


ARTS
OF
POWER



*Statecraft and
Diplomacy*

CHAS. W. FREEMAN, JR.

vs *diplomacy*

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CONTENTS

Foreword by <i>Richard H. Solomon</i>	v
Preface	ix
Introduction	3
■ ■ ■	
THE POWER OF THE STATE	7
National Interests and National Concerns	9
National Power	15
Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Operations	23
Political Actions and Measures	33
Cultural Influence	41
The Use of Economic Measures	45
The Nonviolent Use of Military Power	53
The Use of Force	61
■ ■ ■	
DIPLOMATIC MANEUVER	69
Diplomatic Strategy and Tactics	71
Diplomatic Maneuver	77
Diplomatic Negotiation	87

The views expressed in this book are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace
1550 M Street NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20005-1708

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FACE

The art of statecraft and the craft of diplomacy are as old as human civilization. Statecraft is concerned with the application of the power of the state to other states and peoples. Diplomacy applies this power by persuasive measures short of war.

War, which has been much studied by its practitioners, is an element of statecraft. As Sunzi, one of the earliest and greatest students of the art of war, pointed out millennia ago, however, "weapons . . . are not the tools of the enlightened." He stressed that "to win without fighting is best." Through the ages, enlightened statecraft has viewed the resort to force as an exceptional means rather than the normal way by which to attain its ends. Statecraft has preferred the arts of peace to those of war. It recognizes that there are many tools other than weapons with which to change men's minds.

Generals and admirals understand that the fundamental principles of war, like campaign plans, seldom leave the battlefield unwounded by contact with the enemy. Military commanders nonetheless find inspiration in books of professional maxims as they ponder strategy and tactics by which to prevail in combat. From the time of Sunzi, many members of the military profession have attempted to set down the essentials of the art of war for the edification of commanders and as a stimulus to planning by them.

When I entered the profession of diplomacy, I naturally began to look for something similar on international statecraft and diplomacy, directed at statesmen and diplomats. I did not find it. There are, to be sure, a number of renowned works on the

practice of statecraft, such as the Chinese classics, the *Arthashastra* of Kautilya, the didactic sections of the *Shab Namah*, Nizam al-Mulk Tusi's *Siyasat-Namah*, and Machiavelli's *The Prince*, that deal in part or in passing with the arts of power as they are applied between states. But the focus of these books is the art of government, or rulership, not international relations. Similarly, there are many works on the practice of diplomacy, dating from the rise of modern diplomacy half a millennium ago. But few of these books attempt to state principles and fewer still to relate diplomacy to the power of the state it serves. Unlike the modern professions of the law and military science, diplomacy has not developed a case method of instruction. Nor has it matched other professions in the effort to derive principles from cases.

In these circumstances, practitioners of statecraft and diplomacy have been left with a choice between deriving inspiration from their own studies of history or questing for it in academic theories about international relations. (Such theories, while interesting in their own right, are generally so far removed from the world of practitioners as to offer little, if any, stimulus to problem solving.) Yet it is not unreasonable to believe that statesmen and diplomats, like generals and admirals, might—as they make decisions—benefit from a handy means of revisiting the fundamental principles of the arts of power they practice.

The Diplomat's Dictionary, revised and republished by the United States Institute of Peace Press in 1997, was an effort to collect the lore of these arts of power. It may be read, in a sense, as the footnotes to this volume. *The Diplomat's Dictionary* cited observations by practitioners of statecraft and diplomacy in ancient India, China, Greece, and Rome, the Islamic world, and modern Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas, as well as my own observations from professional experience. This book distills those observations and restates them in short essays. They may be read separately or as a whole.

I wrote *Arts of Power* during a year as a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. I am very grateful to the Institute for that year. I also very much appreciate its willingness to

publish this work. What I have written does not in any way purport to represent the views of the United States Institute of Peace. The writing of *Arts of Power* was very much an individual effort, with all the limitations and opportunities for oversights, errors, and omissions that such an effort implies. I hope for the assistance of readers in improving subsequent editions, if there is a demand for them.

INTRODUCTION

States are established to protect the interests and realize the aspirations of those who create them. To these ends, states compete or cooperate with each other. How well they do this determines whether they rise or fall in wealth and power, and whether they pass their days in tranquility or in turmoil. Statecraft translates national interests and concerns into national goals and strategies. It accumulates and applies the power of the state to other states and peoples to achieve these goals and strategies. Statecraft is the strategy of power.

Power is the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others. Power derives from strength and will. Strength comes from the transformation of resources into capabilities. Will infuses objectives with resolve. Strategy marshals capabilities and brings them to bear with precision. Statecraft seeks through strategy to magnify the mass, relevance, impact, and irresistibility of power. It guides the ways the state deploys and applies its power abroad. These ways embrace the arts of war, espionage, and diplomacy. The practitioners of these three arts are the paladins of statecraft. They provide statesmen—the men and women who practice statecraft—with their reach and impact abroad.

