


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UNOFFICIAL DIPLOMATS



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THE GROWING ROLE OF UNOFFICIAL DIPLOMACY

MAUREEN R. BERMAN and JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

IN A SIGNED ARTICLE that appeared on the front page of the *New York Times* of January 19, 1959, former President Harry S. Truman strongly denounced the recent crop of what he labeled "diplomatic tourists"—those individuals who had traveled to Moscow and those who had entertained visiting Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan "with solicitous attention and social glamour resulting in pressure on the White House."

To Truman it was clear that at a time when the West was trying to find out how to deal with the East, "diplomacy by press interview, special audiences or fishing expeditions could only compound an already complicated situation." Noting the considerable difference between negotiations by governments and probing by private individuals for some kind of deal, Truman cautioned that citizens with no official responsibilities who engage in diplomatic activities should first understand that only the President makes foreign policy; he cannot delegate or share this responsibility, nor can others assume it. Moreover,

... until the President of the United States decides what our foreign policy is and says what it is and stays with it, any statements or declarations made by diplomatic tourists serve no useful purpose in our relations with the Communist world.

I would caution some of our well-meaning, self-appointed, self-assumed peace-makers to be careful lest they forget, in their ardor, that the President makes foreign policy, and they may inadvertently lend themselves to the propaganda purposes of our adversaries. . . .

While critical of diplomatic activities of private citizens, Truman had high praise for the expanding network of exchanges of various groups between the two countries and also expressed pleasure that top Soviet officials had accorded interviews to so many U.S. businessmen, writers, journalists, and political leaders visiting the Soviet Union. "Any new information that came out of those interviews was certainly a net gain," Truman wrote, but he added the following cautionary words: "I do feel that in some interviews those who are not journalists have lent themselves unwittingly to maneuverers of the Kremlin to appeal to our people over the heads of government."

Although the political climate has greatly changed since the cold war years in which Truman wrote, we have quoted extensively from his article because many of the arguments advanced by professional diplomats—and highly placed responsible statesmen like himself—in opposition to the "meddling" of outsiders in what they consider government business remain in use today.

At best, Truman felt, the intervention by nonprofessionals might complicate a difficult situation; at worst, amateur excursions into diplomacy would benefit our adversaries. To the office of the Presidency falls the responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy, and statements by "diplomatic tourists" not only serve no useful purpose; they might, in Truman's opinion, play into the hands of other governments.

Truman's self-protective argument against the intervention of individuals holding no governmental responsibility in foreign affairs was nothing new. Governments, including that of the United States, dislike meddling; as early as 1799, in fact, Congress, at President John Adams' behest, passed a law that made it illegal for any United States citizen without authorization to "directly or indirectly commence or carry on any correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, with intent to influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government or of any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States."¹

¹ U.S. Code, Title 18, Ch. 45, sec. 953, known as the Logan Act. For more on the Logan Act, see pages 31-33.

In 1798, the year before the law was enacted and after diplomatic relations with France had been severed by the United States, Dr. George Logan, a Philadelphia Quaker and eminent Jeffersonian, traveled to France on a mission of peace carrying a letter of introduction from Jefferson. Logan had interviews with Talleyrand and members of the Directory (who had refused to receive the members of President Adams' official mission) and returned to the United States with word of the French desire to renew relations. The Federalists were infuriated with the good doctor, and they passed the law that has taken Logan's name.

Professional resistance to the meddling of outsiders, although not initiated by President Truman, was given an air of urgency by him. What emerges clearly from Truman's article, although it is unexpressed, is his awareness that by the second half of the twentieth century the circumstances in which international diplomacy is carried on have considerably changed. Advances in communication and transportation have made it easier for private citizens acting alone or attached to nongovernmental organizations to become involved in the conduct of interstate relations. Although throughout history private individuals like Dr. Logan have made uninvited—or sometimes invited—excursions into diplomacy, private citizens can now to a degree never before true inform themselves on the foreign policies of their own and other governments, visit and entertain the leaders of foreign governments, suggest new policy positions or probe for changes in policy during those meetings, bring back feelers for policy changes, and then publicize the results of those meetings to large numbers of people through the news media.

