Imperfect Information About Consumer Rights: Implications for Efficiency and Distribution

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Abstract

This paper shows that providing consumer rights can decrease welfare when some consumers remain ignorant. In our framework, consumers uninformed about a mandated warranty may demand excessively safe products in equilibrium. Without the inefficiency uninformed consumers buy the same and efficient product variety as informed consumers but uninformed consumers cross-subsidize informed consumers via firms’ pricing. With respect to the policy option of improving information about consumer-rights, we find that increasing the share of informed consumers may actually raise the risk of inefficiency.

Keywords: Consumer Policy, Misperception, Efficiency, Information, Product Safety.

JEL Codes: D18, K12, K13.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Motivation and Main Results

Knowing when and how to intervene in markets to improve their outcomes is critical for social welfare and represents a long-standing challenge for policy makers. Several empirically very relevant factors can motivate specific economic policies to protect consumers when they transact with supposedly more powerful or knowledgeable firms. For example, potentially misleading or even fraudulent firm behavior and asymmetric information with respect to product quality or safety are concerns that strongly suggest government intervention to protect consumers’ economic interests. In a classical contribution, Spence (1977) asserts that, when consumers underestimate the probability of product defects, consumers should be able to demand a remedy from firms in case of product failure. However, evidence exists that consumers may have little knowledge of their rights (e.g., Bar-Gill and Davis, 2017; Blinder and Krueger, 2004; Wobker et al., 2014). For instance, in a representative 2010 study for the European Union, only 60 percent of consumers were aware of their right to return a good without giving a reason if they purchased the product through post, phone or internet, and only 40 percent of consumers correctly stated their entitlement to free repair or replacement of a fridge which broke down after 18 months (European Commission (2011)).

Although the empirical relevance of consumers’ imperfect information about their rights is undisputed, whether this questions the desirability of providing consumer rights in the first place has not been considered in the previous literature.

This paper shows that providing consumer rights can decrease welfare when some consumers remain ignorant about their rights. In our framework, a product may experience a product failure when the firm invests in normal care but will never fail should the firm invest in high care. Any

1 Such misperceptions of rights are also important in other life domains. For example, Kim (1997) shows for the US that many employees who may be dismissed "at will" actually believe that they are protected against dismissal without just cause.

2 It is important to note that heterogeneity with respect to the willingness to claim consumer rights, due to limited financial resources or knowledge about legal procedure and/or legal council, has effects similar to heterogeneity with respect to knowledge of consumer rights. For example, Engstrom (2011) reports that individuals from groups with low socio-economic status lack legal access. This analogy signifies an even wider applicability of our analysis.

3 Our model is also representative of other circumstances. For example, one product may require an update in
product failure can be repaired at a cost. By assumption, it is efficient that the firm sticks to normal care and the repair costs are incurred in the event of product failure. The policy maker may or may not mandate a warranty that effectively concerns who (not accounting for equilibrium price adjustments) bears the repair costs. If a warranty is mandated, firms are legally obliged to repair any product failure at zero cost for the consumer. In an effort to represent the empirically documented misperceptions on behalf of consumers, we assume that only a share of consumers understand their rights in the event of a product failure, whereas other consumers believe that they have to pay for any eventual repair even when the mandated warranty is in place.

In our basic model we assume competitive firms and risk-neutral consumers. In case no warranty is mandated, all consumers buy the efficient normal-care product and incur the expected repair costs themselves. However, with a warranty mandate, circumstances exist in which uninformed consumers buy the excessively safe product while informed consumers purchase the product with efficient care. This can result because uninformed consumers overestimate the full price of the product manufactured with efficient care (with full price in the meaning of Shavell (1987), for example). This results as consumers add the expected repair costs to the price charged by the firm where the latter already comprises the firm’s expected repair costs which leads to double counting. In other circumstances, both uninformed and informed consumer demand the efficient normal-care product as in the scenario without a mandatory warranty. This scenario in which the inefficiency from excessive care is avoided is more likely if the share of informed consumers is low and/or care is relatively costly while the expected repair cost is small. Also under these circumstances the provision of consumer rights is still consequential when some consumers remain ignorant about their rights. In this case the mandated warranty redistributes from uninformed to informed consumers because all consumers pay for the informed consumers’ expected repairs costs
via the product’s price while uninformed consumers pay for their own repairs in full. This also explains why a high share of informed consumers or high expected repair cost make the scenario in which this cross-subsidization happens less likely as the cross-subsidization becomes more costly. This is a critical observation when it comes to providing consumer-rights information as a possible policy response to consumers’ ignorance. Increasing the share of informed consumers may actually lead to a move from the cross-subsidization equilibrium to the equilibrium entailing the inefficient high-safety product.

In addition to our basic model, we offer analyses of two variations: one in which we consider a monopolistic firm instead of competitive ones and another version in which consumers are risk averse instead of risk neutral. We find that the main result from our basic model is robust to these variations: providing consumer rights can reduce welfare if some consumers remain ignorant about their rights. As in the basic model, the fundamental reason is that firms may offer the product with excessive safety although it is socially undesirable. In contrast to our analysis of the basic model, with monopolistic price setting, the fact that the firm offers the high-safety product to uninformed consumers can be welfare enhancing if a mandated warranty is in place. However, the monopolist chooses to offer the high-safety product variant more often than is demanded from a welfare perspective. With risk-averse consumers and competitive risk-neutral firms, a mandated warranty conveys the welfare gain of an efficient risk allocation between firms and informed consumers. However, the corresponding increase in welfare can be dominated by the welfare loss that results if firms offer the excessively safe product to uninformed consumers.

Our results highlight that limited information about consumer rights can seriously question the social desirability of providing consumer rights in the first place. This may be the case even if the share of uninformed consumers is small. Given that it is widely accepted that consumers have limited information about their consumer rights, our finding has wide-reaching policy implications. Furthermore, even absent a loss in efficiency consumer ignorance can induce substantial distributional effects. Informed consumers may gain at the expense of ignorant consumers where the latter are more likely to belong to more vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. Also in this
way such a consumer protection policy may fail to achieve its main objectives.

1.2 Related Literature

Our paper analyzes whether some consumers’ ignorance about their rights can question the social desirability of providing consumer rights and contributes to the previous literature in two ways.

