

## **B) Aktionsformen der Diplomatie**

### **6. Innovative Formen der Diplomatie (double-track diplomacy, Tsunami diplomacy)**

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## Disaster Diplomacy: *Discord Disintegrated?*

Do natural disasters induce international cooperation amongst countries that have traditionally been 'enemies'? Despite its potential to impact on the dynamics of international affairs, the concept of *Disaster Diplomacy*, the notion that disaster management can prompt long-term change in international relations, has never been addressed fully.

The occurrence, or threat, of natural disasters creates opportunities to facilitate better cooperation or relations amongst states in conflict by fostering linkages which otherwise might not have existed. The cooperative spirit generated from common efforts to deal with disasters - through either perceived necessity or choice from the humanitarian imperative - has the potential to override pre-existing prejudices, and break down barriers which then may never be rebuilt. Even when the initiative derives from the general populace, it could influence bilateral and multilateral relations in areas such as trade, environmental management, and cultural exchange.

Consequently, this process may create conditions for economic, political, or ideological divides and conflicts to be gradually superseded by cooperative structures and mechanisms. Thus, 'spill-over' from predominantly technical or scientific collaboration and humanitarian assistance to successful diplomatic rapprochement can occur. Alternatively, perhaps nothing except changes at the highest level will ever eradicate deeply entrenched interstate enmity, with the inertia of 'Disastrous Diplomacy' being the usual state of affairs.

This section embraces the challenge of examining which prerequisites and circumstances could yield a successful transformation, due to natural disaster, of international relations. It does this by investigating specific case studies covering three natural disasters - earthquakes, drought, and the El Niño phenomenon - on three continents in order to provide a valid empirical basis for hypothesising on the concept of *Disaster Diplomacy*. These case studies are then analysed in the context of a theoretical model which could assist in identifying when and why *Disaster Diplomacy* would occur.

Combining disaster management with international relations is rarely achieved, implying that this section is at the forefront of International Relations theory and practice. We are convinced that the insightful and detailed analyses provided by the authors are just the beginning of further discussion and deliberation on the existence and ramifications of *Disaster Diplomacy*.

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## Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: The Impact of 'Disaster diplomacy'?

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S. 228 ff.

This article challenges the widely held view that the Greek-Turkish rapprochement of 1999 was the direct result of the collaboration following the earthquakes that hit both countries that year. The high-level political and diplomatic efforts which form the basis of the improved relations and which preceded the earthquakes are examined. The article goes on to provide a detailed account of the efforts at governmental and non-governmental levels to mitigate the effects of the disasters and illustrates the impact of the two disastrous events on public perceptions of the 'enemy' and on bilateral relations. In this context, the author warns against the simplistic assumption that diplomatic efforts should be causally linked with the occurrence of disasters. Instead, he asserts that disasters may have a multiplying and legitimising effect on diplomatic rapprochement.

Since the middle of the 1950s, relations between Greece and Turkey have been a source of serious concern for peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean and have presented the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) with its most protracted internal division. In addition to the seemingly intractable problem of Cyprus, disputes over territorial sovereignty in the Aegean Sea, and Turkish arguments about the negative role Greece has played in Turkish relations with the European Union (EU), have served to make the relationship between these nominal allies a source of constant concern for peace and stability in southeast Europe. However, since March 1999, something almost miraculous appears to have happened: Athens and Ankara seem at last to be willing to place their relations on a cordial footing. At the heart of this new-found relationship is the success of the two foreign ministers, George Papandreou and Ismail Cem, in identifying areas of mutual concern and agreeing measures for bilateral cooperation.

Yet, in the minds of many, there has been a tendency to attribute this enormous change in the nature of Greek-Turkish relations to the earthquakes that struck the two countries in August and September 1999, rather than to focus on

the efforts of the two governments. In the aftermath of these tragedies, the world witnessed an outpouring of emotion between the people of the two countries and was amazed to see that such feelings seemingly altered the whole pattern of relations between these, often hostile, allies. Seizing upon the events of August and September 1999, many commentators took to referring to the change of relations between Athens and Ankara as being a process of 'disaster diplomacy'.