Also altering the conduct of international diplomacy is the increased capacity of governments to inform not only their own population but citizens of other countries on foreign and domestic policies. At the same time government foreign policy and actions in many countries are more accessible to public scrutiny and criticism.

Another change is that it is perhaps less true than ever before that politics stops at water's edge. Once a line separating national and international systems was widely accepted, but in the 1970s

recognition has grown that the imaginary boundary is becoming increasingly fuzzy. Now it is quite clear that there is an interrelationship between domestic political processes and what goes on abroad, and indeed it is often impossible to separate what goes on at home from what goes on abroad.

One other change is that increasingly private citizens attempt to influence not only their own government's policies, but also those of foreign governments.²

Recognizing that these developments were bound to affect the centuries-old practice of having relations carried on only by designated envoys of governments, Truman thought it important to warn of the dangers inherent in the conduct of interstate relations by other than accredited diplomats through other than official diplomatic channels. This is not to say that professional diplomats no longer are responsible for the conduct of most interstate relations; they are. Nor is this meant to imply that the majority of interstate business is no longer conducted through normal diplomatic channels; it is. Yet beginning after World War II and burgeoning in the international system of the 1970s, an increasing proportion of international interactions bypasses, complements, or supplements traditional bilateral procedures.

Nations may communicate or try to begin to communicate on many different fronts. These efforts—some official, some private—may overlap and reinforce one another. In other instances they may be contradictory. Part of the action is now carried on through new multilateral arrangements: the United Nations and its worldwide system of specialized agencies and programs, regional groupings, and various international organizations. Governments may also communicate through private individuals, or their representatives may meet in unofficial gatherings sponsored by nongovernmental groups.

Despite Truman's wariness of diplomatic amateurs, a number of private efforts, particularly those beginning in the late 1950s and

² For an extensive analysis of the confluence of national and international factors as they affect the external behavior of nations, see James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 95-149.

early 1960s in the area of arms control, contributed to the improved climate of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. In many of these efforts there was close cooperation between officials and those acting unofficially. Individuals were used to carry messages between the two governments, and in unofficial meetings Soviet and American policy-makers, or persons close to them, could probe for possible new positions or send out feelers about changes that might be possible.

The intent of some of the individuals who initiate private efforts is to prepare the way for intergovernmental action, and often they act with the blessing or at least the knowledge of officials of governments or international organizations. When it suits their purposes governments may support and use private channels. Sometimes nongovernmental actions that are privately initiated and sustained may be viewed with suspicion and regarded by officials, as they were by Truman, as the work of unwelcome meddlers. Private citizens may try to modify or even reverse the official policy lines of their own or foreign governments. Whether they are blessed or unsanctioned, supportive or contradictory to government policies, will in large measure determine how officials respond to private efforts.

We refer to the range of private international relations as "unofficial diplomacy." Within this category fall many different kinds of participants, as well as a variety of channels and approaches. It should be made clear that our concern is not with domestic groups that work to influence only their own government, but with individuals and groups who have contact with private citizens or government officials from other countries as well as with their own government. Furthermore, no effort is made in this volume to deal with cases involving multinational corporations or other commercial ventures.

Unofficial diplomacy does not supplant official diplomacy, either bilateral or multilateral. Although new entities have multiplied on the international scene in recent years, states remain the most important actors in international politics—by their decisions policies are maintained and changed. Many international organizations and some nongovernmental entities, however, influence the policies of

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governments, and they are becoming an ever more important factor in international politics.

Each chapter in this volume describes a linkage between governmental and nongovernmental elements: governments interact through private citizens or by having their representatives communicate through channels arranged by nongovernmental personnel; a number of these channels are examined in Part One. The supplemental functions that unofficial diplomats perform are aimed at preparing the way for or facilitating the conduct of interstate relations. Unofficial diplomacy may set the stage for official actions and contribute to the possibilities of success once matters are taken up in normal diplomatic channels. In Part Two the special role played by private efforts in time of international conflict is detailed, while Part Three considers some special approaches to particular international problems. Usually these enterprises serve more than one function.

