Culture and constitutional compliance

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Abstract:

Does culture matter for the degree to which a constitution is complied with? Constitutions have important economic and political effects. Yet, there is only scant knowledge about why constitutions set effective constraints on politicians in some societies, while being largely disregarded in others. In this paper, we ask if culture matters for constitutional compliance. We develop a number of hypotheses regarding cultural traits that are conducive to constitutional compliance and test them. Our empirical results suggest that societies with individualistic and nonhierarchical cultures exhibit higher levels of compliance with the constitution. These findings suggest a novel transmission channel from cultural traits to long-term economic development: constitutional compliance.

Keywords: Culture; constitutional compliance; individualism; long-term orientation; power distance; kinship.

JEL-Codes: H11; K10; K42; P48; Z10; Z18.

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1. **Introduction**

Reading a country's constitution to learn about that country can be informative in some cases, but utterly useless in others. But why are constitutions complied with in some countries and not in others? More technically speaking: Under what conditions can members of the executive be expected to behave in accordance with the rules laid down in their country's constitution?

Although this is a very fundamental and important question, we know surprisingly little about these conditions. Possible determinants of constitutional compliance include the structure of the constitution itself, the personal traits of those at the helm of government, the occurrence of particularly grave events, and many others. Here, we ask if a society's culture has a significant impact on constitutional compliance.

For a long time, culture was ignored in mainstream economics. This has radically changed in recent years (see, e.g., Alesina and Giuliano 2015; Giuliano 2020; Guiso et al. 2006). The academic quest for the deep determinants of economic development has certainly contributed to this newfound interest in the economic and social consequences of culture. One way to identify different cultures is to rely on religion. Ever since Weber (2002), the Protestant ethic has been discussed as a possible driver of economic development. Recent studies, however, shed some doubt on this potential driver (Becker and Wößmann 2009; Cantoni 2015).

Constitutions can be thought of as sets of institutions (Voigt 2019). For our research question, the relationship between culture and institutions is, therefore, central. Alesina and Giuliano (2015) have surveyed this relationship. In a series of early papers, Tabellini (2008a, 2008b, 2010) has inquired into the relationship between culture, institutions, and economic development. Relying on a measure for generalized morality norms, Tabellini shows that a favorable culture is associated with better legal enforcement as well as with higher economic development. Recent papers by Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011, 2017, 2020) are also very close to our research question. They show that one particular aspect of culture, namely individualism, does not only explain differences in growth and productivity, but also in innovativeness and the establishment of democracy.[1]

We add to the extant literature by focusing on the relationship between culture and a very specific type of institutions, namely constitutions. Constitutions being the most basic layer of formal rules of society, their implementation is always in question, as there is no more basic layer, which could ensure the proper implementation of constitutional rules. This trait of constitutional rules makes culture a potentially important factor in explaining constitutional compliance. Cultures supporting both general norms as well as compliance with such norms are conjectured to be conducive to constitutional

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[1] Other cultural traits have also been linked to the political process. Alesina and Giuliano (2011), for example, show that stronger family ties are associated with lower political participation. Bonoldi et al. (2020) analyze an Austrian border region with different traditional inheritance rules and show that they affect voter turnout.

compliance. We operationalize constitutional compliance as a *de jure-de facto* gap. In other words, we compare the *de jure* provisions of a constitution with the way the constitution is actually implemented. Relying on the dimensions of culture introduced by Hofstede (2010),[2] we find that more individualistic – as opposed to collectivistic – societies exhibit a smaller *de jure-de facto* gap, whereas societies with cultures endorsing hierarchical relationships are associated with a larger gap. These results turn out to be surprisingly robust.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we define our key terms and discuss theoretical connections between culture and constitutional compliance before hypothesizing about the types of cultural norms that are conducive (or detrimental) to constitutional compliance. Section 3 contains the description of our data and the estimation approach. In Section 4, we discuss our results and Section 5 concludes.

2. Theory

2.1.   Definitions

Before developing our argument, we define both culture and constitutional compliance. There are countless ways in which culture has been defined. Here, we adopt the definition proposed by Guiso et al. (2006) who define culture as "those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious and social groups

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2   These are power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence.

transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation" (Guiso et al. 2006, p. 23). Two aspects of this definition are worth emphasizing: First, it includes both beliefs and values. Whereas beliefs refer to people's understanding of how the world supposedly functions, values refer to their convictions how it ought to be organized. The second aspect is that culture is almost time-invariant (or slow-moving, as described by Roland 2004). Williamson (2010) gives the very crude rule of thumb that culture and informal institutions change once in a century, whereas formal institutions, such as constitutions, change once in a decade. This feature of culture is important to consider, if one studies its potential role for institutions as well as for economic development.

It can be helpful to keep the individual level and the group level conceptually apart. The term culture refers to a group characteristic. But, of course, that does not imply that all individuals who belong to a specific group must share all of the beliefs and values of that group's culture. Therefore, we refer to cultural orientations when we speak of individuals.[3]

Constitutions define constitutional actors and allocate competences and obligations to them. Today, they often explicitly contain catalogues of rights that the citizens or inhabitants of a country are supposed to enjoy. We speak of constitutional compliance, if the members of the executive branch of government follow the rules laid down in the constitution. To ascertain the

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[3] When Triandis (1995) refers to the individual level he distinguishes between idiocentrism and allocentrism. Those traits on the group level are referred to as individualism and collectivism.

level of constitutional compliance, one has to compare the *de jure* provisions of a constitution with the constitutional reality, as implemented by the executive. Again, two aspects of this definition are worth emphasizing: To ascertain constitutional compliance in a country, we do not resort to some universal rights standard, but to the rights granted by the constitution of that particular country.

Second, constitutional compliance is not synonymous to the rule of law. The central traits of the rule of law is that every member of society is subject to the same general rules. Now, a constitution might prescribe, for example, a non-equal treatment of men and women or of believers and non-believers. If that is the case, a government might be complying with the text of that constitution, but this government's actions would not be in compliance with the rule of law. The question to what extent constitutional compliance also implies rule of law depends on how it is operationalized.

2.2.   Culture and Constitutional Compliance

We assume that constitutional provisions are intended to bind constitutional actors and, thus, express more than wishful thinking. As already explained above, the particular challenge with implementing constitutional provisions is that there is no more basic layer of formal rules and enforcement agencies that could be relied upon to ensure their implementation. This implies that constitutions need to be self-enforcing, meaning that members of the

executive cannot make themselves better off by overstepping constitutional constraints (see Mittal and Weingast 2013).

If members of the executive consider to renege on constitutional rules, constitutional compliance can be secured via four mechanisms: violations can be sanctioned by (1) the citizens, (2) a veto player, (3) the politicians themselves, and (4) the international community. Our analysis focuses on the first three mechanisms, because in practice the international community often appears rather toothless.[4] Any behavior that, from the point of view of the executive, increases the cost of noncompliance can serve as a sanction.

Citizens can react to constitutional noncompliance by politicians in a variety of ways: they can participate in demonstrations or strikes, become active members of civil society organizations, and so on. In order to organize protest that is costly to the members of the executive, the citizens need to be able to coordinate their behavior (Schelling 1960, Olson 1965). The ability to overcome the dilemma of collective action might be aided by specific cultural norms, which may, for example, set focal points.[5] Solidarity norms prescribing that one should come to support those who have been treated wrongly – in particular by representatives of the state – are but one example for such

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[4] Empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of international agreements is mixed. Whereas Neumayer (2005, 2013) is rather critical, Dreher and Voigt (2011) find that membership in international organizations increases a government's credibility and Dreher et al. (2015) find that it increases FDI.