First, we contribute to the law-and-economics strand of the literature in which it is commonly assumed that agents will (at least on average) become aware of and correctly understand regulations as they apply to them. Misperceptions are mostly analyzed to the extent to which they concern the choice regarding compliance with the law (e.g., Garoupa, 1999). Bar-Gill and Davis (2017) represent an important exception to the rule. They assume that all consumers misperceive the applicable legal standard and inquire about the optimality of adjusting the standard in response to the consumers’ misperception. In contrast, in the present paper, we assume that some consumers perfectly understand the regulation while others do not and our results hinge on this asymmetry. In addition, in the setup of Bar-Gill and Davis, the application of a strict-liability regime would resolve any problems stemming from consumers’ misperceptions of their rights, whereas it is exactly such a policy that can create inefficiency in our setup.

Second, we contribute to the very rich literature on behavioral industrial organization. Several papers consider the possibility that consumers may misperceive specific features of individual products (Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2018; Grubb, 2015). In our paper, consumers may remain ignorant about their legal rights as they pertain to all transactions on the market. Nevertheless, our result regarding the redistribution from uninformed to informed consumers when all consumers buy the normal-care product is reminiscent of important papers from this literature such as Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and Armstrong and Vickers (2012). In this sense, our paper also contributes to the question whether the presence of informed consumer offers protection to less informed consumers, as is discussed, for instance, in Armstrong (2015). Interestingly, in our setting, redistribution from uninformed to informed consumers can be created by extending consumer rights.
1.3 Plan of the Paper

The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic model with competitive firms and risk-neutral consumers and compare the no-warranty and the mandated-warranty regimes. The case of a monopolistic firm is considered in Section 3, whereas Section 4 contains the analysis featuring risk-averse consumers. Section 5 concludes.

2 The Basic Model

2.1 Description

In our basic model, risk-neutral consumers have a valuation amounting to $v$ for a product supplied by a competitive industry at a constant per-unit cost $c$, where $v > c \geq 0$. Consumers consider buying one unit of the product. The firm can apply normal or high care in the manufacturing process. If the product is manufactured with normal care, the product experiences a failure with probability $\pi$. The realization of a product failure is independent across consumers. A failure implies the loss of the consumer’s product valuation $v$ but can be perfectly remedied at a fixed repair cost $r$. Repair is efficient, i.e., $r < v$. If the product is manufactured with high care instead, the firm incurs an additional per-unit safety cost $x$ which excludes the possibility of a product defect. Each firm’s choice between normal and high care is common knowledge.

For our analysis, we assume that $v > c + x$ and $x > \pi r = \rho$, where $\rho$ is the expected repair costs. The latter assumption signifies that the additional cost for high care exceeds the associated benefit in terms of lower expected product repair costs. The first assumption then implies that for both product types consumption benefits surpass costs. Consequently, in the efficient allocation,

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4In Sections 3 and 4, we depart from these assumptions. First, we analyze the outcome with a monopolistic firm that serves consumers with heterogeneous valuations for the product, and, next, consider risk-averse instead of risk-neutral consumers.

5The assumption that high safety ensures no product failure is used for convenience but not critical to our main results.

6It is common to assume that product safety is observable to consumers (see, e.g., Daughety and Reinganum, 2006). For papers considering repercussions of asymmetric information about product safety, refer to Daughety and Reinganum (1995), for example.
all consumers buy one unit of the product manufactured with normal care and the product is repaired in the event of a product failure.

The firm-consumer interaction is guided by consumer law. We distinguish two legal regimes and assume that firms are always bound by the applicable legal rules (as in, e.g., Daughety and Reinganum, 2006). In the first regime, consumers bear the risk of a product failure, that is, they pay for repair in the event of product failure. In the second regime, a mandatory warranty is in place that requires firms to repair defective products at own costs. Our analysis is motivated by the empirical observation that some consumers are unaware of their consumer rights. This is reflected in our setup by assuming that some consumers, share \( 1 - \alpha \), are ignorant about their right to demand from the firm to cover the repair cost when the warranty is mandatory. Consequently, with a mandated warranty, informed consumers understand that the purchase of a normal-care product implies a full price that consists only of the price paid to the firm; uninformed consumers instead consider a full price that includes both the price paid to the firm and the expected repair costs.

To derive the market equilibrium, we consider a two-stage game. In stage 1 firms simultaneously choose prices and whether to offer a product with normal or high care. In stage 2, consumers make their purchase decisions.

2.2 Analysis

In this section, we compare the competitive market outcomes that obtain when there is no mandated warranty to the case where a mandatory warranty is in place.

2.2.1 No Mandated Warranty (Laissez-Faire)

In the laissez-faire regime, consumers bear expected repair costs \( \rho \) when they buy a product manufactured with normal care. The consumer’s full price \( q_n \) includes the transfer to the firm \( p_n \) and the expected repair costs \( \rho \), \( q_n = p_n + \rho \).\(^7\) A firm’s use of high care excludes the possibility

\(^7\)Subscripts denote whether the firm has applied normal care (\( n \)) or high care (\( h \)).
of a product failure such that \( q_h = p_h \). However, the firm incurs an additional care cost \( x \). The assumption of a competitive industry implies prices equal to unit costs for every product offered, resulting in \( p_n = c \) and \( p_h = c + x \). Because the additional care costs \( x \) outweigh the saving of expected repair costs \( \rho \) by assumption, we have \( q_n < q_h \). Thus, all firms offer the normal-care product in equilibrium which is purchased by all consumers. Firms earn zero profits.

### 2.2.2 Mandated Warranty

With a mandated warranty, consumers can demand that the firm repairs the product at no additional personal cost. We assume that some consumers are unaware of their rights resulting from the warranty and that uninformed consumers do not use signals such as product prices to possibly infer the availability of a warranty.\(^8\) Firms cannot distinguish informed and uninformed consumers. Informed consumers (superscript \( i \)) understand that full prices coincide with market prices, \( q_n^i = p_n \) and \( q_h^i = p_h \), because firms have to repair defective products in the mandated-warranty regime. In contrast, uninformed consumers (superscript \( ni \)) perceive full consumer prices \( q_n^{ni} = p_n + \rho \) and \( q_h^{ni} = p_h \).

We start with the following observation:

#### Lemma 1

With a mandatory warranty, informed consumers buy normal-care products in equilibrium.

**Proof.** We prove the observation by contradiction. If informed consumers bought the high-care product, uninformed consumers would likewise do so because \( q_n^i \geq q_h^i \) implies \( q_n^{ni} = q_n^i + \rho > q_h^{ni} = q_h^i \). Competition ensures \( p_h = c + x \). In this case, a firm can attract informed consumers by offering a normal-care product at price \( p_n = c + x - \epsilon, \epsilon \) small, thereby securing a profit per unit equal to \( c + x - \epsilon - (c + \rho) = x - \rho - \epsilon > 0 \).