When official channels are blocked or inflexible, governments may move to alternate channels or seek alternate messengers. If the opportunities for quiet communication through formal channels are limited, and governments want to try out new positions without risking commitment or arousing public sentiment, then they may find it necessary to move to private channels. Governments may use private persons to explore new positions. They risk little for these individuals may be disavowed at any time.

The kinds of private efforts detailed in the cases in this volume are not those intended to influence government policy-makers at home and abroad by capturing newspaper headlines, but those aimed at reaching key decision-makers. To overcome the natural distrust of officials, private individuals must demonstrate compelling reasons why governments should "use" them or work with them. Factors determining their saliency might be: a recognized competence in an area of specialization, the prominence of the individual involved, or the prestige of a nongovernmental group that has established an authoritative basis for its work. In some instances, unofficial diplomats may be well-connected because of previous service in government positions, or else may know personally key decision-makers. If government policy-makers seek out

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specific individuals or private channels, which they sometimes do, it is a pretty good indication that the unofficial diplomats have already established salience as deserving the trust and confidence of decision-makers. The creation of contacts, salience, and trust are the first requirements for successful private efforts.

It is clear that what private individuals or organizations can accomplish is different from what the representatives of governments or international organizations can do—the former can neither make threats nor offer promises. In terms of the resources that government officials control—money, armies, economies—they are feeble. Nevertheless, sometimes alone, other times in concert with official efforts, private initiatives may contribute to the alleviation of problems in communication that may result whenever different nations speak or conduct their relations. By providing auxiliary channels of communication, by serving as intermediaries between governments, by performing various third-party functions, including negotiating and mediating in conflict situations, and by contributing to a climate in which policy-makers can usefully work, private citizens may augment and facilitate official diplomacy.

Adam Curle, writing of the work of the private diplomat, whom he defines as someone who engages in mediation or conciliation of conflict under personal or unofficial auspices, makes it clear he is not describing bumbling amateurs impelled by purely good intentions, but individuals who are as "subtle and experienced as the average public diplomat, although not necessarily in quite the same way, and as well informed, not in the sense of having access to intelligence reports, but in the sense of knowing the people or comparable situations elsewhere, and perhaps in addition, having a high degree of academic competence. . . ." Acting privately the unofficial diplomat has no official base to give weight to his words and he must cultivate in government officials an acceptance of the legitimacy of his actions. It takes special skills and credibility to be effective under these circumstances.

It will soon be readily apparent that privacy and confidentiality

³ Adam Curle, *Making Peace* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1971), p. 231.

are elements essential to the success of many of these efforts. It is in the nature of probes that in order to be effective they often need to be carried on without fanfare, for publicity can jeopardize the entire operation. The authors in this volume have been able to "go public" because they do not compromise ongoing efforts. Some of the approaches—or those similar to them—have been used in other situations, and others are in the planning stages. Still others we may never know about given the necessity of secrecy if private channels are to be effective and, perhaps more important, used again.

The cases that are presented in this volume are only a sample of the wide variety of approaches that have been developed and used in a number of international situations by individuals from the United States and other countries. In no way are they meant to represent a complete catalogue of such activities.

Moreover, most of the cases deal with security issues of peace and war, although it should be noted that the role of nongovernmental groups in economic and social affairs as described in the section to follow is growing in extent and significance; since World War II this role has become to a great degree institutionalized and in many ways is linked to changes in the international system in the past twenty years.

The Conduct of Diplomacy in the 1970s

Diplomacy has been viewed by students and practitioners as the oldest method states have employed for conducting their relations peacefully with other states. Ideas rather than blows are exchanged, policies are explained, and differences of opinion are accommodated rather than fought over. Through the years, the forms and methods of diplomacy had become remarkably similar around the globe. For the better part of four centuries, the professionals who conducted diplomacy were, in Kenneth Thompson's words, "a small group of leaders who spoke the same language, catered as often to one another as to their own people, and played

to one another's strengths and weaknesses."⁴ This brand of diplomacy evolved in a Western world made up of sparsely populated, separated states whose governments spoke on behalf of the state—the people scarcely counted before 1789—and who held a near monopoly on information and communication with other governments. Due to an enormous increase in the number of actors, both national and non-national (and in the number of cultures they represent), and to a complicated array of international issues, the international system of the 1970s—and the practice of international diplomacy—have grown increasingly complex.