[5] There is evidence that the inclination to protest acts of governments is transmitted from generation to generation and can, thus, rightfully be said to constitute or reflect a specific aspect of culture (Gutmann and Voigt 2020a).

norms (see also Guiso et al. 2011 on civic capital). Cultural norms may not only facilitate protest, but they can also affect the propensity of citizens to vote, to participate in civil society organizations, as well as their preferences as voters. At least in democracies, citizens can punish politicians or their parties by voting them out of office. All these actions can impact on the likelihood of politicians to comply with constitutional constraints.

Veto players are defined here as those actors who have the capacity to block a change to the status quo (Tsebelis 2002). This means in our case that if members of the executive try to renege on constitutional constraints, for example, the legislature or the judiciary could stop them. If cultural norms support or even demand such behavior from the members of these branches of government, this incentivizes constitutional compliance.

So, if cultural norms facilitate wide-spread protest by citizens or interventions by veto players whenever the executive tries to renege on constitutional constraints, noncompliance with the constitution is less likely to occur. Rational politicians try to predict the costs of opposition and decide to refrain from actions, if the expected net-benefits are close to zero or even negative.[6]

We started with the situation that a member of the executive considers not to comply with some constitutional constraints. Now, the likelihood of considering such behavior can also differ according to that actor's cultural orientation. If their ethics dictate strict compliance with rules, then breaking

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[6] Only politicians guided by supreme values might be immune to such incentives (see Bernholz 2017; Congleton 2020b).

a rule to make oneself better off might be prohibitively costly. This is, hence, the third mechanism by which culture can impact on the likelihood of constitutional compliance (see, e.g., Congleton 2020a).

Although these mechanisms can be clearly delineated from each other in theory, it is close to impossible to ascertain their individual relevance empirically. How should it be established that some politicians comply with the constitution because of their own ethics rather than for fear of the costs imposed on them by veto players or citizens? Rather than probing into such specific transmission channels, we ask next what cultural traits are likely to enhance or hinder compliance with the constitution by members of the executive.

2.3.   Cultural Norms Conducive to Constitutional Compliance

Today, most constitutions claim that everybody is to be treated alike, independent of personal traits such as age, gender, race, religion, income, and so on (e.g., Elkins et al. 2009:86). Cultural norms congruent with such stipulations are expected to lead to higher compliance with constitutions. Now, can we identify particular cultural norms that should be conducive or detrimental to constitutional compliance?

Platteau (2000) was among the first to theorize about the potential relevance of generalized morality for economic development. Tabellini (2008a), who picked up the idea and proposed a variable for measuring it, describes generalized morality as being connected with two main ideas: "First, the

conviction that the individual is entitled to a set of basic rights that others should not violate. Second, the idea that we are all equal, in the limited sense that the same principles of justice should be applied equally towards everybody" (ibid.:272). Accordingly, we hypothesize that *societies with higher scores in generalized morality exhibit higher levels of constitutional compliance* (H1).

Individualism describes cultural orientations in favor of a loosely knit social framework in which individuals are expected to take care of themselves and their immediate family. In contrast, collectivism describes cultural orientations in favor of a tightly knit social framework in which individuals expect their relatives or members of their in-group to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede 1980). Individualistic societies are characterized by moral values that reflect universal impersonal principles, such as fairness, individual rights, and justice. These principles emphasize the welfare of all individuals in society equally. Collectivist societies exhibit a morality based on communal values such as in-group loyalty or the moral relevance of betrayal and respect tied to particular groups and relationships (see Enke 2019). Citizens in individualist societies are, thus, more likely to expect constitutional compliance of their political representatives, independent of the political orientation of the office holder. In contrast, keeping up tradition plays an important role in collectivist cultures with their emphasis on time-honored community values. If the constitution is an attempt to legitimize the state based on rational thought, this might be met with indifference or even refusal by large parts of collectivist societies, as long as

the constitution's content does not match with the informal norms of these societies. Therefore, we expect that *constitutional compliance is higher in more individualist societies* (H2).

Cultures emphasizing that different persons ought to have different roles in life, and especially those cultures endorsing strict hierarchical relationships between people, are expected to be incompatible with equal rights being guaranteed by a constitution. This can be a major source of constitutional noncompliance, if forms of equal treatment are stipulated in the constitution. As we have explained above, this is typically the case in modern constitutions. Power distance expresses the degree to which the less powerful members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. It implies the acceptance of a hierarchical order in which everybody has their place, and which needs no further justification. In contrast, members of societies with low power distance strive to equalize the distribution of power and demand justification for inequalities of power (Hofstede et al. 2010). The unconditional acceptance of hierarchical orders gives politicians leeway in their compliance with the constitution, whereas citizens in societies with low power distance would challenge politicians for such transgressions. Thus, *societies characterized by higher levels of power distance exhibit lower levels of constitutional compliance* (H3).

Furthermore, noncompliance with the constitution may be caused by a lack of patience, as those not complying want to reach a certain goal immediately. At least some of the time, the goal could be reached while complying with the

constitution, but it would take longer. Falk et al. (2018) show that patience is the single most important preference in explaining economic development. Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) even use the term patience capital to underscore the relevance of patience for productivity. We argue that if a culture attributes high value to patience, this should favor constitutional compliance. Following Hofstede (1980), we refer to this as long-term orientation and hypothesize that *societies scoring higher on long-term orientation exhibit more constitutional compliance* (H4).

Until now, we have mainly relied on the cultural dimensions by Hofstede et al. (2010). An alternative path is to study the role of religion. Religions are important in transmitting both beliefs and values from generation to generation and are therefore often treated as a form of culture. Two traits of religions seem of particular relevance here. The first is whether a religion does discriminate between people who, according to most modern constitutions, should have equal rights. The equal treatment of women and men comes to mind. The second trait refers to how the religion conceptualizes the relationship between the state and the individual. If, for example, it endorses obedience to rulers, even if they do not comply with the constitution, then the probability of constitutional compliance would be undermined.

3. Empirical Analysis

3.1 Data and Empirical Design

Our dependent variables are supposed to reflect the degree of compliance with the constitution. They come from the novel Constitutional Compliance Dataset (see Gutmann et al. 2020a), which combines information from two publicly available sources, the Comparative Constitutions Project (see Elkins et al. 2009) and the Varieties of Democracy Project (or V-DEM). Information from the Comparative Constitutions Project is used to establish whether a country's constitution entails a specific rule, such as prescribing an independent judiciary or the prohibition of torture. Variables from V-DEM are then matched to these dummy variables to ascertain if the rules that exist are complied with in practice. If not, a *de jure-de facto* gap emerges. The Constitutional Compliance Dataset measures compliance in four areas based on 13 *de jure* constitutional rules and their *de facto* implementation. Principal factors are calculated for property rights and the rule of law (CC-R), political rights (CC-P), civil rights (CC-C), and basic human rights (CC-B). These four indicators are also aggregated using factor analysis into one overall indicator of constitutional compliance (CC-T), which serves as the main dependent variable in our empirical analysis. As a robustness check, we also draw on an expert assessment of the extent to which the executive complies with the constitution (v2exrescon, hereafter V-T), which comes directly from version 10 of the V-DEM dataset. Descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Table 1.

<< Table 1 >>

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To measure the prevalence of certain cultural traits on the country level, we rely on data by Geert Hofstede, who initially conducted surveys among IBM employees in about 30 countries in the 1960s (see Hofstede et al. 2010). The survey was translated into local languages to avoid cultural biases in the way questions were framed. Hofstede's six cultural dimensions (individualism, power distance, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence) were not postulated based on theory; they were rather found inductively. With further survey waves, Hofstede's measures of cultural dimensions have been expanded to cover around 100 countries. Although Hofstede's data were initially collected as a measure of corporate culture, it has since been validated in numerous studies as a more general measure of a country's culture. Country rankings across various studies and measures are very stable. Hofstede's data has been used extensively in the social psychology literature and is also used increasingly in the economics literature (see, e.g. Debski et al. 2018; Galor and Özak 2016; Gorodnichenko and Roland 2011, 2017, 2020; Gründler and Köllner 2020; Herrmann et al. 2008).