With a mandated warranty, the market equilibrium will thus be characterized by either the co-existence of high- and normal-care products or the exclusive provision of normal-care products. We elaborate on these equilibrium candidates in turn.

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\(^8\)This assumption is usually imposed in industrial organization models assuming behavioral consumers (e.g., Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2018).
Consider the equilibrium candidate in which both the high- and the normal-care products are offered. Since informed consumers buy the normal-care product (see Lemma 1), it must be uninformed consumers who purchase the high-care product. Competition ensures zero profits such that \( p_n = c + \rho \) (i.e., the product’s price matches the firm’s expected per-unit repair costs) and \( p_h = c + x \).

Next, consider the equilibrium candidate in which only the normal-care product is traded. Competition drives firms’ expected profits to zero, implying \( p_n = c + \alpha \rho \). This price reflects that only informed consumers (share \( \alpha \)) create expected repair costs for firms.

Proposition 1 summarizes the equilibrium:

**Proposition 1** Assume a mandated warranty and that competitive firms serve demand. (i) If \( \alpha \geq \hat{\alpha} = (x - \rho)/\rho \), informed consumers buy the normal-care product at \( p_n = c + \rho \) and uninformed consumers purchase the high-care product at \( p_h = c + x \). (ii) If \( \alpha < \hat{\alpha} \), all consumers buy normal-care products at \( p_n = c + \alpha \rho \).

**Proof.** (i) The equilibrium with separated markets requires that uninformed consumers prefer the high-care product and firms have no incentive to deviate. Informed consumers buy the normal-care product as explained in Lemma 1. Uninformed consumers prefer the high-care product to the normal-care product as long as \( q_{ni}^n = c + 2\rho \geq q_{ni}^h = c + x \), which requires \( 2\rho \geq x \). For firms it can never be optimal to offer the high-care product at a price that deviates from \( p_h \). In contrast, a firm may make a profit by undercutting the price of the normal-care product if this allows the firm to serve uninformed consumers who do not demand repair of defective products. The additional profits with uninformed consumers may suffice to cover losses incurred for informed consumers. With the firm serving both kind of consumers the expected per-unit cost amount to \( c + \alpha \rho \). The maximum price that allows to attract uninformed consumers results from \( \hat{p}_n + \rho = q_{ni}^h - \epsilon = c + x - \epsilon \) because uninformed consumers associate expected repair costs \( \rho \) with the normal-care product. The deviation to \( \hat{p}_n \) results in positive firm’s profits when \( \hat{p}_n = c + x - \rho - \epsilon \geq c + \alpha \rho \). This would require \( \alpha < \hat{\alpha} = (x - \rho)/\rho \). In summary, noting that \( \alpha \geq \hat{\alpha} \) implies \( x < 2\rho \), the equilibrium with both high-care and normal-care products exists for \( \alpha \geq \hat{\alpha} \).
(ii) Firms trade only the normal-care product if no firm benefits from offering the high-care product to uninformed consumers. The maximum price uninformed consumers would pay for the high-care product is \( \hat{p}_h = p_n + \rho - \epsilon = c + (1 + \alpha)\rho - \epsilon \) which would guarantee a non-negative profit for \( \hat{p}_h = c + (1 + \alpha)\rho - \epsilon \geq c + x \). Consequently, deviation to the high-care product is not profitable when \( \alpha < \hat{\alpha} \).

The regime with a mandated warranty induces a unique equilibrium in which either both normal-care and high-care products are traded or only normal-care ones. The outcome depends on how the share of informed consumers \( \alpha \) compares to the relative increase in costs for a high-care product \( (x - \rho)/\rho \). Firms have no incentive to offer the high-care product variant when the share of informed consumers is low or, equivalently, the additional care costs are relatively high. With only normal-care products on offer firms charge \( p_n = c + \alpha\rho \), and uninformed consumers are willing to pay an additional amount \( \rho \) for a high-safety product. Accordingly, the maximum price a firm can charge for the high-care product is \( c + (1 + \alpha)\rho \) which is not high enough to cover costs \( c + x \) for a too low share of informed consumers \( \alpha < \hat{\alpha} \). In contrast, for a high share of informed consumers \( (\alpha > \hat{\alpha}) \) the only stable equilibrium features both types of products on offer. In this case, if a firm that offers the normal-care product would like to attract uninformed consumers as well it would have to lower its price below average per-unit costs \( c + \alpha\rho \).

Proposition 1 clarifies that the socially desired outcome in which only normal-care products are traded results for a not too high share of informed consumers \( \alpha \). However, it is important to note that the provision of consumer rights has distributional consequences even absent this inefficiency. With only the normal-care product on offer, firms’ pricing cross-subsidizes informed consumers with transfers from uninformed consumers. Informed consumers obtain the product at a price below marginal costs (i.e., at \( c + \alpha\rho \) instead of \( c + \rho \)) whereas uninformed consumers face a full price above marginal costs. Firms earn a profit equal to \( \alpha\rho \) per unit sold to uninformed consumers and earn zero profits on average.

The thought about distributional effect also provides intuition why the pooling equilibrium with only the normal-care product on offer is obtained for a low share of informed consumers.
while otherwise a separating equilibrium results. As long as the share of informed consumers is not too high, the extent of cross-subsidization in the pooling equilibrium is limited and the high-safety product is not attractive for uninformed consumers. This changes as the share of informed consumers and therefore the extent of cross-subsidization increases.

Proposition 2 summarizes the efficiency and distributional consequences of a mandated warranty:

**Proposition 2** (i) If $\alpha \geq \hat{\alpha}$, a mandated warranty lowers efficiency relative to the laissez-faire regime. Informed consumers and firms are unaffected by the mandated warranty, whereas uninformed consumers lose utility from it. (ii) If $\alpha < \hat{\alpha}$, a mandated warranty leaves efficiency unaffected relative to the laissez-faire regime. However, the mandated warranty induces a redistribution from uninformed consumers to informed consumers. For both possible outcomes, firms are indifferent between the mandated-warranty and the laissez-faire regime.

**Proof.** Follows from above. ■

It is disconcerting that providing consumer rights by mandating a product warranty can lower efficiency when some consumers misperceive their rights. In addition, even if there is no inefficiency, the purely distributional repercussions that result when the share of informed consumers is low will imply lower welfare for welfare functions that put a higher weight on disadvantaged individuals when some realistic correlation between socio-economic status and the status of being informed is assumed. Moreover, when some correlation between consumers’ information about the warranty and their vulnerability as consumers is assumed, then the provision of consumer rights harms the people it is intended to protect most strongly. In case (i) of Proposition 2, uninformed consumer lose from the warranty because they ultimately purchase an inefficient product. In case (ii), uninformed consumers lose from the warranty because they cross-subsidize informed consumers.