The Actors

In traditional representations of the international system, which customarily portray interstate relations as the only significant ones, only slight attention is paid to nongovernmental activity. In this widely accepted image of the international system, which Arnold Wolfers called the "billiard-ball" model, the international community is composed only of states, each of which "represents a closed, impermeable and sovereign unit, completely separated from all other states."⁵

The political reality today, however, is that the interactions of governments are only one level of international relations.⁶ One student who stresses that fact is John Burton, whose conception of world society—he shies away from use of the term international relations because in his view it represents a system made up of

⁴ Kenneth W. Thompson, *Christian Ethics and the Dilemmas of Foreign Policy* (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1959), pp. 81–82.

⁵ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 3–24.

⁶ For a detailed discussion of the multiple levels of interaction in the international system of the 1970s, see Donald J. Puchala and Stuart I. Fagan, "International Politics in the 1970s: The Search for Perspective," *International Organization* (Spring 1974), 28:247–66. See also J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System: Theoretical Essays* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 77–92.

The senior editor of this volume once proposed in the early 1950s only half-facetiously that a prize be offered for the invention of a word that would describe the present world system as accurately as Bentham's invention of "international" described the system of his day.

—Thompson, *Discord and Collaboration*, pp. 10 + 5. 13

states alone—is one composed of many systems of interactions, not just those among states. Among others are communication, tourism, trade, and science. Taken together and superimposed one on the other, the various systems form a cobweb image. World society is a series of overlapping systems and transactions on many levels—domestic and international, governmental and nongovernmental.⁷ These levels are not always distinct and indeed may be confused. If we were to posit an official/unofficial continuum, on one end would be traditional bilateral relations and intergovernmental organizations, while on the other side would be nongovernmental organizations composed of private citizens. In between there are institutions that are partly governmental and nongovernmental, and others that are nongovernmental in membership but working very closely with governments.

Complicating the picture of the international system of the 1970s is the great increase in the number—and even in the kinds—of units or actors that initiate actions affecting the international system. Not only has the number of sovereign states skyrocketed—by 1975 the total had reached 150—but there are also nonstate international entities whose activities sustain the international system.

International Organizations

Part of the complexity of official international relations results from the impressive growth in numbers and importance of international intergovernmental organizations. The ranks of these organizations have increased at the rate of several dozen per year,⁸ and perhaps of greater significance is the fact that their position has been enhanced, both as vehicles through which much interstate business is conducted and as semi-independent actors. The quantitative evidence now available suggests, moreover, that an increasing volume of diplomatic transactions is conducted through such organizations.⁹

⁷ John Burton et al, *The Study of World Society: A London Perspective* (Pittsburgh, International Studies Association Occasional Paper # 1, 1973).

⁸ Puchala and Fagan, "International Politics in the 1970s," p. 252.

⁹ Donald J. Puchala, "International Transactions and Regional Integration," *International Organization* (Autumn 1970), 24:759–62.

One factor contributing to the growth of international organizations in the 1970s—and to the significant complications in the conduct of interstate business—is the emergence of issues that transcend frontiers of national interest and action. While in the past most matters were handled entirely through bilateral channels, today there are numerous crucial issues that require the action and consent of many nations to effect solutions.

It is true that nations have always been to some degree interdependent by virtue of occupying the same planet, yet issues have emerged in the past ten years that to varying extents affect all nations, and whose solutions are beyond the reach of unilateral or even bilateral action. They have not replaced the issues of 1945 but are added to them. Security, nuclear proliferation, trade, territorial issues, and old problems of war and peace remain important today, yet linked to them in complicated arrays are issues of economic interdependence, resource shortages, and environmental control.