Among the six cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede, three are of particular interest here, namely individualism vs. collectivism, power distance, and long-term orientation. Higher values on the individualism index reflect a societal preference for loosely knit social ties and we expect it to be associated with a smaller *de jure-de facto* gap. Higher values on the power distance index reflect the acceptance of hierarchical social orders and we expect it to be associated with a larger *de jure-de facto* gap. More long-term orientation reflects a higher level of patience, which we expect it to be

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associated with a smaller *de jure-de facto* gap. One cultural concept that is of interest to us has not been measured by Hofstede (2010). Data on generalized morality is, therefore, taken from Tabellini (2008a). Although individualism and generalized morality have many conceptual similarities, the bivariate correlation between their indicators is merely 0.50.

Although cultural traits are generally assumed to be very stable over time (Roland 2004; Williamson 2010), it could be questioned whether a correlation between constitutional compliance and present-day cultural traits allows for a causal interpretation. Here, we employ two different identification strategies. For the first one we employ three instruments that explain the historical distribution of individualistic cultural values. Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017; 2020) propose to instrument individualism with historical pathogen prevalence and the population's blood distance from the United Kingdom. These instruments are theoretically motivated by the idea of coevolution between culture and genes, postulated in the biological literature (Richerson and Boyd 2008). In addition, we rely on a novel indicator by Enke (2019) that measures the historical prevalence of kinship tightness in societies, based on information from Murdock's (1967) Ethnographic Atlas. It captures the extent to which people are interconnected in tightly structured, extended family systems. As Enke argues, the historical prevalence of tight kinship favors communal values at the expense of universal values that would allow cooperation with strangers outside the kinship structure. Hence, countries in which the population's ancestors relied on tight kinship can be expected to be less individualistic and more collectivistic to this day.

Our second identification strategy has been proposed by Gründler and Köllner (2020) and exploits regional patterns in the spatial distribution of culture. The advantage of these instruments is that they exist for all cultural dimensions of Hofstede. Their disadvantage is reliance on more demanding theoretical assumptions. However, the validity of these instruments has been discussed and carefully evaluated by Gründler and Köllner (2020). To construct their instruments, Gründler and Köllner split each continent into four disjoint regions. The instrument for individualism (and analogously for the other cultural traits) is then calculated for each country as the average level of individualism of all other countries located in the same region.

We control for several country characteristics that are exogenous to a country's culture but potentially relevant to the level of constitutional compliance in a country. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) propose a set of four standard geographic control variables to explain a society's long-term development: its absolute latitude, the share of its land area located in the tropics, a dummy variable for being landlocked, and a dummy variable for being located on an island. We control for the same four country characteristics. Moreover, we control for whether a country has ever been a Spanish, a French, or a British colony, or whether it has never been colonized using four dummy variables. We employ data from CEPII, which considers that colonies have been under the control of different colonial powers over time. Finally, we control for a country's ethnic fractionalization as well as the share of Muslims in the population. Ethnic fractionalization is linked to social trust and domestic conflict, both of which affect social accountability mechanisms

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that may force politicians to comply with the constitution. The share of Muslims in the population is important to take into account due to Islam's powerful influence on Muslim countries' legal systems and the arising conflicts between constitutionalism and contemporary interpretations of Islamic norms (Gouda 2013; Gutmann and Voigt 2015, 2018; Powell et al. 2020).

To fully understand how culture affects the behavior of members of the executive, we need to take into account the possibility that culture can have an effect on the content of the constitution and not only its implementation. For example, if a culture widely accepts hierarchical relationships between people, the constitution might impose fewer constraints on the government which, in turn, would have less reason to renege on the constitution. To see if that is the case, we try to predict the content of constitutions relying on the cultural dimensions just described. It turns out that they are not robustly correlated with the content of the constitution, implying that we can discard this potential transmission channel from the outset.

In our empirical analysis, we estimate models of the form

$$Compliance_i = \alpha + \beta \times Culture_i + \gamma \times X_i + \varepsilon \qquad (1)$$

where the dependent variable is an indicator of constitutional compliance in country i. Larger values indicate a smaller *de jure-de facto* gap or more constitutional compliance. *Culture* is an indicator of national culture, for example from Hofstede et al. (2010). Over different model specifications, we

stepwise include a vector of control variables *X*, which can be considered exogenous to a country's national culture, but potentially statistically related to both culture and constitutional compliance.

Our baseline models are estimated using OLS and robust standard errors are reported. To further strengthen our claim that the estimated statistical relationship between culture and constitutional compliance allows for a causal interpretation, we also use instrumental variable regressions, utilizing the instrumental variables for different national cultures described above. 2SLS estimates are also reported with robust standard errors. We further report tests for weak instruments and where more than one instrumental variable is available for overidentifying restrictions.

3.2 Empirical Results

Table 2 shows our results for the relationship between generalized morality and constitutional compliance. Absent any control variables, generalized morality is associated with higher constitutional compliance or a smaller *de jure-de facto* gap, as predicted by our theory. However, this result is not robust to the inclusion of control variables.[7]

<< Table 2 >>

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[7] See Neumayer and Plümper (2017) for the importance and conceptual foundation of robustness in quantitative research.

The relationship between individualism-collectivism and constitutional compliance is displayed in Table 3. More individualistic societies exhibit more constitutional compliance. This result is robust to accounting for a range of control variables and corroborates our second hypothesis (see Columns 1 to 3). The relationship is strongest for compliance with property rights and the rule of law (see Column 4).

<< Table 3 >>

Table 4 shows the results for power distance, which are again consistent with our theoretical predictions summarized in our third hypothesis. A higher power distance is robustly associated with less constitutional compliance. The relationship between power distance and constitutional compliance is most pronounced for civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law (see Columns 4 and 6).

<< Table 4 >>

The empirical results corresponding to our fourth hypothesis are shown in Table 5. Long-term orientation, however, is clearly not systematically related to constitutional compliance. Appendix A shows the regression results for the three remaining cultural dimensions of Hofstede. Interestingly, two of these cultural dimensions are also associated with the size of the *de jure-de facto* gap. Societies that are more restrained and more masculine are systematically lacking constitutional compliance. Uncertainty avoidance is not associated with the size of the *de jure-de facto* gap.

<< Table 5 >>

Appendix C shows regression results corresponding to the third Columns of the previously discussed regression tables, but the dependent variable by Gutmann et al. (2020) is replace by that from the V-DEM dataset. See Section 3.1 for a discussion of the relative strengths and weaknesses of these alternative indicators of constitutional compliance. Table C1 supports the robustness of our main results so far: individualism and power distance are systematically related to constitutional compliance, which is in line with our second and third hypothesis. In Appendix A, we found that also some cultural dimensions for which we had no theoretical prediction are associated with constitutional compliance. However, these results are not robust to the use of an alternative dependent variable.

In Appendix D, we show results from 2SLS instrumental variable regressions as an attempt to evaluate whether our results do indeed allow for a causal interpretation. The columns in each table correspond to Columns 1 to 3 in our main regression tables, although the control variables are not displayed. An interesting first finding is that our instrumental variable regressions lend support to our first hypothesis regarding generalized morality, as shown in Table D1. Instrumenting morality with regional trust and regional tolerance (see Gründler and Köllner 2020 for these instrumental variables) provides us with a positive and significant effect of generalized morality on constitutional compliance. A test of the exclusion restriction does not indicate any violation and two out of three models exhibit no sign of weak instruments. The results

in Table D2 also support that there is a causal effect of individualism on constitutional compliance. The first three columns use the indicators by Gorodnichenko and Roland (2020) and Enke (2019) as instrumental variables for individualism (see Section 3.1 for a detailed discussion). The last three columns add regional individualism by Gründler and Köllner (2020) to the vector of instrumental variables). There is no sign of a violation of the exclusion restriction and overall weak instruments do not seem to be an issue.