Our results highlight that increasing consumers’ awareness of their rights may be an important policy complement to the provision of consumer rights. At the same time, we find that the efficiency and distributional consequences of such an awareness policy are not straightforward:
Proposition 3 Assume a mandated warranty. (i) If $\alpha \geq \hat{\alpha}$, increasing the share of informed consumers increases utility of the newly informed consumers and leaves others unaffected. Aggregate consumer welfare increases. (ii) If $\alpha < \hat{\alpha}$, increasing the share of informed consumers benefits newly informed consumers but harms all other consumers via a higher price. Aggregate consumer welfare remains unchanged. (iii) Increasing the share of informed consumers from just below to just above $\hat{\alpha}$ benefits newly informed consumers but harms all already informed consumers. Aggregate consumer welfare decreases.

Proof. (i) Individual consumer welfare amounts to $v - c - \rho$ for informed consumers and $v - c - x$ for uninformed consumers. Aggregate consumer welfare amounts to $v - c - \alpha \rho + (1 - \alpha) x$. Turning an uninformed consumer into an informed one increases individual and total consumer welfare as $\rho < x$. (ii) Individual consumer welfare amounts to $v - c - \alpha \rho$ for informed consumers and $v - c - (1 + \alpha) \rho$ for uninformed consumers. Aggregate consumer welfare equals $v - c - \rho$. (iii) At $\alpha = \hat{\alpha}$, informed consumers’ utility falls from $v - c - \hat{\alpha} \rho$ to $v - c - \rho$. Uninformed consumers’ utility remains unchanged because $v - c - (1 + \hat{\alpha}) \rho = v - c - x$ at $\alpha = \hat{\alpha}$. Aggregate consumer welfare decreases from $v - c - \rho$ to $v - c - \hat{\alpha} \rho - (1 - \hat{\alpha}) x$. ■

We illustrate these results in Figures 1 and 2. As long as $\alpha < \hat{\alpha}$ firms only offer the normal-care product and an increase in the share of informed consumers means that firms more often pay for repairs. The additional costs are passed on to all consumers (see Figure 1). With newly informed consumers being better off, in this range, consumer welfare which equals total welfare is constant at $v - c - \rho$ (see Figure 2).

At some point, the extent to which uninformed consumers cross-subsidize informed ones becomes so large that the former prefer switching to the high-care product. Moving from the equilibrium with only the normal-care product to separated markets, informed consumers’ utility experiences a downward jump in utility as uninformed consumers’ cross-subsidization ceases. Total welfare experiences a downward jump due to the introduction of the inefficient high-safety product variant. In the separated-markets scenario, a further increase in the share of informed consumers is clearly socially beneficial as the newly informed consumers switch form the inefficient
In summary, the economic policy of increasing the share of consumers informed about their rights can be detrimental for welfare and may be associated with unintended distributional effects by increasing the extent of cross-subsidization.

Besides the policy maker, information about consumer rights could also be provided by firms. Note that because the information pertains to consumer rights regarding all products in the market, the information provision cannot generate a competitive advantage for a single firm. When the market equilibrium is such that both product variants are traded, firms earn zero profits with both informed and uninformed consumers and thus do not care about the share of informed consumers. When the market equilibrium is such that only normal-care products are offered, firms charge \( c + \alpha \rho \), earning a profit only with uninformed consumers. In this case, turning a consumer with an unknown type into a consumer who is informed cannot raise profits but may actually result in a loss. Finally, also a shift in the share of informed consumers from below to above \( \hat{\alpha} \) does not increase firms’ profits which remain at zero, negating an incentive for firms to
inform consumers. Therefore:

Remark: Firms have no incentive to inform uninformed consumers about their rights.

3 The Case of a Monopolistic Firm

In this section, we assume that a monopolistic firm serves demand and that consumers’ valuations are uniformly distributed on the unit interval where $v^{max} = 1 > 1 - c - x > 0$. Without competitors trying to lure consumers away from the firm, the monopolist can induce outcomes possibly out-of-equilibrium in the competitive framework.

3.1 No Mandated Warranty (Laissez-Faire)

In the laissez-faire regime, a consumer’s willingness to pay for a normal-care product is $v - \rho$ and $v$ for a high-care product. Because additional care costs $x$ exceed the increase in the consumers’

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The specific assumptions regarding consumer demand are made for simplicity. Results from an alternative model with a uniform valuation are similar and available from the authors upon request.
willingness to pay \( \rho \), the monopolist offers only the normal-care product.\(^{10}\) Consumers with valuations \( v \geq \hat{v} \) buy the product, where \( \hat{v} = p_n + \rho \). The firm maximizes its profits,

\[
\Pi = (p_n - c)(1 - p_n - \rho),
\]

using the profit-maximizing price

\[
p_n = \frac{1 + c - \rho}{2}.
\]

This outcome induces profits and welfare amounting to

\[
\Pi^N = \frac{(1 - c - \rho)^2}{4} \quad \text{and} \quad W^N = \frac{3\Pi^N}{2}.
\]

The laissez-faire regime implies that only the efficient normal-care product is traded. As usual, market power causes an inefficiently low equilibrium output level as welfare would be maximal when the price amounts to marginal costs \( c \).

### 3.2 Mandated Warranty

With a mandated warranty, the firm can choose whether to induce an outcome in which all consumers buy the normal-care product or an outcome in which (un)informed consumers buy the (high-)normal-care product.\(^{11}\) We first derive the profit-maximizing outcome in the two cases and then explain which one is selected by the firm.

**Markets for Normal- and High-Care Products:** The outcome in which (un)informed consumers buy the (high-)normal-care product can only result when the self-selection constraints

\[
p_n \leq p_h \leq p_n + \rho
\]

\(^{10}\)Any combination of prices \( p_n = p_h - \rho \) result in the same level of demand but higher per-unit profits with the normal-care product, \( p_n - c = p_h - c - \rho > p_h - c - x \).

\(^{11}\)Offering only the high-care product is a dominated strategy. The monopolist could always offer the normal-care product next to the high-care product and charge the same price for both products. Informed consumers would switch to the normal-care product which leads to a cost saving for the firm equal to \( x - \rho \) per switching consumer.
are fulfilled, where the first (second) inequality ensures that (un)informed consumers prefer the (high-)normal-care product. (Un)informed consumers buy as long as $v \geq \hat{v}_n(\hat{v}_h) = p_n(p_h)$. Expected repair costs are irrelevant for informed consumers as they demand repairs at no personal cost from the firm and for uninformed consumers as they demand high-care products.