The clear distinctions that used to be drawn between the "high politics" of security and war and the "low politics" of economic and other nonsecurity issues appear of limited value in understanding what goes on in world politics today.¹⁰ Since 1973 key economic issues have been high-priority agenda items in UN General Assemblies once focused primarily on issues of security and war. Moreover, in crises such as that created by the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, economic and political issues are closely related.

The oil embargo of October 1973 brought to a head the question of the relationship between the developed and developing worlds. The General Assembly scheduled the Seventh Special Session on Development and International Cooperation for Sep-

¹⁰ See on this point, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 378–79; and Stanley Hoffman, "International Organization and the International System," *International Organization* (Summer 1970), 24:401.

Richard Barnet observes that in the nuclear age, since territorial expansion has declined as a means to promote national security, distinctions between economic and non-economic reasons to go to war have blurred: "The increasing economic interdependence of the globe and the increasing dependence of military machines on high technology and scarce mineral resources mean that national security is more than ever dependent upon the state of the economy." See *Roots of War* (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 160.

tember 1975 and gave it a mandate to consider "new concepts and options [for] the solution of world economic problems, in particular those of developing countries." The continuing "North/South" dialogue between rich and poor countries has been carried on in a number of international frameworks including the United Nations and its agencies and at the Paris-based Conference on International Economic Cooperation composed of eight industrial and nineteen developing countries. The Seventh Special Session opened the way for the Paris talks set up outside the UN system and where negotiations may go on for years to come on issues of energy and development.¹¹

Economic and social issues have given rise to other new international organizations and frameworks in the 1970s. Special conferences on a range of issues in which all nations are involved have been organized in the UN system, among them the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the Conference on Population in Bucharest in 1974, the World Food Conference in Rome in 1974, the 1975 conference held in Mexico City in connection with International Women's Year, and the Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat) held in Canada in 1976, as well as more specialized meetings such as those on the Law of the Sea and the Conference on Crime. New international mechanisms to deal with a number of the major economic and social issues confronting the world grew out of these meetings.

The United Nations and other multilateral arrangements may provide the setting for discreet, exploratory talks, as well as the more formal public dealings. In the corridors, in the dining rooms, and in the lounges of the United Nations, quiet diplomacy goes on. One delegate remarked that, "There is nothing like an unobtrusive face-to-face talk to get diplomatic business done. There is no other place in the world that offers so many opportunities for

¹¹For a comprehensive review of the evolving "North/South" dialogue, see Branislav Gosovic and John G. Ruggie, "On the Creation of a New International Economic Order: Issue Linkage and the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly," *International Organization* (Spring 1976), 30:309-46. Experts from a number of developing countries express their views in *Beyond Dependency* (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1975).

this kind of work as New York in the fall."¹² When they are speaking for-the-record in open meetings, delegates have to be very careful. In more relaxed official settings, they may have more freedom to speak and to shade meanings, yet they are still representatives and accountable for what they say. In unofficial gatherings they may feel freer yet to speak frankly of problems at home and of other difficulties.

Nongovernmental International Actors *M60*

Also complicating the international picture are the nongovernmental entities that have since 1945 experienced phenomenal growth in number and range. The word "transnational" has been widely adopted to deal with the great variety of nongovernmental international interactions.¹³ Transnational actors are as diverse as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, multinational businesses, and international professional associations. Some of these, like the foundations, have headquarters in one nation and operations in many countries. Others, like international professional associations, are truly international institutions with citizens of more than one country gathering for annual, biennial, or triennial congresses to discuss the state of their professions or their particular interests. International professional associations include the International Congress of Scientific Unions, the International Political Science Association, the International Association of Universities, the International Chess Federation, to name but a few. These transnational actors all have official contacts—some with international governmental organizations through their affiliation with UNESCO, and others with states—in the sense that all, or at least most of them, make proposals for national legislation to promote an interest or interests of the profession or even for international multilateral action. Although these transnational associations work through of-

¹²Paul Hofmann, "In the UN Lounges, Urgent Diplomacy is Conducted," *New York Times*, October 13, 1975.