Tables D3 to D4 show the effects of power distance, long-term orientation, and masculinity. However, in our reduced sample, the regional instruments by Gründler and Köllner (2020) are not sufficient to run meaningful instrumental variable regressions for these three cultural dimensions. The regressions for uncertainty avoidance, displayed in Table D7, do not suffer from weak instruments and uncertainty avoidance remains unrelated to constitutional compliance.

3.3 Model Extensions

The concept of tightness is used to describe how tight or loose the rules and norms are that members of a society are supposed to follow (Pelto 1968; Triandis 1995). Tight cultures have many strong norms and a low tolerance of deviant behavior, whereas loose societies have weak social norms and a high tolerance of deviant behavior (Gelfand et al. 2011). Accordingly, one could hypothesize that "tighter" cultures are more likely to have governments that comply with the constitution. Based on data provided by Gelfand et al. (2019), we find no support for the relevance of tightness for the size of the *de jure-de*

facto gap (see Table E4 in the Appendix). It should, however, be noted that these results are based on a very small sample that does not even allow for the inclusion of control variables.

It would be interesting to account for whether a country is an electoral democracy using data by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020). We propose to use a narrowly defined concept of democracy here to avoid conflating electoral democracy with other institutional constraints on the executive, which might already entail aspects of constitutional compliance.[8] Even then, democracy does not lend itself as a control variable, because it is itself heavily determined by societal culture (Gorodnichenko and Roland 2020). Moreover, one can imagine that both, democracy favors constitutional compliance and constitutional compliance helps to consolidate democracy. Thus, we use democracy not as a control variable in our regression analyses, but we conduct a horse rase between cultural traits and democracy to see if culture has an effect on constitutional compliance that is independent of the country's democracy rating.

Appendix B shows two sets of regressions for each of our four cultural dimensions of interest. The first set of regressions only controls for a cultural characteristic and the second set adds a binary indicator of electoral

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[8]   For example, the commonly used polity2 indicator of democracy already codes as one of its elements whether the executive ignores constitutional restrictions, making it unsuitable for our analysis.

democracy to the specification.[9] We are most interested in Tables B3 to B6, which correspond to the two hypothesis that are so far supported by our empirical analysis. It is noteworthy that democracy has in all models a strong positive effect on constitutional compliance. Comparing the results in Tables B3 and B4, we find that there is an effect of individualism that is independent of individualism's association with democracy. The only subcategory, in which individualism does not exhibit a significant effect is compliance with political rights. The results in Tables B5 and B6 tell the same story. Only compliance with political rights is not affected by power distance, after one controls for an electoral democracy dummy. Together, the results in Appendix B suggest that the relationship between culture and constitutional compliance can at most partially be explained by democracy as a mediating factor. Only compliance with political rights in the constitution cannot be explained by culture, once democracy is accounted for.

Social psychologists working with the individualism collectivism dichotomy stress that individuals in societies dominated by collectivist norms make a sharp distinction between in-group and out-group. Whereas norms of solidarity could very well apply to the in-group, members of the out-group are often seen as potential enemies and treated accordingly (Triandis 1995 is just one example). The in-group can be delimited very differently. In one extreme,

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[9] If controlling for democracy would render the effect of culture on constitutional compliance insignificant, this might indicate that the effect of culture on constitutional compliance runs primarily via making a country more democratic. If the effect remains statistically significant, this indicates that there is an effect that is independent of democracy.

it only comprises the family (Banfield 1958 with his description of a village in Southern Italy comes to mind); in the other extreme, it might encompass an entire nation (patriotism or nationalism) or even more than that (think of the Islamic concept of "umma" uniting all Muslims). Accounting for the size of the in-group is a challenge. As an attempt to capture it, we include an interaction effect between individualism and ethnolinguistic fractionalization into our regression model. Table E1 in the Appendix shows that we find no empirical support for this argument.

Triandis (1995, 44f.) proposes to separate horizontal from vertical individualism as well as horizontal from vertical collectivism. In collectivist cultures, "horizontal" would imply a sense of social cohesion and "oneness" with members of the in-group, whereas "vertical" would imply a sense of serving the in-group as well as doing one's duty and sacrifice for the in-group. In both individualist and collectivist societies, the vertical dimension stands for accepting inequality. To gauge whether it makes a difference whether a collectivist (or individualist) culture tends to be more horizontal or more vertical, we assume that the horizontal vs. vertical dimension is reflected well in Hofstede's power distance dimension introduced above. Relying on the interaction effect between the individualism and power distance dimensions, thus, allows us to see whether this more fine-grained delineation is empirically relevant. Table E2 in the Appendix does not seem to support the relevance of this conceptual distinction for constitutional compliance. Only one regression model exhibits a statistically significant interact term.

4. Conclusion

The results of our empirical study show that culture is relevant for constitutional compliance. Individualism is associated with smaller constitutional *de jure-de facto* gaps, whereas power distance is associated with reduced constitutional compliance. These results are robust across various model specifications and are largely not mediated by electoral democracy. We also find some support for our hypothesis concerning the relevance of generalized morality for constitutional compliance, but only in our instrumental variable regressions. Long-term orientation is the only cultural dimension for which the expected relationship with constitutional compliance is not supported by the data. Overall, our results can be interpreted as evidence for a novel transmission channel between cultural factors and economic development, which is constitutional compliance.

Constitutions can be interpreted as sets of promises. If constitutional provisions are reliably enforced, they are conducive to economic and political stability and can help citizens form reliable long-term expectations. This is a crucial precondition for irreversible investments, which, in turn, promote growth and development. Constitutional compliance is, thus, of high value to a society.

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Appendix A: Other cultural dimensions

Table A1: Indulgence, OLS

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-T	(3) CC-T	(4) CC-R	(5) CC-P	(6) CC-C	(7) CC-B
Indulgence	1.390**	1.614**	1.379**	1.273**	0.442	1.212**	0.421
	(0.526)	(0.477)	(0.497)	(0.431)	(0.350)	(0.406)	(0.437)
Island		0.362	0.238	-0.015	0.197	0.152	0.447*
		(0.190)	(0.188)	(0.149)	(0.145)	(0.180)	(0.221)
Landlocked		-0.259	-0.396*	-0.406*	-0.167	-0.272	-0.144
		(0.215)	(0.197)	(0.186)	(0.160)	(0.169)	(0.167)
Latitude		0.020**	0.005	0.008	0.004	0.003	-0.008
		(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Tropics		-0.329	-0.907*	-0.609	-0.352	-0.472	-1.410***
		(0.352)	(0.349)	(0.325)	(0.335)	(0.327)	(0.329)
ESP colony			-0.538*	-0.387	-0.097	-0.548*	-0.347
			(0.246)	(0.210)	(0.184)	(0.248)	(0.263)
FRA colony			0.256	-0.025	0.132	0.267	0.403
			(0.267)	(0.206)	(0.155)	(0.315)	(0.207)
GBR colony			-0.053	0.248	-0.063	-0.228	-0.081
			(0.205)	(0.170)	(0.183)	(0.182)	(0.188)
Not colonized			-0.397*	-0.289	-0.233	-0.352	-0.065
			(0.198)	(0.179)	(0.141)	(0.180)	(0.168)
Muslim			-0.014***	-0.011***	-0.006*	-0.011***	-0.009**
			(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Fractionalization			0.131	-0.181	0.180	0.235	0.087
			(0.416)	(0.296)	(0.391)	(0.392)	(0.317)
Constant	-0.364	-1.086**	0.066	-0.151	-0.058	0.068	0.476
	(0.257)	(0.386)	(0.456)	(0.406)	(0.325)	(0.439)	(0.330)
R-squared	0.11	0.36	0.55	0.55	0.30	0.48	0.43
Observations	89	84	83	83	83	83	83