The firm maximizes profits

$$\Pi = \alpha(p_n - c - \rho)(1 - p_n) + (1 - \alpha)(p_h - c - x)(1 - p_h),$$

subject to the self-selection constraints $p_n \leq p_h \leq p_n + \rho$, which results in\(^\text{12}\)

$$p_n = \frac{1 + c + \rho}{2} + \max\left\{\frac{(1 - \alpha)x - 3\rho}{2}, 0\right\} \quad p_h = \frac{1 + c + x}{2} - \max\left\{\frac{\alpha x - 3\rho}{2}, 0\right\}$$

The self-selection constraint for informed consumers, $p_n \leq p_h$, is non-binding for the firm’s profit-maximization. The constraint for uninformed consumers is binding at high values of additional care costs $x$. Higher values of additional costs $x$ increase the firm’s marginal costs and the optimal price in the market segment for the high-care product variant. For $x > 3\rho$, uninformed consumers would prefer the normal-care product if the firm would set prices according to unrestricted profit maximization. Accordingly, when $x > 3\rho$, the firm has to adjust prices for the normal-care (high-care) product upwards (downwards) to sustain the separated markets for normal- and high-care levels.

For $x \leq 3\rho$, we obtain profits and welfare amounting to

$$\Pi^W_{sep} = \alpha \Pi^N + (1 - \alpha) \frac{(1 - c - x)^2}{4} \quad W^W_{sep} = \frac{3\Pi^W_{sep}}{2}.$$ 

Below we will argue that the firm never chooses separated markets when $x > 3\rho$ and therefore omit the respective welfare measures here.

\(^{12}\)The derivation is relegated to the Appendix.
Market Only for Normal-Care Products: Informed (uninformed) consumers buy the normal-care product if \( v \geq p_n \) \((v \geq p_n + \rho)\). This signifies that some price levels will create positive demand only from informed consumers, namely when \( 1 > p_n \geq 1 - \rho \).

The firm chooses the price of the normal-care product to maximize

\[
\Pi = \alpha(p_n - c - \rho)(1 - p_n) + (1 - \alpha)(p_n - c) \max\{(1 - p_n - \rho), 0\},
\]

where the firm understands that it has to bear expected repair costs only for informed consumers. The profit-maximizing price amounts to\(^{13}\)

\[
p_n = \begin{cases} 
\frac{1+c+\rho}{2} - (1 - \alpha)\rho & \text{for } \rho \leq R = \frac{1-c}{1+2\sqrt{\alpha}} \\
\frac{1+c+\rho}{2} & \text{for } \rho > R 
\end{cases}
\]

The firm chooses to serve both groups of consumers as long as repair costs are not too high, \( \rho < R \). If the firm wants to attract both consumer groups, it asks for a price lower than the profit-maximizing price for informed consumers and the discount increases with the level of expected repair costs. This makes serving only informed consumers preferable for the firm when repair costs are high. The critical value \( R \) decreases in the share of informed consumers, that is, a higher value of \( \alpha \) makes it more likely that only informed consumers will be served. For \( \rho \leq R \) we have

\[
\Pi^{W,\text{nosep}} = \Pi^N - \rho^2\alpha(1 - \alpha) \quad \text{and} \quad W^{W,\text{nosep}} = W^N - \frac{\rho^2\alpha(1 - \alpha)}{2}.
\]

Below, we will argue that the firm never chooses to trade only the normal-care product if \( \rho > R \).

We are now in the position to compare profit levels for the two cases. Proposition 4 summarizes the market equilibrium when a monopolistic firm serves the market subject to a mandated warranty:

**Proposition 4** Assume a mandated warranty and that a monopolist serves demand. Define

\(^{13}\)The derivation is relegated to the Appendix.
\[ T = x^2 - 2x(1-c) + 2\rho(1-c) + \rho^2(4\alpha - 1). \]

(i) If \( T \geq 0 \), informed consumers purchase the normal-care product at \( p_n = (1 + c + \rho)/2 \) and uninformed consumers buy the high-care product at \( p_h = (1 + c + x)/2 \).

(ii) If \( T < 0 \), all consumers buy normal-care products at \( p_n = (1 + c + \rho)/2 - (1 - \alpha)\rho \).

\textbf{Proof.} First, consider the two extreme cases where the firm sells only to informed consumers should only normal-care products be sold (i.e., when \( \rho > R \)) and where the uninformed consumers’ self-selection constraint is binding should the monopolistic firm offer both care levels (i.e., when \( x > 3\rho \)). If \( \rho > R \), it is true that \( T > 0 \) and \( x < 3\rho \) (since \( x < 1 - c < (1 + 2\sqrt{\alpha})\rho < 3\rho \)). The firm strictly prefers to offer both product variants at prices \( p_n = (1 + c + \rho)/2 \) and \( p_h = (1 + c + x)/2 \) instead of offering only the normal-care product exclusively to informed consumers. If \( x > 3\rho \), we have that both \( T < 0 \) and \( \rho < R \) (since \( \rho < x/3 < (1-c)/3 < R \)) are true. The firm strictly prefers to offer only the normal-care product. This holds because, starting from the situation with both product variants, it would already be better to only sell the normal-care product without adjusting its price. For the firm, the lost revenue per uninformed consumer is equal to \( \rho \) which falls short of the cost saving \( x \) while uninformed consumers’ demand remains unchanged.

Next, we consider all parameter combinations in between the two extreme cases. When \( \rho \leq R \) and \( x < 3\rho \), the firm compares profits \( \Pi^{W,sep} = \alpha \Pi^N + (1 - \alpha)(1 - c - x)^2/4 \) and \( \Pi^{W,nosep} = \Pi^N - d^2\alpha(1 - \alpha) \). The firm prefers (no) separation of markets for informed and uninformed consumers if
\[
(1 - \alpha)(1 - c - x)^2/4 \geq (\alpha)(1 - \rho)^2/4 - \rho^2\alpha(1 - \alpha)
\]
which results in \( T \geq (>)0 \).