The military are the fists of statecraft. War is the ultimate argument of the state. The profession of arms applies violence to intimidate and dominate the decisions of other states and peoples.

Espionage is the sixth sense of the state. Spies are statecraft's hidden eyes, ears, and hands. Spymasters serve statesmen by collecting intelligence and by carrying out their directives in

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140

statecraft



secret. Analysts serve statesmen by relating information to national interests. *presents the work for peace for...*
Diplomacy is the profession of persuasion. Diplomats are statecraft's visible eyes, ears, and hands. They are the voice of their state in foreign lands. They are the peaceable heralds of its power. Statesmen use diplomats to apply this power through overt measures short of war.

To advance national interests, statesmen must discern the hierarchy of such interests and invoke the values that give them force. To build national well-being, preserve domestic tranquility, and ensure freedom from coercion by other states, statesmen must accumulate power for their state. To do this, they must master the elements of power and the means by which it can be applied. To magnify power's effects, statesmen must be able to maneuver their state into positions of strategic advantage. To apply power to other states and peoples, they must be able to use warriors, spies, and diplomats with skill.

Diplomacy is the form that statecraft takes in times of peace. It is the elegantly unbloody arm of strategy in war.

Diplomats work alongside spies and warriors to counsel statesmen and to monitor and guard the interests of their state in relation to others. They harness the power of other states to that of their own in coalitions to promote these interests. They shape the perceptions and actions of other states and peoples. Diplomats contain rivalry between states, harmonize their interests, and build cooperation between them. They erect and operate the framework for their nation's political, economic, cultural, and military interaction with foreigners. Diplomats assist their fellow citizens in international trade, investment, and cultural exchange. They protect the interests of their compatriots abroad.

The task of diplomats is the nonviolent advancement of the political, economic, cultural, and military interests of their state and people. They nurture relations with foreign states that will evoke cooperation or neutrality when war becomes necessary. Diplomats conduct the passage from protest to menace, from dialogue to negotiation, from ultimatum to reprisal, from war

to settlement and reconciliation with other states. They build and tend the coalitions that deter or make war. Diplomats disrupt the alliances of enemies and sustain the passivity of potentially hostile powers. Their activity marks the phase of policy prior to war; it aggregates the power of allies; it helps to set the aims of war; it contrives war's termination; it forms, strengthens, and sustains the peace.

The work of diplomats is thus of vital importance to the wealth, power, and well-being of the nation they serve. Like the arts of war and espionage, diplomacy is a path to safety or to ruin that warrants systematic inquiry by statesmen.

diplomacy: in peace & war!

DIPLOMATIC MANEUVER

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Diplomatic maneuver is the process by which states reposition themselves vis-à-vis other states. They do so to gain strategic advantage in political, economic, or military matters or to forestall developments damaging to their strategic position. There are thirteen basic maneuvers to accomplish this. Each may be carried out by purchase, a negotiated exchange of benefits, or coercion. None may be carried out by unilateral action; each requires actions by two or more states to succeed.

These diplomatic maneuvers are (1) the exaction of concessions from other states; (2) the accommodation or appeasement of other states' demands; (3) the containment and ostracism of adversaries to hamper their achievement of their national objectives; (4) the management of tensions with adversaries through détente; (5) constructive engagement with adversaries to alter their behavior and expand cooperation with them; (6) rapprochement with adversaries and enemies; (7) estrangement from former partners and allies in order to make partners and allies of their adversaries and enemies; (8) the formation and dissolution of ententes, coalitions, and alliances; (9) the achievement and maintenance of a position of monopoly control; (10) the domination of a state or region to the exclusion of others' influence; (11) agreements to practice mutual restraint in the pursuit of unilateral advantage in capabilities; (12) agreements to share power and its benefits; and (13) the use of international regulatory regimes and organizations.

Exaction, Accommodation, and Appeasement

If a state covets and wishes to obtain something controlled by another state, it must persuade or compel the other state to concede what it wants or continue to do without it. It may seek territory, an ethnic minority and its land, the use of bases and facilities, an outlet to the sea, transit rights, natural resources, commodities, markets, technology, or wealth. A state should not demand what it will be unable either to take or to pay for with something of equal value to the state from which it is demanding it. To do so is to court futility and a reputation for fecklessness.

A state may have many motives for desiring concessions from another beyond simply obtaining the item at issue. It may desire to weaken the other state by depriving it of that item, or to preempt still another state's efforts to gain strategic advantage by acquiring or using the item. It may wish to punish another state, to obtain reparations for injuries suffered at its hands, or to compel it to show deference. A state may aspire to a privileged position as the protector of a minority population of compatriots or coreligionists in another state. It may seek to annex the lands of such a minority or to establish them as a friendly buffer state. It may want to extinguish the independence of another state and to annex its entire territory and population.