Table A2: Masculinity, OLS

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-T	(3) CC-T	(4) CC-R	(5) CC-P	(6) CC-C	(7) CC-B
Masculinity	-0.540	-1.047*	-1.129*	-1.195**	-0.236	-0.764*	-0.837*
	(0.413)	(0.466)	(0.503)	(0.424)	(0.361)	(0.378)	(0.392)
Island		0.638**	0.524*	0.419*	0.212	0.328	0.530
		(0.219)	(0.251)	(0.179)	(0.163)	(0.246)	(0.267)
Landlocked		0.537	0.462	0.581	0.092	0.205	0.431
		(0.281)	(0.320)	(0.295)	(0.191)	(0.248)	(0.216)
Latitude		0.007	0.001	0.003	0.006	0.000	-0.013
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Tropics		-0.400	-0.730	-0.577	-0.076	-0.423	-1.256**
		(0.525)	(0.383)	(0.292)	(0.272)	(0.339)	(0.405)
ESP colony			-0.063	-0.119	0.095	-0.053	-0.122
			(0.295)	(0.250)	(0.155)	(0.259)	(0.274)
FRA colony			-0.077	0.068	-0.117	-0.208	0.219
			(0.503)	(0.297)	(0.175)	(0.516)	(0.378)
GBR colony			0.218	0.386*	0.038	0.109	-0.043
			(0.215)	(0.145)	(0.117)	(0.223)	(0.204)
Not colonized			-0.357	-0.291	-0.314*	-0.172	-0.146
			(0.199)	(0.174)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.173)
Muslim			-0.016***	-0.013***	-0.005	-0.013**	-0.010**
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Fractionalization			-0.084	-0.258	-0.361	0.250	0.196
			(0.420)	(0.347)	(0.293)	(0.393)	(0.359)
Constant	0.759***	0.705	1.366*	1.162*	0.356	0.955	1.272*
	(0.208)	(0.570)	(0.650)	(0.472)	(0.328)	(0.580)	(0.552)
R-squared	0.02	0.20	0.51	0.53	0.35	0.41	0.43
Observations	68	65	65	65	65	65	65

Table A3: Uncertainty avoidance, OLS

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-T	(3) CC-T	(4) CC-R	(5) CC-P	(6) CC-C	(7) CC-B
Unc. avoid.	0.191	0.617	0.499	0.276	0.419	0.432	0.037
	(0.374)	(0.523)	(0.601)	(0.615)	(0.234)	(0.526)	(0.390)
Island		0.595*	0.432	0.272	0.253	0.283	0.397
		(0.234)	(0.254)	(0.215)	(0.137)	(0.244)	(0.256)
Landlocked		0.172	0.051	0.130	0.026	-0.068	0.104
		(0.255)	(0.254)	(0.236)	(0.143)	(0.215)	(0.106)
Latitude		0.018	0.011	0.013	0.009*	0.008	-0.007
		(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Tropics		-0.026	-0.360	-0.243	0.072	-0.151	-1.057*
		(0.559)	(0.446)	(0.438)	(0.249)	(0.380)	(0.429)
ESP colony			-0.153	-0.201	0.059	-0.119	-0.171
			(0.288)	(0.246)	(0.160)	(0.246)	(0.285)
FRA colony			-0.052	0.032	-0.035	-0.168	0.156
			(0.396)	(0.259)	(0.135)	(0.422)	(0.325)
GBR colony			0.178	0.298	0.086	0.099	-0.132
			(0.230)	(0.172)	(0.116)	(0.249)	(0.214)
Not colonized			-0.403	-0.356	-0.303*	-0.197	-0.202
			(0.210)	(0.184)	(0.140)	(0.159)	(0.171)
Muslim			-0.016***	-0.013***	-0.005*	-0.013**	-0.010**
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Fractionalization			0.019	-0.145	-0.344	0.317	0.277
			(0.378)	(0.355)	(0.269)	(0.360)	(0.361)
Constant	0.366	-0.642	0.079	0.048	-0.222	-0.008	0.645
	(0.281)	(0.815)	(0.957)	(0.929)	(0.321)	(0.866)	(0.663)
R-squared	0.00	0.18	0.47	0.48	0.37	0.39	0.39
Observations	68	65	65	65	65	65	65

Appendix B: Horse race

Table B1: Generalized morality, OLS

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-R	(3) CC-P	(4) CC-C	(5) CC-B
Morality	0.854**	0.891***	0.205	0.550	0.677*
	(0.305)	(0.256)	(0.156)	(0.277)	(0.291)
Constant	0.333***	0.224*	0.143**	0.327***	0.020
	(0.097)	(0.086)	(0.052)	(0.080)	(0.078)
R-squared	0.07	0.09	0.01	0.04	0.06
Observations	79	79	79	79	79

Table B2: Generalized morality and democracy, OLS

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-R	(3) CC-P	(4) CC-C	(5) CC-B
Morality	0.652**	0.740***	0.098	0.392	0.576*
	(0.211)	(0.183)	(0.119)	(0.229)	(0.274)
Democracy	1.434***	1.072***	0.753***	1.121***	0.715**
	(0.204)	(0.185)	(0.144)	(0.179)	(0.217)
Constant	-0.760***	-0.593***	-0.431**	-0.527**	-0.524*
	(0.190)	(0.169)	(0.141)	(0.166)	(0.204)
R-squared	0.54	0.43	0.49	0.48	0.25
Observations	79	79	79	79	79

Table B3: Individualism, OLS

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-R	(3) CC-P	(4) CC-C	(5) CC-B
Individualism	1.680***	1.969***	0.371*	1.082***	0.959***
	(0.268)	(0.241)	(0.158)	(0.228)	(0.239)
Constant	-0.356*	-0.609***	0.024	-0.143	-0.328*
	(0.161)	(0.143)	(0.094)	(0.139)	(0.153)
R-squared	0.19	0.29	0.04	0.11	0.09
Observations	98	98	98	98	98

Table B4: Individualism and democracy, OLS

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-R	(3) CC-P	(4) CC-C	(5) CC-B
Individualism	0.999***	1.443***	0.071	0.488*	0.689**
	(0.259)	(0.261)	(0.130)	(0.223)	(0.240)
Democracy	1.181***	0.910***	0.520***	1.029***	0.467*
	(0.175)	(0.151)	(0.127)	(0.163)	(0.191)
Constant	-0.953***	-1.069***	-0.238	-0.662***	-0.563**
	(0.164)	(0.133)	(0.132)	(0.156)	(0.190)
R-squared	0.53	0.52	0.29	0.48	0.17
Observations	98	98	98	98	98

Table B5: Power distance, OLS

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-R	(3) CC-P	(4) CC-C	(5) CC-B
Power dist.	-1.766***	-1.885***	-0.447*	-1.255***	-0.978**
	(0.331)	(0.324)	(0.173)	(0.256)	(0.336)
Constant	1.538***	1.494***	0.461***	1.185***	0.691***
	(0.162)	(0.159)	(0.081)	(0.127)	(0.151)
R-squared	0.24	0.33	0.05	0.20	0.11
Observations	68	68	68	68	68

Table B6: Power distance and democracy, OLS

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-R	(3) CC-P	(4) CC-C	(5) CC-B
Power dist.	-1.069***	-1.393***	-0.038	-0.758***	-0.542*
	(0.212)	(0.280)	(0.132)	(0.193)	(0.268)
Democracy	1.548***	1.093***	0.909***	1.105***	0.968**
	(0.196)	(0.186)	(0.210)	(0.177)	(0.286)
Constant	-0.193	0.272	-0.556*	-0.051	-0.392
	(0.243)	(0.264)	(0.235)	(0.225)	(0.331)
R-squared	0.68	0.61	0.56	0.56	0.38
Observations	68	68	68	68	68