Our main result from the basic model, that a mandated warranty can induce firms to offer an inefficient product variant, is robust to the consideration of market power. In addition, the way in which parameters make one or the other case more likely is also similar. Especially, the critical value \( T \) increases in the share of informed consumers such that the inefficient high-care product
will be offered if the share of informed consumers surpasses a threshold. Higher additional care costs $x$ decrease while higher expected repair costs increases $\mathcal{T}$. In other words, it is less likely that the monopolist offers the high-care product for higher prevention costs and/or lower repair costs.\footnote{We have $\partial \mathcal{T} / \partial \alpha = 4 \rho^2 > 0$, $\partial \mathcal{T} / \partial x = -2(1 - c - x) < 0$, and $\partial \mathcal{T} / \partial \rho = 2(1 - c - \rho) + 8 \rho \alpha > 0$.}

However, note that in the present framework the provision of consumer rights is welfare relevant also if only the efficient normal-care product is offered in equilibrium. The introduction of the warranty affects price setting and introduces different perceived \textit{full} prices for informed and uninformed consumers. With variable demand this results in altered purchase decisions which alter welfare, an effect absent in the base model with given demand.

Regarding consumers, similar distributional implications from the warranty arise with a monopolistic firm when compared to those in the setup with competitive firms. When the firm offers both product variants, informed consumers are indifferent with respect to the warranty (their \textit{full} price is always $(1 + c + \rho)/2$) whereas uninformed consumers lose from the introduction of the warranty (as their \textit{full} price rises from $(1 + c + \rho)/2$ to $(1 + c + x)/2$). When the firm offers only normal-care products, informed consumers gain from the warranty’s introduction whereas uninformed consumers lose from it. The \textit{full} price for informed consumers is reduced by $(1 - \alpha) \rho$ while the \textit{full} price for uninformed consumers increases by $\alpha \rho$. The monopolistic firm strictly prefers the regime with no mandated warranty, whereas competitive firms were indifferent between regimes. With both product variants on offer, the monopolist shares some of the loss due to the introduction of the inefficient high-care product variant. In the equilibrium with only the normal-care product variant on offer, the distortion in prices between informed and uninformed consumers impedes monopolistic profit maximization.

In terms of overall welfare, we find that the provision of consumer rights is always welfare reducing when some consumers remain ignorant about their rights. Informed consumers benefit when only normal-care products are traded. However, their gain is more than offset by the losses of uninformed consumers and the monopolist.
Interestingly, in contrast to the basic model where it is welfare dominant in all circumstances that only the normal-care product is offered, it can be socially optimal to trade the high-care product conditional on a mandated warranty and monopolistic price setting. This possibility results from the fact that the high-care product opens up a second market and thus can counter the monopolist’s incentive to create artificial scarcity. In other words, total output can be higher when both product variants are offered. However, and in line with the findings for the base model, we find that the monopolist introduces the high-care product variant even in circumstances in which it is not socially preferred. From a comparison of welfare levels, it follows that separated markets should obtain only if

\[ x^2 - 2x(1 - c)x + 2\rho(1 - c) - \rho^2(1 - 4\alpha/3) = T - \rho^28\alpha/3 > 0. \]

We summarize the welfare and distributional results in Proposition 5:

**Proposition 5** Assume a mandated warranty and that a monopolist serves demand. Both profits and welfare are always lower than in the laissez-faire regime. The firm offers the high-care product for more parameter combinations than is socially optimal. In addition, we find that (i) if \( T \geq 0 \), informed consumers obtain the same level of utility as without a warranty while uninformed consumers are worse off, and, (ii) if \( T < 0 \), informed (uninformed) consumers are better (worse) off than in the laissez-faire regime.

**Proof.** Follows from the above. ■

We conclude our discussion of the monopoly case by considering the effects of informing consumers, i.e., an increase in the share \( \alpha \). Proposition 6 summarizes the main findings:

**Proposition 6** Assume a mandated warranty and that a monopolist serves demand. (i) If \( T \geq 0 \), that is high- and normal-care products are traded, both profits and welfare increase in the share of informed consumers. (ii) If \( T < 0 \), the firm offers only the normal-care product and an increase in the share of informed consumers reduces (increases) profits and welfare for \( \alpha < (>) 1/2 \).
Proof. We have $\partial T / \partial \alpha > 0$ and Proposition 4 describes how the market equilibrium depends on $T$. With markets for high-care and low-care products, we find $\partial \Pi^{W,sep} / \partial \alpha = ((1 - c - \rho)^2 - (1 - c - x)^2)/4 > 0$ and $\partial W^{W,sep} / \partial \alpha = 3/2 \partial \Pi^{W,sep} / \partial \alpha > 0$. When only the normal-care product is offered, we obtain $\partial \Pi^{W,nosep} / \partial \alpha = -\rho^2(1 - 2\alpha)$ and $\partial W^{W,nosep} / \partial \alpha = -\rho^2(1 - 2\alpha)/2$. ■

If the share of informed consumers is high enough to effect $T \geq 0$, the firm switches to a regime in which both care levels are traded. Any further increase of $\alpha$ increases welfare and profits by shifting consumers to the efficient normal-care product. As long as $T < 0$ such that only the normal-care product is offered by the firm, more informed consumers lower profits and welfare when the change leads to a more heterogeneous consumer population, that is, when the initial share of informed consumers is less than one half. Note that, due to our finding of the firm choosing market separation too often, a downward jump in welfare occurs when the share of consumers just surpasses the threshold to induce market separation.

These findings indicate another difference to the base model summarized in the final remark:

Remark: The monopolist can have an incentive to inform consumers about their rights, especially if the initial share of informed consumers is not too low.

4 The Case of Risk-Averse Consumers

Next, we consider risk-averse consumers and risk-neutral firms. This setup introduces new welfare effects for a mandated warranty under which firms have to repair faulty products at no cost to consumers. In contrast to our basic model, the social evaluation of the high-care product depends on the risk allocation. If firms carry the risk of product failure, risk concerns are no longer relevant and only the normal-care product should be offered. However, if risk lies with consumers, the high-care product may be second-best efficient. The first-best allocation requires risk-neutral firms to bear risks as the cheapest insurer.

Slightly adjusting the framework used in Polinsky (1983), we assume consumers with utility

$$u(y) = y - s(y - E(y))^2,$$
where \( y \) is the outcome, \( s \geq 0 \) measures risk aversion and \( E(.) \) is the expectation operator. The case \( s = 0 \) corresponds to our basic model, and larger values of \( s \) imply greater risk aversion. Consumers maximize expected utility which amounts to

\[
E(u(y)) = E(y) - s \text{Var}(y),
\]

where \( \text{Var}(y) \) is the variance of the outcome variable \( y \).