While the earthquakes certainly had a major impact in changing public perceptions of the relationship, to claim that the earthquakes brought about rapprochement is both factually wrong, and indeed weakens the basis for the process. While public opinion is undoubtedly powerful, it is also fickle. And a process built solely upon a popular outburst, such as that seen at the time of the disasters, would be unlikely to stand the significant tests that are inevitably placed upon peace processes. In reality, the current *détente* is built upon something far more valuable. Namely, a sincere recognition by two governments that in the contemporary international environment a policy of cooperation is far more advantageous than continued confrontation.

This is not to say that 'disaster diplomacy' has not been important; it has played a fundamental role in the development of the process of rapprochement between Athens and Ankara. However, this impact has been most pronounced not in the formulation of policies to foster rapprochement but in the creation of a positive environment in which to implement such policies. Rather than start the process, 'disaster diplomacy' opened the way for the development of greater ties between the people of the two countries and thus allowed for the strengthening of the dialogue developed between the two governments in advance of the earthquakes. Therefore, disaster diplomacy is a process of 'citizen diplomacy' that has legitimised, and generated popular support for, an official process that had already been put in place several months earlier.

### *1. Greek-Turkish disputes*

For almost fifty years, relations between Greece and Turkey have seemingly varied between cold and hostile. Despite the fact that the two countries lived peacefully side-by-side throughout the 1930s and 1940s,<sup>1</sup> the emergence of the question of Cyprus as an issue in the mid-1950s quickly brought the two countries into diplomatic conflict and much of the goodwill which had developed between the two governments was lost as Athens and Ankara worked to secure a solution on the basis of the interests of their respective communities on the island. Although Cyprus was granted independence in 1960, Greece and Turkey continued, by virtue of the Cypriot constitution,<sup>2</sup> to be involved in the affairs of the island and came close to conflict on several occasions over political developments on the island.<sup>3</sup> In July 1974, a major war between the two countries was only narrowly averted after Turkey staged an invasion of the island in response to a coup against the Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios, instigated by the Greek military government of the day.

While Cyprus has continued to play a major part in Greek-Turkish relations since 1974, the two countries have also faced a number of bilateral differences,

most notably over a range of issues in the Aegean. For its part, Ankara has identified a number of areas of contention, such as territorial waters and airspace. Greece rejects these disputes, and recognises the issue of the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf as the only legitimate point of contention.<sup>4</sup> The argument that there are significant oil reserves in the Aegean Sea has, however, made this issue particularly important, and the dispute led Athens and Ankara to the verge of military engagement in 1976 and 1987.

Although there have been attempts to address these differences over the years, little has been achieved. While the question of Cyprus continues to remain in the hands of the United Nations (UN), and is essentially regarded as being a matter to be solved by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot political leaderships, and therefore not a direct Greek-Turkish issue, it nevertheless has a significant role in shaping Greek-Turkish relations. As far as bilateral disputes are concerned, a number of attempts have been made to find solutions, all of which have met with little success. Prior to the current process of rapprochement, the most noteworthy attempt by the governments of Greece and Turkey to improve relations was the Davos process, initiated in January 1988, as a direct result of the 1987 Aegean crisis. The most notable success of this process was the signing of the *Memorandum of Understanding*, which set out a framework of interaction in the Aegean. At the same time, it led to the initiation of regular contacts between the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, Andreas Papandreu (the father of George Papandreu) and Turgut Özal. However, the Davos process was brought to an end in 1991, when a new government led by Constandinos Mitsotakis in Greece stated that Cyprus, rather than bilateral differences, should be the primary focus of attention in bilateral relations, and that no overall improvement could take place without a solution to the island's continued division.<sup>5</sup>