Table B7: Long-term orientation, OLS

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-R	(3) CC-P	(4) CC-C	(5) CC-B
LTO	0.569	0.354	0.388	0.252	0.724*
	(0.423)	(0.381)	(0.250)	(0.330)	(0.327)
Constant	0.018	-0.003	-0.063	0.191	-0.347
	(0.223)	(0.193)	(0.150)	(0.171)	(0.188)
R-squared	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.06
Observations	89	89	89	89	89

Table B8: Long-term orientation and democracy, OLS

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-R	(3) CC-P	(4) CC-C	(5) CC-B
LTO	0.212	0.070	0.194	-0.009	0.546
	(0.287)	(0.293)	(0.166)	(0.236)	(0.311)
Democracy	1.338***	1.064***	0.725***	0.976***	0.665***
	(0.182)	(0.152)	(0.136)	(0.161)	(0.194)
Constant	-0.794***	-0.648***	-0.503**	-0.401*	-0.750**
	(0.212)	(0.175)	(0.173)	(0.181)	(0.233)
R-squared	0.47	0.37	0.42	0.38	0.22
Observations	89	89	89	89	89

Appendix C: V-DEM

Table C1: Alternative dependent variable, OLS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	V-T	V-T	V-T	V-T	V-T	V-T	V-T
Island	0.301	0.368	0.483	0.575[*]	0.446	0.798[*]	0.470
	(0.247)	(0.230)	(0.281)	(0.249)	(0.259)	(0.357)	(0.295)
Landlocked	-0.606	-0.056	-0.272	-0.619[*]	-0.651[*]	0.408	-0.213
	(0.351)	(0.240)	(0.297)	(0.286)	(0.297)	(0.471)	(0.273)
Latitude	-0.002	0.003	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.011
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Tropics	-1.114[*]	-0.527	-0.798	-1.392[**]	-1.390[**]	-1.214[*]	-0.954
	(0.489)	(0.347)	(0.460)	(0.442)	(0.430)	(0.550)	(0.533)
ESP colony	-0.349	-0.132	-0.466	-0.347	-0.462	-0.316	-0.380
	(0.366)	(0.321)	(0.321)	(0.394)	(0.383)	(0.286)	(0.328)
FRA colony	-0.179	-0.136	-0.002	-0.007	0.005	0.164	-0.062
	(0.390)	(0.323)	(0.355)	(0.322)	(0.326)	(0.425)	(0.431)
GBR colony	0.150	-0.071	-0.490	0.333	0.309	0.030	-0.211
	(0.260)	(0.254)	(0.281)	(0.253)	(0.260)	(0.297)	(0.283)
Not colonized	0.119	-0.200	-0.484	0.155	0.050	-0.256	-0.388
	(0.293)	(0.261)	(0.284)	(0.291)	(0.283)	(0.297)	(0.302)
Muslim	-0.016[***]	-0.010[**]	-0.012[*]	-0.016[***]	-0.015[***]	-0.015[**]	-0.015[**]
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Fractionalization	0.548	0.067	0.608	0.532	0.455	0.412	0.566
	(0.446)	(0.413)	(0.454)	(0.444)	(0.450)	(0.486)	(0.495)
Morality	0.774						
	(0.455)						
Individualism		1.510[*]					
		(0.650)					
Power dist.			-1.725[**]				
			(0.570)				
LTO				-0.185			
				(0.568)			
Indulgence					0.454		
					(0.720)		
Masculinity						-1.520	
						(0.813)	
Unc. avoid.							-0.381
							(0.545)
Constant	1.462[**]	0.667	2.564[**]	1.355[*]	1.151[*]	2.257[*]	1.559
	(0.525)	(0.411)	(0.761)	(0.592)	(0.471)	(0.862)	(0.838)
R-squared	0.41	0.38	0.49	0.41	0.42	0.45	0.41
Observations	75	94	65	83	83	65	65

Appendix D: Instrumental variable regressions

Table D1: Generalized morality, IV

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	CC-T	CC-T	CC-T
Morality	1.835***	1.574*	2.263**
	(0.484)	(0.792)	(0.836)
R-squared	.	0.06	0.38
Observations	68	65	64
F-stat	20.57	13.30	7.69
J-stat	1.32	0.96	2.70

Table D2: Individualism, IV

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	CC-T	CC-T	CC-T	CC-T	CC-T	CC-T
Individualism	2.602***	3.668**	2.124*	2.357***	3.463**	2.204*
	(0.392)	(1.182)	(0.858)	(0.388)	(1.215)	(0.905)
R-squared	0.14	0.06	0.43	0.13	0.04	0.45
Observations	93	92	92	75	75	75
F-stat	53.76	5.72	10.11	47.13	4.61	13.66
J-stat	0.02	1.49	1.96	4.80	4.06	3.84

Table D3: Power distance, IV

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	CC-T	CC-T	CC-T
Power dist.	-2.750***	-3.024	-5.344
	(0.656)	(1.570)	(3.296)
R-squared	0.15	0.13	.
Observations	64	61	61
F-stat	14.31	3.08	1.49

Table D4: Long-term orientation, IV

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	CC-T	CC-T	CC-T
LTO	-4.940	-1.825	-2.130
	(5.939)	(1.292)	(1.397)
R-squared	.	0.21	0.44
Observations	58	55	55
F-stat	1.29	5.71	5.49

Table D5: Masculinity, IV

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-T	(3) CC-T
Masculinity	2.246	3.008	2.938
	(2.616)	(4.590)	(4.808)
R-squared	.	.	.
Observations	64	61	61
F-stat	3.93	2.22	2.46

Table D6: Uncertainty avoidance, IV

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-T	(3) CC-T
Unc. avoid.	0.018	1.244	0.204
	(0.497)	(0.872)	(0.918)
R-squared	0.00	0.15	0.48
Observations	64	61	61
F-stat	72.11	32.71	13.04

Appendix E: Model extensions

Table E1: Interaction: Individualism x fractionalization, OLS

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-R	(3) CC-P	(4) CC-C	(5) CC-B
Individualism	1.301	1.068	0.437	1.109	0.708
	(0.695)	(0.690)	(0.303)	(0.596)	(0.519)
Fractionalization	-0.161	-0.741	0.048	0.337	-0.218
	(0.727)	(0.713)	(0.441)	(0.650)	(0.723)
Ind x Fract	0.173	1.429	-0.360	-0.639	0.240
	(1.165)	(1.163)	(0.649)	(1.087)	(1.122)
Island	0.266	0.141	0.129	0.157	0.394
	(0.202)	(0.186)	(0.104)	(0.192)	(0.229)
Landlocked	0.101	0.092	0.088	-0.007	0.157
	(0.220)	(0.223)	(0.114)	(0.203)	(0.150)
Latitude	0.001	0.004	0.002	0.001	-0.011
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Tropics	-0.108	-0.051	-0.012	0.124	-0.711*
	(0.297)	(0.306)	(0.206)	(0.230)	(0.337)
ESP colony	-0.033	-0.025	-0.003	-0.036	-0.019
	(0.246)	(0.215)	(0.136)	(0.215)	(0.251)
FRA colony	-0.034	-0.330	0.014	0.083	0.267
	(0.286)	(0.236)	(0.136)	(0.316)	(0.209)
GBR colony	-0.061	0.095	-0.119	-0.042	-0.160
	(0.196)	(0.206)	(0.115)	(0.172)	(0.234)
Not colonized	-0.409	-0.298	-0.353*	-0.248	-0.125
	(0.206)	(0.191)	(0.140)	(0.177)	(0.186)
Muslim	-0.013***	-0.009**	-0.004*	-0.013***	-0.007*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	0.142	-0.048	0.131	0.001	0.445
	(0.515)	(0.505)	(0.268)	(0.469)	(0.415)
R-squared	0.46	0.47	0.25	0.44	0.27
Observations	94	94	94	94	94