### 4.1 No Mandated Warranty (Laissez-Faire)

If consumers bear the risk resulting from the possibility of product defect and repair, the high-care product generates both a reduction of expected repair costs (as above) and a reduction of risk-bearing costs to zero (new).\(^{15}\) Our assumptions ensure that the saving in expected repair costs is not sufficient to offset the additional cost \( x \), but the additional reduction in risk-bearing costs may make the investment \( x \) worthwhile.

Price competition ensures prices \( p_n = c \) and \( p_h = c + x \) for the normal-care and the high-care product, respectively. With the normal-care product, consumer utility is \( v - c \) when no product defect occurs and \( v - c - r \) otherwise. In contrast, the high-care product eradicates risk and ensures the outcome \( v - c - x \). We obtain:

**Lemma 2** Assume that there is no mandated warranty and risk-averse consumers. For low levels of risk aversion \( s \leq \bar{s} = (x - \rho)/(\pi(1 - \pi)r^2) \), firms offer the normal-care product at \( p_n = c \). For high levels of risk aversion \( s > \bar{s} \), firms offer the high-care product at \( p_h = c + x \).

**Proof.** The expected outcome and variance from consuming the normal-care product are \( v - c - \rho \) and \( \pi(1 - \pi)r^2 \). With the high-care product consumers achieve expected utility \( v - c - x \). In equilibrium firms offer the product that maximizes consumers’ expected utility resulting in the critical value for risk-aversion \( \bar{s} \).

\(^{15}\)Note that we assume that firms take the market regulation as given. In the present setting, firms would otherwise find it optimal to offer consumers an insurance against the repair cost. Hence, the subsequent analysis is particularly relevant for situations where firms are unable to offer warranties to consumers.
The equilibrium is efficient in a second-best sense. Provided consumers carry the risk of product failure, it is socially optimal if firms offer the high-care product when consumers are sufficiently risk-averse \((s > \bar{s})\). In this case, costs of risk bearing with the normal-care product \((s\pi(1 - \pi)r^2)\) surpass the additional expected costs incurred for the high-safety variant \((x - \rho)\). If risk-aversion is less pronounced \((s < \bar{s})\), offering the normal-care product is second-best efficient.

4.2 Mandated Warranty

When a warranty is mandated, either both product variants or only the normal-care product may be traded in equilibrium. Lemma 1 still applies and an equilibrium in which only the high-care product is traded is unfeasible. The following proposition characterizes firms’ equilibrium behavior.

**Proposition 7** Assume a mandated warranty and risk-averse consumers. (i) If either both \(\alpha > \bar{\alpha} = \hat{\alpha} + s(1 - \pi)/\pi\) and \(s \leq \bar{s}\) or \(s > \bar{s}\), informed consumers buy the normal-care product at \(p_n = c + \rho\) and uninformed consumers purchase the high-care product at \(p_h = c + x\). (ii) If \(\alpha \geq \bar{\alpha}\) and \(s \leq \bar{s}\), all consumers buy the normal-care product at \(p_n = c + \alpha \rho\).

**Proof.** Informed consumers always purchase the normal-care product in equilibrium. When both product variants are offered, uninformed consumers achieve expected utility \(v - c - x\). In order to induce uninformed consumers to purchase the normal-care product instead, a firm would have to set the product’s price \(\bar{p}_n\) such that \(v - \bar{p}_n - \rho - s\pi(1 - \pi)r^2 \geq v - c - x\) resulting in \(\bar{p}_n \leq c + x - \rho - s\pi(1 - \pi)r^2\). Non-negative profits result only for \(\bar{p}_n \geq c + \alpha \rho\) that is if \(\alpha < \bar{\alpha}\). Reversing the argument, with only the normal-care product on offer, each firm charges \(p_n = c + \alpha \rho\) and only if \(\alpha < \bar{\alpha}\) applies will uninformed consumers be better off from buying the high-care product at a price that allows for non-negative profits.

The proposition shows that equilibrium outcomes with a mandated warranty follow a structure similar to that in the basic model. The quantitative difference pertains to the additional risk-cost incurred by uninformed consumers who purchase the normal-care product. As these
consumers expect to bear repair costs themselves they perceive a variance in outcomes equal to \( \pi(1 - \pi)r^2 \). Accordingly, the threshold value for the share of informed consumers above which two markets obtain is lower than that in the baseline scenario absent risk-aversion. With risk-aversion it becomes more likely that the high-care product will be offered to uninformed consumers. Figure 3 illustrates the equilibria that emerge with and without a mandated warranty for different combinations of the risk-aversion parameter and the share of informed consumers.

We are now in a position to analyze the efficiency effects of a mandated warranty. As explained above, consumers’ risk aversion can make it socially desirable that the high-care product is offered. This means that the outcome in which both product variants are traded can be preferred over the outcome in which only the normal-care product is traded because the eradication of risk-bearing costs benefits uninformed consumers. However, the results in Proposition 8 clarify that the competitive equilibrium contains the high-care product in socially too many circumstances.

**Proposition 8** Assume a mandated warranty and risk-averse consumers. (i) If \( s > \bar{s} \) or both \( s \leq \bar{s} \) and \( x > 2\rho \), welfare is higher than in the laissez-faire regime independent of the share of informed consumers. (ii) If \( s \leq \bar{s} \) and \( x < 2\rho \), welfare is higher than in the laissez-faire regime
when either $\alpha < \bar{\alpha}$ or $\alpha > \alpha^* = 1 - \frac{s\pi(1-\pi)}{x-\rho} > \hat{\alpha}$. Welfare is lower due to the warranty when $\alpha \in [\bar{\alpha}, \alpha^*)$.

**Proof.** For $s > \bar{s}$, uninformed consumers are equally well-off in both regimes, consuming a high-safety product at price $c + x$. However, informed consumers are better off with the mandated warranty as it delivers both no risk-bearing costs and the cheaper normal-care product.

With a mandated warranty and $s \leq \bar{s}$, welfare amounts to $\alpha(v - c - \alpha\rho) + (1 - \alpha)(v - c - (1 + \delta)\rho - s\pi(1 - \pi)r^2) = v - c - \rho - (1 - \alpha)s\pi(1 - \pi)r^2$ for $\alpha < \bar{\alpha}$ and $\alpha(v - c - \rho) + (1 - \alpha)(v - c - x) = v - c - \rho - (1 - \alpha)(x - \rho)$ for $\alpha > \bar{\alpha}$. Welfare is increasing in $\alpha$ for $\alpha \in (0, \bar{\alpha})$ and for $\alpha \in (\bar{\alpha}, 1)$. At $\alpha = 0$, welfare with or without a mandated warranty coincide. At $\alpha = \bar{\alpha}$, where the trading of both product variants starts, welfare exhibits a downward jump and amounts to $v - c - \rho - (1 - \bar{\alpha})(x - \rho)$, whereas welfare without the warranty amounts to $v - c - \rho - s\pi(1 - \pi)r^2 = v - c - x + \bar{\alpha}\rho$. Welfare with a mandated warranty is lower than welfare with no warranty if $x < 2\rho$.