Even in the light of almost five decades of poor relations between Greece and Turkey, the years 1996-1999 were shrouded in particular tension and mistrust. In January 1996, a major crisis developed between the two countries when Turkey laid claim to the small islet of Imia (known as Kardak in Turkish) in the eastern Aegean. Athens rejected the claim, and a military standoff rapidly developed. On this occasion, a direct conflict was averted at the last minute by the intervention of the United States, which managed to broker an agreement for the two sides to disengage their military forces from around the islet and effectively 'agree to disagree' over the status of Imia.<sup>6</sup> Over the course of the following eighteen months, relations improved a little, helped by a meeting of the Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis and the Turkish President Süleyman Demirel at the NATO summit meeting in Madrid in July 1997. However, just six months later, a train of events began which brought any hope of an improvement of Greek-Turkish relations to a grinding halt.

The decision of the EU, at the European Council summit in Luxembourg in December 1997, to set as a condition for Turkish entry an improvement of Ankara's relations with Athens, did not lead to more cordial ties, as many had hoped, but, in fact, only served to heighten tensions between the neighbours. Steadfastly insisting that it would not accept conditions that were more stringent,

or wider ranging, than those applied to other potential candidates for EU entry, Ankara made it clear that it would not fall into line and make what it considered to be concessions to its neighbour. During this period, it appeared that Turkey was consciously trying to assert its unwillingness to be seen to be making concessions by taking an even stronger stance than usual *vis-à-vis* Athens so as to ensure that it would not be seen to be giving in to EU demands.

Concurrently with the Luxembourg Summit, the question of the deployment of Russian made S-300 missiles in Cyprus generated a new, more dangerous, and militaristic dimension to the Greek-Turkish relationship. Almost immediately after the January 1997 decision of the (Greek Cypriot) government of Cyprus to order the Russian made anti-aircraft missiles as part of its Joint Defence Doctrine with Greece,<sup>7</sup> Turkey responded by stating that it would not allow the presence of these missiles in Cyprus and would take all measures, military if necessary, to ensure that they would not be deployed. Over the next months, there were regular bouts of speculation about what would happen if the missiles arrived and there were a number of efforts made by the international community to persuade all the parties concerned to step back from their respective positions. By August 1998, the situation was ready to come to a head. Turkey's restatement of its position led to serious debate in Athens about the consequences of continued support for the Cypriot government's decision to buy the missiles. Following considerable internal debate, the government of Prime Minister Simitis made it clear that it felt that the destabilisation of the relationship between Greece and Turkey would do serious harm to Greece's efforts to enter the single European currency and that, given the military difficulties of defending the island in the event of an attack, the missiles should, instead, be deployed in Crete.

Despite the brief easing of tensions following the decision by the government of Cyprus to accept the Greek offer to place the missiles in Crete, things were still to get worse. This time the cause for instability was the leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan. Following his expulsion from Syria in the autumn of 1998, due to military pressure from Turkey, the PKK leader had wandered around Europe looking for asylum. With the support of a number of Greek sympathisers, the PKK leader arrived in Greece in January 1999. Realising the potentially disastrous situation that it had on its hands, the Greek government removed him from the country and placed him in its Embassy in Kenya, while efforts were made to find a safe haven for him in a friendly African state. The Turkish security forces finally captured Öcalan in February, as he left the security of the Greek Embassy compound in Nairobi.

The high profile capture of the PKK leader immediately led to a major diplomatic row between the neighbours as the Turkish government accused Greece of being a state sponsor of terrorism, and Athens responded by highlighting what it saw as Turkey's human rights violations against the Kurdish community. At the level of the two peoples, the effects were just as dramatic. In Turkey there were public demonstrations as thousands took to the streets castigating Greece and declaring it an eternal enemy of the Turkish people. At the same time, the media fanned public feeling by publishing articles stating the 'long