Table E2: Interaction: Individualism x power distance, OLS

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-R	(3) CC-P	(4) CC-C	(5) CC-B
Individualism	-0.272	-1.531	0.127	0.299	0.759
	(1.188)	(0.968)	(0.672)	(0.887)	(1.381)
Power dist.	-2.088	-3.161***	-0.233	-1.334	-0.229
	(1.040)	(0.884)	(0.604)	(0.780)	(1.271)
Ind x PD	2.344	4.658**	0.301	0.931	-0.671
	(1.995)	(1.610)	(1.204)	(1.495)	(2.255)
Island	0.296	0.215	0.162	0.151	0.345
	(0.228)	(0.164)	(0.133)	(0.227)	(0.262)
Landlocked	-0.134	-0.060	-0.033	-0.216	0.047
	(0.233)	(0.225)	(0.136)	(0.190)	(0.113)
Latitude	-0.004	-0.000	0.004	-0.005	-0.013
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Tropics	-0.383	-0.174	-0.011	-0.189	-1.052**
	(0.340)	(0.257)	(0.242)	(0.302)	(0.388)
ESP colony	-0.093	-0.074	0.085	-0.106	-0.216
	(0.269)	(0.200)	(0.142)	(0.255)	(0.290)
FRA colony	-0.326	-0.170	-0.180	-0.405	0.072
	(0.384)	(0.167)	(0.159)	(0.432)	(0.329)
GBR colony	-0.264	-0.060	-0.059	-0.299	-0.336
	(0.246)	(0.169)	(0.148)	(0.252)	(0.254)
Not colonized	-0.586*	-0.488**	-0.366*	-0.368*	-0.298
	(0.227)	(0.182)	(0.160)	(0.166)	(0.208)
Muslim	-0.013***	-0.010***	-0.005	-0.010*	-0.009**
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Fractionalizati on	0.005	-0.144	-0.352	0.302	0.261
	(0.381)	(0.249)	(0.302)	(0.387)	(0.353)
Constant	1.899*	2.220**	0.324	1.328*	0.928
	(0.783)	(0.652)	(0.374)	(0.642)	(0.894)
R-squared	0.58	0.67	0.36	0.51	0.43
Observations	65	65	65	65	65

Table E3: Religion

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-R	(3) CC-P	(4) CC-C	(5) CC-B
Island	0.376	0.075	0.232	0.296	0.530**
	(0.205)	(0.192)	(0.118)	(0.182)	(0.190)
Landlocked	-0.326	-0.303*	-0.176	-0.235	-0.083
	(0.182)	(0.148)	(0.118)	(0.161)	(0.141)
Latitude	0.014	0.012	0.007	0.011	0.004
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Tropics	-0.422	-0.338	-0.224	-0.134	-0.641*
	(0.331)	(0.282)	(0.224)	(0.263)	(0.318)
ESP colony	-0.029	-0.147	0.075	-0.092	0.230
	(0.261)	(0.218)	(0.169)	(0.225)	(0.208)
FRA colony	0.247	0.141	0.121	0.165	0.294
	(0.220)	(0.165)	(0.141)	(0.204)	(0.192)
GBR colony	0.407*	0.466**	0.198	0.225	0.138
	(0.198)	(0.163)	(0.123)	(0.166)	(0.182)
Not colonized	0.035	0.040	-0.025	0.009	0.119
	(0.186)	(0.182)	(0.136)	(0.154)	(0.154)
Catholic	0.005	0.004	0.003	0.004*	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Muslim	-0.011***	-0.008**	-0.005*	-0.008**	-0.008**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Protestant	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Fractionalization	0.232	-0.100	0.439	0.235	-0.084
	(0.404)	(0.340)	(0.268)	(0.347)	(0.286)
Constant	-0.414	-0.311	-0.369	-0.318	-0.017
	(0.472)	(0.406)	(0.292)	(0.402)	(0.317)
R-squared	0.35	0.37	0.22	0.29	0.28
Observations	146	146	146	146	146

Table E4: Tightness

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-R	(3) CC-P	(4) CC-C	(5) CC-B
Tightness	-0.052	-0.033	-0.020	-0.061	-0.001
	(0.069)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.061)	(0.052)
Constant	0.767	0.603	0.274	0.753	0.103
	(0.496)	(0.377)	(0.234)	(0.404)	(0.385)
R-squared	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.00
Observations	31	31	31	31	31

Tables

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
CC-T	169	0.01	1.01	-2.21	1.05
CC-R	169	-0.08	0.86	-1.40	0.95
CC-P	169	0.03	0.57	-1.50	0.38
CC-C	169	0.08	0.84	-1.56	0.83
CC-B	169	-0.11	0.81	-1.92	0.43
V-T	169	0.53	1.24	-2.60	3.00
Generalized morality	79	-0.02	0.27	-0.52	0.77
Individualism	98	0.40	0.22	0.06	0.91
Power distance	68	0.59	0.22	0.11	1.04
Long-term orientation	89	0.46	0.24	0.04	1.00
Indulgence (vs. restraint)	89	0.45	0.22	0.00	1.00
Masculinity	68	0.49	0.20	0.05	1.10
Uncertainty avoidance	68	0.68	0.23	0.08	1.12
Island	163	0.18	0.38	0.00	1.00
Landlocked	163	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
Latitude	163	26.31	17.35	0.00	65.00
Pct. land area in the tropics	149	0.31	0.41	0.00	1.00
Former Spanish colony	169	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00
Former French colony	169	0.18	0.39	0.00	1.00
Former British colony	169	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00
Never colonized	169	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00
Share Muslim	164	23.00	35.08	0.00	99.90
Ethnic fractionalization	161	0.45	0.26	0.00	0.93
Trust, reg. IV	68	27.34	12.20	6.50	50.50
Tolerance, reg. IV	68	67.29	5.74	54.40	77.26
Blood distance to the UK, IV	95	1.52	0.81	0.00	3.34
Pathogen prevalence, IV	95	0.00	0.65	-1.31	1.16
Kinship, IV	96	0.49	0.31	0.00	1.00
Individualism, reg. IV	80	40.80	20.70	2.00	91.00
Power distance, reg. IV	64	60.07	15.38	30.36	84.25
Long-term orientation, reg. IV	58	41.86	18.92	0.00	82.67
Masculinity, reg. IV	64	50.06	6.77	34.33	68.00
Uncertainty avoidance, reg. IV	64	68.19	18.14	37.00	96.80
Democracy	168	0.60	0.49	0.00	1.00
Tightness	31	6.48	2.87	1.60	12.30
Year of universal suffrage	167	1961.41	22.88	1901.00	2008.00

Table 2: Generalized morality, OLS

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-T	(3) CC-T	(4) CC-R	(5) CC-P	(6) CC-C	(7) CC-B
Morality	0.854**	0.142	0.186	0.153	-0.066	0.256	0.110
	(0.305)	(0.427)	(0.357)	(0.278)	(0.226)	(0.393)	(0.401)
Island		0.365	0.242	0.035	0.156	0.204	0.320
		(0.192)	(0.188)	(0.149)	(0.105)	(0.214)	(0.197)
Landlocked		-0.349	-0.287	-0.304	-0.201	-0.174	0.013
		(0.279)	(0.235)	(0.223)	(0.148)	(0.184)	(0.149)
Latitude		0.023*	0.001	0.005	0.007	-0.001	-0.013
		(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Tropics		0.100	-0.792	-0.738*	0.068	-0.403	-1.566***
		(0.492)	(0.404)	(0.331)	(0.285)	(0.401)	(0.317)
ESP colony			-0.147	0.044	-0.062	-0.180	-0.254
			(0.282)	(0.207)	(0.170)	(0.283)	(0.231)
FRA colony			0.188	-0.049	-0.032	0.217	0.557*
			(0.348)	(0.221)	(0.138)	(0.422)	(0.270)
GBR colony			0.045	0.406*	-0.037	-0.149	-0.158
			(0.221)	(0.156)	(0.167)	(0.220)	(0.234)
Not colonized			-0.113	-0.033	-0.124	-0.094	-0.019
			(0.206)	(0.197)	(0.118)	(0.182)	(0.165)
Muslim			-0.017***	-0.014***	-0.007*	-0.013***	-0.010***
			(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Fractionalization			0.233	0.031	0.058	0.393	0.011
			(0.421)	(0.316)	(0.336)	(0.404)	(0.297)
Constant	0.333***	-0.527	0.664	0.377	0.048	0.581	0.907*
	(0.097)	(0.516)	(0.610)	(0.494)	(0.274)	(0.628)	(0.434)
R-squared	0.07	0.20	0.49	0.50	0.32	0.40	0.49
Observations	79	76	75	75	75	75	75