With $s < \bar{s}$ and $x < 2\rho$, there exists a value $\alpha^* \in (\bar{\alpha}, 1)$ for which welfare with and without a mandated warranty coincide. The level $\alpha^*$ follows from $v - c - \rho - s\pi(1 - \pi)r^2 = v - c - \rho - (1 - \alpha^*)(x - \rho)$. ■

When risk aversion is large (i.e., $s > \bar{s}$), the mandated warranty improves the situation for informed consumers because they can obtain the cheaper normal-care product without having to bear risk costs. Uninformed consumers consume the high-care product variant with or without the warranty in place. When risk aversion is more moderate so that the high-care product is not offered in the laissez-faire regime, the mandated warranty may increase or decrease welfare. The benefits from the superior risk allocation for informed consumers may be outweighed by the additional costs if the high-care product is offered to uninformed consumers. Firms offer the high-care product for $\alpha > \bar{\alpha}$ and the adverse efficiency effect dominates for intermediate levels of the share of informed consumers as long as additional care costs are not too high ($x < 2\rho$). With a higher share of informed consumers the positive risk allocation effect becomes dominant. For $x > 2\rho$ the high-care product is sufficiently unattractive such that the high-care product is only introduced when the share of informed consumers is so high that a gain in overall welfare is still
Figure 4: Welfare as a function of the share of informed consumers if \( s < \bar{s} \) and \( x < 2\rho \)

obtained.

Figure 4 illustrates welfare levels as a function of the share of informed consumers for \( x < 2\rho \) and \( s < \bar{s} \). The figure again highlights the role of consumer information. While total welfare is non-monotonic in the share of informed consumers, the highest level of welfare is achieved when consumer rights are implemented and all consumers are aware of these rights.

In terms of consumer welfare, we again find that informed consumers benefit and uninformed consumers lose from the provision of consumer rights. However, the distributional effects might be larger compared to those from our basic model. Before, informed consumers were either indifferent or better-off due to a cross-subsidization from uninformed consumers. In the present setup, they also benefit from the eradication of risk-bearing costs. In contrast, uninformed consumers do not benefit from this risk-shifting effect, as they mistakenly believe that they still bear the risk of product failure.

In summary, we again find that the provision of consumer rights can be welfare reducing when some consumers remain ignorant about their rights. As was true in the two previous models, the possible welfare loss results from the offer of an excessively safe product.
5 Conclusion

Evidence shows that consumers have limited knowledge about their rights. It is important for policy makers to understand what this implies for the desirability of market interventions. Simple intuition may suggest that the misperception of some consumers goes to their private disadvantage but is otherwise welfare-neutral.

Using a simple framework, this paper shows that the misperception of consumer rights by some can cause potentially severe inefficiency. This result was established assuming either competitive firms or a monopolist. Our finding suggests that possible misperceptions of rights are a very important factor for the determination and evaluation of economic policy interventions. When introducing risk-averse consumers these results are extended in the sense that efficiency and total consumer surplus only increase as long as gains from the improved risk allocation dominate possible inefficiencies resulting from the purchase decisions by uninformed consumers.

An important implication of our analysis is to show that the welfare effects of extending consumer rights are unbalanced. While consumers who are aware of their rights can benefit, unaware consumers are even hurt. In practice, unaware consumers might be more vulnerable consumer groups which policy makers would like to protect. If policy interventions are meant exactly to protect such consumer groups our model would suggest that well-meant policies might backfire. Therefore, our paper highlights that not only the design of public policy interventions is relevant, but that consumer awareness of their rights is equally important.
References


Monopolistic profit maximization with a mandated warranty

Markets for Normal- and High-Care Products

The partial derivatives with respect to prices \( p_n \) and \( p_h \) are given by

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_n} = \alpha (1 - 2p_n + c + \rho)
\]

and

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_h} = (1 - \alpha)(1 - 2p_h + c + x).
\]

The unrestricted profit-maximizing prices

\[
p_n = \frac{1 + c + \rho}{2} \quad p_h = \frac{1 + c + x}{2}
\]

imply \( p_h > p_n \) due to \( x > \rho \) such that the self-selection constraint for informed consumers is never binding. The self-selection constraint for uninformed consumers is binding if \( (x - \rho)/2 > \rho \) or \( x > 3\rho \). In this case, the prices \( p_n \) and \( p_h \) that maximize profits results from

\[
\alpha(1 - 2p_n + c + \rho) + (1 - \alpha)(1 - 2p_n - 2\rho + c + x) = 0
\]

and \( p_h = p_n + \rho \).

Market Only for Normal-Care Products

The partial derivative of profits with respect to the price \( p_n \) is

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_n} = \begin{cases} 
1 - 2p_n + c + \rho - 2(1 - \alpha)\rho & \text{for } p_n < 1 - \rho \\
\alpha(1 - 2p_n + c + \rho) & \text{for } p_n > 1 - \rho
\end{cases}
\]
The derivative exhibits an upward jump from \((2\alpha + 1)\rho - 1 + c\) to \(3\rho - 1 + c\) at \(p_n \to 1 - \rho\). Consequently, if \(\rho < (1 - c)/3\) the profit maximum is obtained for \(p_n < 1 - \rho\) for sure and if \(\rho > (1 - c)/(2\alpha + 1)\) the profit maximum necessarily requires \(p_n > 1 - \rho\). For \((1 - c)/3 < \rho < (1 - c)/(2\alpha + 1)\) we need to compare profits for \(p_n = (1 + c + \rho)/2 - (1 - \alpha)\rho = p_{n1}\) for which both consumer groups are served and for \(p_n = (1 + c + \rho)/2 = p_{n2}\) with only informed consumers buying the product. We have

\[
\Pi(p_{n1}) = \frac{(1 - c - \rho)^2}{4} - \rho^2 \alpha (1 - \alpha) \quad \text{and} \quad \Pi(p_{n2}) = \frac{\alpha (1 - c - \rho)^2}{4}
\]

where

\[
\Pi(p_{n1}) \geq \Pi(p_{n2}) \iff \rho \leq R = \frac{1 - c}{1 + 2\sqrt{\alpha}}.
\]