¹³For a detailed examination of transnational phenomena, see Keohane and Nye, eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics*.

official channels to achieve their objectives, to a certain extent their operations elude governmental control.¹⁴

Although nongovernmental groups have always been active in international affairs, it is not an exaggeration to say that prior to the end of the second world war, only a limited number of individuals outside the realm of government had contact with individuals, let alone officials of other nations.¹⁵ International bankers and businessmen, a few manufacturing and mining company executives who sought raw materials or markets in foreign countries, missionaries, members of international sports federations, some labor leaders, members of international political and religious movements, and the Roman Catholic Church about exhaust the list of those who engaged in any considerable degree in international activities. A small number of these were influential in world politics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Transnational political movements—anarchism, socialism, and Zionism—the international labor movement, and peace and humanitarian groups were having an impact on government policies in a number of states. Transnational organizations, such as the International Peace and Arbitration Association located in London and the Interparliamentary Union formed in Berlin in 1888, labored to influence governments to settle disputes peacefully and to abolish war.¹⁶

Government and private business enterprises began to collaborate closely on economic policy in this period as well. As a result of

¹⁴ For an analysis of the impact and growth of international professional associations, see William M. Evan, "MNCs and IPAs: An International Organization Research Frontier," *International Associations* (Union of International Associations, Brussels) (February 1972), 24:90-101.

¹⁵ James A. Field, Jr. examines the scope of transnational activities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in "Transnationalism and the New Tribe," in Keohane and Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, pp. 3-23.

¹⁶ Just at the turn of the century, in the summer of 1898, Czar Nicholas II of Russia issued a call to the nations of the world to join in a conference for the limitation of armaments. As the capital of a neutral country, The Hague was selected as the site for the conference that opened on May 18, 1899. In addition to the official participants, among those present at The Hague were observers from unofficial groups such as the American and French Peace Societies. Not only were observers from the Peace Societies present at the second Hague conference in 1907; the socialists, anarchists, and Zionists all held their international congresses in Amsterdam during the conference. Their presence did not go unnoticed by the official conveners and in fact provoked anxiety about public reaction if the conference

the growing recognition of common interests, the international business movement organized a meeting at Liege, Belgium, in 1905—the first International Congress of Chambers of Commerce and Commercial and Industrial Associations. The movement steadily grew and at its international congress held in Paris in 1914, influential businessmen from all leading countries participating adopted a constitution that called for the creation of an executive council and secretariat to carry out the policies formulated at the biennial congresses for common action to protect and expand business interests and "to secure harmony of action on all international questions affecting commerce and industry and to promote peace."¹⁷

War broke out two months after the Paris conference, and the creation of a permanent international business organization had to wait. But soon after the war businessmen from the Allied countries of Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, and the United States met in Atlantic City in 1919 and in Paris in 1920 on the matter of establishing a permanent organization and on the pressing issue of the day—postwar reconstruction.

While the International Chamber of Commerce was one of the few transnational organizations of its day—nonprofit institutions in which citizens of at least two different countries are represented, at least one of whom is not an agent of government or an intergovernmental organization—today it is estimated there are between 2,500 and 3,000 such groups.¹⁸

Not only did traditional images of the international system depict sovereign states as the only actors, they also represented each state as having full command of all people, resources, and goods

should fail to produce significant results. As one delegate observed on the Socialists' presence: "Through the summer the Socialists prowled around The Hague like a cat around a birdcage." See Barbara W. Tuchman, *The Proud Tower* (New York: Bantam Books, 1966), p. 308.

¹⁷ The origins and development of the International Chamber of Commerce in the period 1919-1938 are detailed in George L. Ridgeway, *Merchants of Peace: Twenty Years of Business Diplomacy through the International Chamber of Commerce* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938).