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Table 3: Individualism, OLS

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-T	(3) CC-T	(4) CC-R	(5) CC-P	(6) CC-C	(7) CC-B
Individualism	1.680***	1.448**	1.356*	1.523**	0.322	0.905	0.785
	(0.268)	(0.492)	(0.572)	(0.564)	(0.238)	(0.475)	(0.525)
Island		0.341	0.264	0.125	0.133	0.164	0.391
		(0.187)	(0.199)	(0.186)	(0.103)	(0.190)	(0.223)
Landlocked		0.247	0.101	0.093	0.088	-0.008	0.157
		(0.228)	(0.219)	(0.228)	(0.112)	(0.202)	(0.149)
Latitude		0.010	0.001	0.005	0.002	0.001	-0.011
		(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Tropics		0.422	-0.109	-0.056	-0.011	0.127	-0.712*
		(0.389)	(0.296)	(0.308)	(0.203)	(0.227)	(0.333)
ESP colony			-0.030	-0.001	-0.009	-0.047	-0.015
			(0.246)	(0.220)	(0.134)	(0.216)	(0.252)
FRA colony			-0.028	-0.282	0.002	0.061	0.275
			(0.273)	(0.220)	(0.131)	(0.309)	(0.200)
GBR colony			-0.059	0.114	-0.123	-0.051	-0.157
			(0.196)	(0.202)	(0.114)	(0.172)	(0.228)
Not colonized			-0.411*	-0.321	-0.347*	-0.237	-0.129
			(0.202)	(0.188)	(0.138)	(0.170)	(0.188)
Muslim			-0.013***	-0.009**	-0.004*	-0.013***	-0.007*
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Fractionalization			-0.091	-0.171	-0.096	0.082	-0.122
			(0.390)	(0.358)	(0.290)	(0.345)	(0.337)
Constant	-0.356*	-0.773*	0.111	-0.309	0.196	0.117	0.402
	(0.161)	(0.347)	(0.423)	(0.404)	(0.225)	(0.388)	(0.327)
R-squared	0.19	0.23	0.46	0.47	0.25	0.44	0.27
Observations	98	94	94	94	94	94	94

Table 4: Power distance, OLS

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-T	(3) CC-T	(4) CC-R	(5) CC-P	(6) CC-C	(7) CC-B
Power dist.	-1.766***	-1.442**	-1.306**	-1.363**	-0.172	-1.122**	-0.620
	(0.331)	(0.470)	(0.471)	(0.446)	(0.202)	(0.383)	(0.492)
Island		0.302	0.290	0.171	0.166	0.161	0.368
		(0.181)	(0.211)	(0.164)	(0.131)	(0.211)	(0.255)
Landlocked		0.111	-0.044	0.046	-0.009	-0.150	0.072
		(0.281)	(0.226)	(0.236)	(0.124)	(0.183)	(0.116)
Latitude		0.006	0.002	0.005	0.006	0.000	-0.010
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Tropics		-0.109	-0.421	-0.251	-0.016	-0.204	-1.041**
		(0.474)	(0.339)	(0.286)	(0.241)	(0.295)	(0.372)
ESP colony			-0.175	-0.238	0.075	-0.138	-0.192
			(0.293)	(0.240)	(0.167)	(0.251)	(0.288)
FRA colony			-0.200	-0.062	-0.141	-0.296	0.134
			(0.442)	(0.240)	(0.154)	(0.476)	(0.330)
GBR colony			-0.173	-0.024	-0.023	-0.204	-0.263
			(0.221)	(0.173)	(0.129)	(0.228)	(0.224)
Not colonized			-0.528*	-0.470*	-0.342*	-0.304	-0.248
			(0.210)	(0.183)	(0.142)	(0.156)	(0.175)
Muslim			-0.014***	-0.011***	-0.005	-0.011*	-0.009**
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Fractionalization			0.063	-0.103	-0.333	0.356	0.295
			(0.395)	(0.324)	(0.293)	(0.382)	(0.343)
Constant	1.538***	1.101	1.614*	1.410**	0.327	1.314*	1.177
	(0.162)	(0.598)	(0.620)	(0.485)	(0.241)	(0.557)	(0.642)
R-squared	0.24	0.28	0.54	0.58	0.35	0.48	0.42
Observations	68	65	65	65	65	65	65

Table 5: Long-term orientation, OLS

	(1) CC-T	(2) CC-T	(3) CC-T	(4) CC-R	(5) CC-P	(6) CC-C	(7) CC-B
LTO	0.569	-0.064	-0.575	-0.532	0.130	-0.717	-0.264
	(0.423)	(0.459)	(0.493)	(0.433)	(0.333)	(0.429)	(0.394)
Island		0.506**	0.425*	0.162	0.244	0.319	0.514*
		(0.185)	(0.208)	(0.169)	(0.135)	(0.197)	(0.227)
Landlocked		-0.308	-0.313	-0.342	-0.155	-0.169	-0.140
		(0.242)	(0.218)	(0.204)	(0.157)	(0.174)	(0.170)
Latitude		0.019*	0.005	0.009	0.005	0.001	-0.005
		(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Tropics		-0.115	-0.903*	-0.582	-0.289	-0.556	-1.360***
		(0.445)	(0.399)	(0.373)	(0.333)	(0.363)	(0.331)
ESP colony			-0.261	-0.124	0.072	-0.368	-0.279
			(0.280)	(0.208)	(0.229)	(0.250)	(0.245)
FRA colony			0.215	-0.058	0.172	0.184	0.391
			(0.265)	(0.207)	(0.178)	(0.310)	(0.209)
GBR colony			0.051	0.340*	0.041	-0.197	-0.031
			(0.200)	(0.158)	(0.184)	(0.188)	(0.195)
Not colonized			-0.159	-0.069	-0.181	-0.093	-0.064
			(0.207)	(0.193)	(0.136)	(0.162)	(0.154)
Muslim			-0.017***	-0.014***	-0.006*	-0.015***	-0.010***
			(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Fractionalization			0.275	-0.034	0.167	0.438	0.030
			(0.454)	(0.331)	(0.389)	(0.424)	(0.312)
Constant	0.018	-0.340	0.815	0.504	0.009	0.892	0.710
	(0.223)	(0.439)	(0.538)	(0.451)	(0.419)	(0.448)	(0.423)
R-squared	0.02	0.20	0.48	0.48	0.28	0.43	0.43
Observations	89	84	83	83	83	83	83

Correlation matrix:

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1) Generalized morality	1.00						
(2) Individualism	0.50***	1.00					
(3) Power distance	-0.60***	-0.62***	1.00				
(4) Long-term orientation	0.01	0.15	0.04	1.00			
(5) Indulgence (vs. restraint)	0.23*	0.17	-0.30*	-0.42***	1.00		
(6) Masculinity	-0.25	0.06	0.14	0.02	0.08	1.00	
(7) Uncertainty avoidance	-0.54***	-0.24*	0.24*	-0.02	-0.11	-0.05	1.00