muslim signs taken down and went to parley with Commander Karremans. They smoked a cigarette together, had a drink, and discussed the differences between soldiers and politicians. They then negotiated the withdrawal of the blue helmets. In the meantime, in the area around the camp, witnesses were talking of piles of dead bodies, cases of rape, and even children's throats being cut in front of their parents. A few thousand Muslim men decided to try to escape into the woods; others put themselves under the protection of the blue helmets. The day after, the Bosnian Serb occupiers separated women and children from the men who had stayed behind. Women and children were loaded onto buses brought in from Sarajevo and transferred to a camp hastily set up in Tuzla, beside the airport runway. Many of the fleeing men were captured, while those who stayed behind in Potočari were taken prisoner. Soon after this they were murdered and buried in mass graves. Their fate became known only after U.S. intelligence sources produced aerial photographs showing mounds of fresh earth that were believed to be possible mass graves. It is estimated that over 7,800 unarmed men were murdered.

The Srebrenica massacre represented a turning point in the Bosnian affair. Such was the shame felt by the international community that the UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) mission was terminated forthwith and replaced by the much more robust IFOR (Peace Implementation Force) mission under NATO command, making it quite clear that a second massacre would not be tolerated. However, the Srebrenica enclave had now been lost by the Bosnian Muslims, and this was taken into account in dividing up the territory among the different ethnic groups. It was one of the largest massacres to take place in Europe since the end of World War II and one of the gloomiest pages in UN history. In other

parts of the world—in Cambodia, in Rwanda—even larger massacres than the Srebrenica one had taken place, but there had been no explicit UN commitment to protect the civilian populations that had been disavowed, with unarmed men actually being abandoned in the hands of those who were to murder them only a few hours later. In April 2002, following the publication of several film sequences shot by Bosnian Serb soldiers and of a special investigation, the Dutch government led by Wim Kok resigned as a result of the way its troops had behaved.

KOSOVO 1999

Four years later, after the war in Bosnia had been brought to a laborious close, new conflicts broke out in neighboring Kosovo, where a precarious coexistence had been established between the Serb-speaking population of Greek Orthodox religion, which represented about 10 percent of the population, and the Albanian-speaking majority of Muslim faith. While the Albanian population was demanding independence and backing up its claim by means of guerrilla operations, the Yugoslav state intervened in defense of the Serb population, often by carrying out indiscriminate reprisals. A number of mass killings took place, mostly of Albanians. NATO placed the region under its control as a precise consequence of the Srebrenica massacre and held a series of talks in February 1999 at Rambouillet castle (Paris) with Kosovo separatists and the Yugoslav government. After considerable pressure had been exerted, the agreement was signed by the Kosovo separatists but not by the Serbs. Russia considered that too much had been demanded of Serbia, and also NATO countries such as Italy and Greece deemed the requests presented not a fair basis for an agreement.

As the winds of war gathered, the atrocities committed by both sides increased, initially directed mainly against the Albanian population. This period marked the beginning of the Albanian exodus from Kosovo, which involved as many as 850,000 persons (out of a total of about two million inhabitants). In March 1999, NATO began heavy bombing of Serbia and Kosovo, hitting not only military targets but also civilian targets. There were numerous errors, which caused a number of civilian victims estimated at between 1,200 and 5,000 persons. The use of fragmentation bombs increased the number of civilian victims, while the use of depleted uranium munitions led to a still-to-be-quantified increase in the incidence of tumors, which affected also NATO troops even though they had spent only a limited period in the area.

Many of the mass graves found at the end of the war could be traced to massacres having occurred after the end of the negotiations and

COSMOPOLITANISM AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

during the NATO air strikes. Even though official sources have attempted on numerous occasions to minimize the number of civilian victims, it would appear that more victims were caused by aerial bombardments than by ethnic cleansing. Even the chairman of NATO Military Command, General Naumann, expressed dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the intervention: "Promised on humanitarian needs, it was difficult to defend the NATO intervention logically and politically when it was initially causing damage but did not prevent the expulsion of Kosovars. That a huge outflow of refugees followed the initial bombing was, embarrassing, to say the least."¹ At the end of the acute phase of the conflict, the same type of intimidation and violence was inflicted on the new Serbian minority.

TOO MUCH AND TOO LITTLE

I have compared two well-known and tragic events that apparently encapsulate contradictory ethical issues. Only a few years after these events the general impression is that, in both cases, the international community should have done more and better. However, the crimes with which the international community has besmirched itself are quite different and indeed opposite. In the first case, it was guilty of indifference, as it did not have the courage to stick its neck out enough to avoid a massacre and, more in general, to avert a bloody civil war. In the second, possibly in the grip of guilt feelings at not having intervened effectively on the previous occasion, it became involved in a violent intervention that probably did more harm than good. In the first case, it intervened too little and too late; in the second, too much and too early. Similar dilemmas are the order of the day; in Darfur and Sierra Leone, in Sri Lanka and East Timor, and in many other places in the past and in the present and, we may sadly prophesy, also in the future. What may be demanded and expected of the international community?

The fall of the Berlin wall did not lead to the end of democides, but it became increasingly difficult for public opinion to accept them. In which cases, with what institutions, and using what tools must the international community intervene? How would the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina have changed if the international community had drawn upon its political and military resources to defend Srebrenica? How many Albanians would have been killed in Kosovo if NATO had not intervened? The question of whether or not it is effective to act will always accompany

1. Klaus Naumann, "Nato, Kosovo, and Military Intervention," *Global Governance* vol. 8, no. 1 (2002): 13-17, on p. 15.