¹⁸ Kjell Skjelsbaek, "The Growth of International Nongovernmental Organizations in the Twentieth Century," in Keohane and Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* p. 72.

within its territory, although this picture did not always square with the empirical reality. Today it is quite clear that no nation has total control over all its people, nor is a government capable of monitoring all the international activities that are initiated from within its borders. The degree of control—and the extent to which nongovernmental groups are free to enter into transnational relations—differs, of course, from nation to nation. In varying degrees individuals and groups within nations may engage in nongovernmental international activities,¹⁹ and a multitude of linkages join governmental and nongovernmental organizations and entities.²⁰ In libertarian democracies private initiatives are the result of personal concerns or the interest of voluntary institutions, while citizens of authoritarian systems, such as the Soviet Union, who are in contact with representatives of private organizations in libertarian democracies are almost always under the ultimate control of official bodies.

Many of the private transnational institutions recently created in which citizens from more than one country are participants—perhaps active in many professions yet sharing a concern in a particular policy subject—are concerned with issues previously dealt with almost exclusively by governments.²¹ Some of these have as their participants or members not only private citizens but officials of various kinds (legislators, government executives, and even high policy-makers) acting in a private capacity, and they may closely cooperate with official institutions.

¹⁹ Karl Kaiser links the spectacular growth of transnational relations with the increasing accessibility of liberal Western societies to the outside world, of which he cites the growth of international investment, trade and movement of persons as evidence. See *Europe and the United States: The Future of the Relationship* (New York: Aspen Institute, 1973), p. 3.

²⁰ One of the linkages joining nongovernmental and governmental entities involved in international activities is that individuals frequently move in and out of official positions, maintaining contacts and relations with personnel active in official and unofficial institutions. The Fall 1976 issue of *Trialogue*, a publication of the transnational organization, the Trilateral Commission, reported that three members of the Commission since its creation in 1973 were now serving or about to serve in high government positions in trilateral countries: U.S. President-elect Jimmy Carter, Vice-President-elect Walter Mondale, and French Prime Minister Raymond Barre. The prominence of some of the participants in the meetings of the Trilateral Commission and other similar institutions has led to criticism from some who fear they may exert too much influence on policy-makers.

²¹ Two notable organizations established before 1945 whose members engaged in international activities were the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) founded in Honolulu, Hawaii

One such institution is the Trilateral Commission formed in 1973 by private citizens of Western Europe, Japan, and North America to foster closer cooperation among these three regions on common problems. In the June 16, 1975 issue of *Newsweek* magazine, Robert Christopher reported on the plenary meeting of the Commission held in Kyoto, Japan, May 30 to 31, 1975.²² He wrote of the theme which "loomed largest" in the Kyoto discussions:

Somehow the present international system must be changed so as to accommodate in some degree the increasingly insistent demands of the poor nations for a greater share of the world's wealth and power. . . . The movers and shakers gathered in Kyoto had found themselves largely in agreement in their diagnosis of the world's central political problem. As a group, they were in a rare position to press this diagnosis on the world's policy-makers. Any diagnosis, after all, is a necessary preliminary to any cure.

The Trilateral Commission works closely with public international agencies and national governments—while in Japan the group met with then Prime Minister Takeo Miki, and Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa gave the concluding conference address—and the linkages between the organization and international and national governing bodies are extensive. Members of the Trilateral Commission are prominent, well-connected individuals, many

in 1925 and the Institute of International Law (IIL) which celebrated its one hundredth anniversary in 1973. The organizers of the IPR hoped that Western understanding of Asia would be improved by bringing together leaders of different nations for unofficial discussions of their differences. By the mid-50s the U.S. leadership of the IPR was defending itself against charges of cooperation with Communism by the McCarran Committee and Senator Joseph McCarthy. See John N. Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974).

The essential conception of the IIL composed of approximately 120 member jurists from 40 countries in every region of the world is that an international body of highly qualified jurists acting independently of government would be able to contribute significantly to the formulation of principles and rules of international law. Many institute members play active and indeed leading roles in official international and national bodies concerned with international law. See Oscar Schachter, "Institut de Droit International. The Role of the Institute of International Law and Its Methods of Work—Today and Tomorrow," *Tribune de Geneve* (June 1973), pp. 2-3.

²² The activities and the membership of the Trilateral Commission are reported on in its numerous publications. For a report of the Kyoto Conference prepared by the North American segment of the commission, see *Trialogue*, no. 7 (Summer 1975).