Confronted by demands of any kind from another state, a state must consider both the long- and short-term consequences of acceding to such exactions. It must weigh the balances of perceived power and fervor between it and the other state with regard to the issues in contention in order to judge whether it can gain most by bargaining or by refusing to do so. If a state decides to negotiate, it must consider what it will require in exchange for meeting the other state's demands. A state seeking to negotiate with another must decide whether it will seek to link still other issues to those originally in contention in an effort to compose a fairer bargain. Such a state should consider whether support from others might strengthen

its position and what price it would have to pay in terms of its other interests to entice others to provide such support. Are there unilateral actions it can take to counter the demands of the other state or to render them moot? Can gaining time enable it to improve its position? Is the matter one on which it will eventually have to yield? If so, can it obtain something in return for an *accommodation* of the other state now that it could not gain if forced to yield to it later?

A state seeking only limited adjustment of the status quo may be appeased by meeting enough of its demands to reduce the sources of tension with it and to curb further ambition on its part for disadvantageous change. Attempted *appeasement* of a state seeking to overthrow or make major alterations in the status quo is, however, more likely to stimulate its appetite for further concessions than to sate it. Before responding to demands from another state, especially one more powerful, a state must therefore assess the other's overall strategy and objectives, as well as the basis for the other's claim. Failure to address the limited demands of a bitterly aggrieved and powerful foreign state can be as dangerous as naively granting concessions to a power with larger ambitions.

Containment, D tente, and Constructive Engagement

A state may seek to dominate other states or to extend its borders and spheres of influence in ways that threaten the vital or strategic interests of other states. It may seek to change the existing international order step-by-step or to do so in a revolutionary manner that is contemptuous of international norms. Whatever their differences on other matters may be, states that benefit from the status quo will share an interest in combining to check the ambitions of another state to overthrow the status quo. This interest can form the basis of a coalition effort to deny an expansionist or revolutionary power opportunities to expand its presence or influence abroad and to counter its efforts to do so. Such *containment* aims at restricting the access of the state that is its target to the benefits of normal

international relationships, at weakening it, and at retarding its efforts to strengthen itself. Containment seeks to erode the potential aggressor's ambition, dull its revolutionary fervor, or change its political complexion through protracted frustration of its goals.

States that are locked in a broadly adversarial relationship may wish to reduce the danger of conflict by diminishing the level of tension between them. Détente is a diplomatic maneuver that accepts the existence of fundamental conflicts of national interests and concerns with an adversary state and seeks to manage rather than to eliminate these conflicts. It rests on the effort to identify common interests that can be used to add stabilizing elements of cooperation to a relationship that, it assumes, will remain essentially antagonistic. The purpose of détente is to give a potential enemy state disincentives to unilateral action, to soften its hostility, and to gain a measure of influence over its decision making. Détente promotes dialogue that can lessen the danger of miscalculation or inadvertent provocation by either side. It does not signal an end to rivalry.

Rivalry can continue even when the state that is the object of détente is a revolutionary power whose ardor for radical change has begun to ebb. In that case, détente can promote the gradual incorporation of such a state into the existing international order by giving it an increasing stake in the stable continuation of that order. By giving such a state practical reasons to cooperate, and by broadening interaction with its government and people, détente can also serve to some extent as an instrument for the subversion of dogmatism. As long as fundamental conflicts of interest with it persist, however, the relationship with such a state will remain basically adversarial.

Conversely, when an adversarial relationship with another state is primarily based on differences in ideology or on a few relatively narrow conflicts of interest, it may be possible to establish a relationship with it in which elements of cooperation gradually come greatly to outweigh elements of competition. Such constructive engagement allows common interests to be pursued with another state, even as sharp differences continue

to exist with it on some issues. The central element of constructive engagement is the conduct of diplomatic dialogue on matters of common strategic concern. This dialogue aims at expanding areas of agreement and cooperation between two formerly estranged states, even as both acknowledge that they have apparently irreconcilable differences on some specific issues. Setting aside such differences allows both sides to work to narrow them. Deferring final resolution of disputes enables experience with the successful pursuit of common interests to create a better context for resolving such disputes.

In its most developed form, constructive engagement may be comprehensive, attempting to connect bureaucracies, institutions, and individuals in both states in a myriad of discrete cooperative programs. The entanglement of a broad range of special interests in common endeavors reduces the vulnerability of the emerging relationship to short-term reversal caused by changes of leadership, political flare-ups, or setbacks on either side. It builds domestic support for the new relationship by spreading awareness of its benefits on both sides. Such engagement is inherently subversive of formerly isolated states. It introduces new ideas and awareness of alternatives to established ways broadly throughout their society. This can sow the seeds of political change.

Rapprochement and Estrangement

Shifting balances of power and perception or the emergence of new issues between states will cause an alert state to reexamine and readjust its existing pattern of foreign relations. Such change may make it beneficial for a state to forge a closer relationship with a former rival. Rapprochement is a process. It begins when states previously hostile to each other express a desire to search for areas of strategic agreement and to resolve conflicts between them. Rapprochement may be intended to build the basis for entente, or merely to add a deterrent element of uncertainty to the strategic calculations of adversaries and potential enemies. Whatever its motive,

3

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